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Question Thirteen
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QUESTION THIRTEEN Is passive potency divided into ex qua and in qua? Is passive potency divided into de qua (or ex qua) and in qua? [Arguments pro and con] 1 [1] It seems not: ‘De qua’ is the same as ‘in qua,’ as is evident, and the converse is also true. Proof: if some potency of the ‘in which’ [in qua] becomes a potency ‘from which’ [de or ex qua], whereas another does not, we must assume that matter is in some way a principle of this or that form. Hence, with respect to some form it would have to have a functional relationship other than that of a mere receptacle. But there seems to be nothing present in such cases except matter (or something assumed to be a part of the form, an assumption we rejected earlier in the question of Bk. VII on seminal reasons). 1 2 To the contrary: Since all matter serves as the receptacle of its form, it would follow [if one were to deny this distinction] that the matter of air is related in the same way to the fire-form, and that to an organic body is related in the same way to an intellective soul [as it is to the form of corporeity] or also that air [has a special affinity for transmitting] light [that earth does not]. Then there would be no point in saying that only certain forms are educed from the potency of matter or from the passive principle, whereas others are not. And it would be a waste of time to inquire which ones are and which are not so [educible]—which runs counter to the common [scientific] opinion and contradicts the Philosopher, 2 according to whom, it would seem, the intellect comes from without [and cannot be educed from the potentiality of matter]. 1 Cf. supra Bk. VII, q. 12, nn. 32-44. 2 Aristotle, De generatione animalium II, ch. 3, 736b 28-29: “Relinquitur autem intellectum solum deforis advenire et divinum esse solum”; Auctoritates Aristotelis, ed. J. Hamesse, p. 224: “Solus intellectus est in nobis ab extrinseco, quia ipse solus est divinus.” 558 THE METAPHYSICS OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS [I.—TO THE QUESTION] 3 [2] As for the [adequacy] of the division we are inquiring about, namely concerning ‘de qua’ and ‘in qua,’ we must maintain the following. In any subject or passive principle whatsoever, whether matter or [composite] subject, the relationship which such a [material] principle bears to that which is composed of it and [some form or] act, is like the ‘out-of-which’ [ex quo] such a composite exists or can exist. Hence this relationship can be called the very being of the ‘potency de qua.’ 4 But that relationship which such a [material] principle has to the act [or form] with which it serves to constitute the composite, is the relationship of ‘potency in qua.’ For matter [in its essence contains] nothing of the act itself that primarily exists in it [qua subject] for if it did, the act [or form] would not be in it primarily [qua form] but would only be there as a part [of the matter, rather than as a part of the composite]. Only matter, however, is the proper receptacle of form, and therefore is only ‘in qua,’ not ‘ex qua.’ 5 But the third relationship matter possess, namely to the agent, can be called the aspect of ‘potency in quam,’ according to what the author of On the Six Principles 3 holds about the agent requiring ‘something in which’ it can act. And this ‘in which it is’ is not the ‘that which the agent produces,’ whether this be the product or composite as such, or that by which this [composite] is produced, namely, the form. 6 Interpreted in this fashion, the aforesaid distinction of ‘ex quo,’ ‘in quo’ and ‘in quod,’ corresponds to the three relations in the passive principle to their respective termini, and to that extent the distinction is appropriate. But the distinction is out of place if matter is compared exclusively to any one of these three termini. For each relationship refers exclusively to its own term. Several relationships never concur with respect to the same term, as is clear to anyone who considers the arguments for such. For how, in relation to the selfsame passive component, is something both the form and the agent? Or secondly, how is it both what is active and 3 Liber sex principiorum ch. 2, n...