Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle

Question Nine

QUESTION NINE Could anything whatsoever be the term of an active potency? Fourth, it is asked: “Could anything whatsoever be the term of an active potency?” [Arguments pro and con] 1 [1] It seems so: At least in regard to creatures. For whatever there is, at some past time it did not exist; therefore, it came to be from some agent. 2 Also, it seems that in the divine (as regards the Persons produced, at least) there is some active potency that is generative as regards the Son and that is [active] spiration as regards the Holy Spirit. 3 In favor of the opposite: There is the fact that the terminus of an active potency seems to be something that results from a per se agent to which that potency belongs; chance events do not stem from a per se cause. 4 Also, it is evident about God, for just as in the case of material causes, the first is not itself caused materially, so also in the class of efficient causes the first agent is not of itself the terminus of an active potency. [I. —TO THE QUESTION] 5 [2] To the question this must be said. That something exists after being non-existent becomes intelligible only if it has its existence from something. But everything other than God exists after being non-existent (it is not necessary to go into the proof for this here). It is evident that every such thing has existence from something, and thus is the terminus of some active potency. But even if there were something which never had its existence as something new or unprecedented, as long as it did not exist necessarily of itself, it would still need to have existence, perhaps, from something. (About this matter see what follows in the question on sempiternity of the 534 THE METAPHYSICS OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS world, whether this be possible or not). 1 As some beings have existence from God immediately, while certain others receive it from secondary causes, some things are termini of the divine active potency alone, whereas other are termini of both secondary active potencies and of [God’s] active potency simultaneously, if the whole effect of a secondary cause stems effectively from the first [cause]. 6 Now since God, however, is necessarily existing of himself, he is not a terminus of an active potency, properly speaking, according to those who define such a potency as that which requires for its terminus some producible nature existing in some absolute supposit [or person]. For the divine nature is not produced, and although the relative supposit [or divine person of the Son and Holy Spirit] may be produced within the divine nature by this production whereby that nature is communicated [to the Son and Holy Spirit]. 7 Whether this [begetting of the Son and spiration of the Holy Spirit] occurs by means of something that is truly an active potency or not, cannot be learned from creatures, because no such instance of it exists there. Perhaps, communicating the same nature would seem to be a more perfect form of acting than producing another nature would be. Also, according to Bk. I of the Metaphysics, 2 the individual supposit seems to be the primary terminus or end-result of a production. If the first [i.e. the production of the person or supposit] could stand without the second [i. e. the production of a nature], then whatever is proper to what depends upon the first [such as action or active potency] would also seem to stand. But as this is not the place to discuss such things, since they are profound theological matters, we can by-pass them here. 8 If the question, however, is to be understood of an immanent action and its terminus (not who or what is produced by it, but that ‘about which’ [circa quam] it is, which terminus is also called its ‘object’), then it is evident that any being whatsoever is the term of such an action, because [every] being is intelligible and every being can be loved. [II.—REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS] 1 Perhaps Scotus intended to treat of this in Bk. XII; cf. Duns Scotus, Lectura II, d. 1, nn. 90-154 (XVIII, 29-51); Ordinatio II, d. 1, nn. 95-178 (VII, 50-91). 2 Aristotle, Metaphysics I, ch. 1, 981a 24. BOOK IX QUESTION NINE 535 9 The answer...