Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle

Question One

BOOK NINE QUESTION ONE Are act and potency mutually opposed? Are act and potency opposed? 1 [1] It seems not: For act implies potency, because this follows ‘It is, therefore it can be,’ [since] opposite does not hold. 2 This is confirmed because Aristotle, in chapter 3, where he is describing the possible, declares: 1 “A thing is capable of doing something if there will be nothing impossible in its having the actuality of that of which it is said to have the capacity.” Now it is clear that what is actual shares in this definition; therefore it is possible, according to what Aristotle says of potency and the possible. 3 Also, the same supposit 2 cannot be sometimes under one, sometimes under another of two opposites that subdivide a genus, as is evident from the Topics IV 3 in the case of faith and opinion. But potency and act are asserted of the same thing, thus the man in potency is the same as the man in actuality. For what [was] in potency is not something else than what is actual, according to what the Commentator says in Bk. VIII: 4 “The transfer from potency [to act] does not increase a thing as to the multitude [of its parts], but in the perfection of its being.” 1 Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, ch. 3, 1047a 24-26. 2 “Supposit” is the technical term for an individual substance or subject. It is the Latin equivalent of the Greek term for “‘hypostasis.” A ‘rational supposit’ is a person. 3 Aristotle, Topics IV, ch. 5, 125b 35-59: “Secundum haec autem neque fides opinio, contingit enim eandem opinionem et non credentem habere. Non contingeret autem, si fides esset species opinionis; non enim contingit idem amplius permanere, si quidem ex specie omnino permutatum sit, quemadmodum nec idem animal quandoque hominem esse quandoque non.” 4 Averroes, Metaphysics VIII, com. 15 (ed. Iuntina, VIII, f. 105va): “Translatio enim eius non largitur ei multitudinem sed perfectionem in esse.” 456 THE METAPHYSICS OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS 4 Also, one opposite does not perfect another, nor make one thing in combination with it; but act perfects potency and makes up one thing with it, as is clear from Metaphysics VII and VIII. 5 5 Also, those things do not divide something, as opposites, if one of them is equated with the thing divided; ‘act’ however is equated with ‘a being,’ because a being in potency is only a being in a qualified sense; therefore, simply speaking, it is a non-being. 6 To the contrary: In Metaphysics IX ch. 5, 6 we read: “Actuality, then, is the existence of a thing not in the way in which we express by ‘potentiality .’” 7 Also, in his preface to the De anima, 7 the Commentator says: “[Potency and act are differences found in all the categories and] they are greatly opposed.” [QUESTION TWO] Are they opposed relatively? Are they opposed relatively? 8 [1] It seems not: Relatives are by nature simultaneous, but act is simply prior to potency in three ways according to Metaphysics IX, ch. 7, 8 therefore, etc. 9 Also, one is opposed only relatively to one; but not only is one potency opposed to one act, or vice versa, [but] the same potency refers to contrary acts. Hence, in Metaphysics X, ch. 4: 9 “Of the things which fall under the same potency the most different are 5 Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, ch. 13, 1039a 5-8; VIII, ch. 6, 1045a 21-36. 6 Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, ch. 6, 1048a 31-32. 7 Cf. Averroes, De anima I, com. 6 (ed. Crawford, p. 10): “Potentia enim et actus sunt differentiae quae contingunt omnibus praedicamentis, et sunt valde oppositae.” 8 Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, ch. 8, 1049b 4-5: “From out discussion of the various senses of ‘prior,’ it is clear that actuality is prior to potency.” 9 Aristotle, Metaphysics X, ch. 4, 1055a 28-31. BOOK IX QUESTIONS ONE & TWO 457 contrary.” And in IX, ch. 7: 10 “Every potency is at one and the same time a potency of the opposite.” 10 Also, correlatives are opposed relatively; but passive potency does not refer correlatively to active potency; therefore, neither is potency referred or opposed relatively to act. 11 Also, relatives are not primary differences of being, but act and potency are this sort of thing; therefore, etc. 12 This reason is also confirmed, because those things which pertain to...