Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle

Question Nineteen

QUESTION NINETEEN Is the concept of the genus other than the concept of the difference? 1 [1] For the negative: For in the text 1 it is said that “the genus absolutely does not exist apart from the species-of-a-genus.” 2 Also, in Bk. X of this work, ch. 10: 2 the genus as such is diverse in diverse species. 3 Also, otherwise it would be a part of the species and thus not predicable formally of it. 4 Also, in Bk. VII of the Physics, 3 comparison is not made according to the genus, because “in the genus are latent equivocations.” 5 For the affirmative: If not, then either the genus is the same as the concept of one difference only, and then it will be predicated only of one species; or it is [the same as the concept] of each difference. And then either there will be as many concepts of the genus as of the differences, or if the concept of the genus is one only, then the concepts of the differences will be completely the same as that one; therefore they will be the same among themselves; all the consequences are incongruous ; therefore, etc. [I.—BODY OF THE QUESTION A.—THE NEGATIVE VIEW IS UNACCEPTABLE] 6 [2] [Explanation of the view] There is the negative opinion, 4 based on the third argument 5 given above. The manner of explaining 1 Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, ch. 12, 1038a 5-7. 2 Aristotle, Metaphysics X, ch. 8, 1058a 2-5. 3 Aristotle, Physica VII, ch. 4, 249a 22-24. 4 Thomas Aquinas, Metaphysica VII, lect. 12, ed. Parma XX, 494-495; Summa theol. I, q. 50, a. 4, ad 1 (V 10b); Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. II q. 7 (PhB II, 103); Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 50, ad 2 (BFS V, 45): “Ad secundum dicendum quod licet genus et differentia semper dicant diversas rationes formales—propter quod unum de altero non potest praedicari, pro eo quod praedicatio variatur propter solam diversitatem rationum vel intentionum—: tamen non semper oportet quod genus et differentia nominent diversas essentias realiter distinctas seu diversos gradus formales.” 5 Cf. supra, n. 3. 310 THE METAPHYSICS OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS it is that the genus and difference are not synonyms. For they differ according to the modes or formulas of conceiving the same concept, which are the notions of the determinable and the determining. The formula of the genus is the determinable formula, whereas the formula of the difference is the formula of determining. 7 [Refutation of the view] [Arg. 1] Against this: therefore in the definition there is a redundancy, because the same concept is twice stated through the genus and through the difference. 8 Reply: the redundancy is excused because of the diverse modes of conceiving. 9 Against this: there is a useless repetition when the definitions for the names are posited; the same is said in this chapter 6 and according to Bk. II of the On Interpretation. 7 Given the formulas of the genus and the difference, however, the same concept is said twice; therefore, etc. 10 This is confirmed, because according to Aristotle in this chapter, 8 there is a redundancy in this case: “A biped having feet,” and nevertheless there is another formula of conceiving. 11 [Arg. 2] Also those formulae of conceiving are either essentially within the concept of genus and difference, or they are not but are accidental to the formulae under which these concepts are conceived. If the second be the case, a redundancy is not avoided. If the first is so, then either both formulae are essentially within the concept of the species, or not. If not, then the definition of the species essentially includes what does not pertain essentially to the species, for it includes what is essentially included in the concept of the genus. If it does, therefore the concepts of the genus and the difference are simply other, because they are through other formulae which they essentially include which also are about the concept of the species per se. (The opposite opinion does not posit such diversity, as will shortly become evident.) 9 6 Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, ch. 12, 1038a 30-33. 7 Aristotle, De interpretatione II, ch. 11, 21a 30-31. 8 Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, ch. 12, 1038a 21-23. BOOK VII QUESTION NINETEEN 311 12 [Arg. 3] Also, third, the definition ought to be primarily...