Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle

Question Fifteen

QUESTION FIFTEEN Text of Aristotle: “The truth has indeed now been stated, but still let us state it yet more clearly, taking up the question again. The parts of the formula, into which the formula is divided, are prior to it, either all or some of them.” (Metaphysics VII, ch. 10, 1035b 3-6). Is the singular intelligible to us per se? [Arguments Pro and Con] 1 [1] It seems not according to the authorities: And the first authoritative statement is that of Aristotle here, for he seems to say and to show several times that as “one withdraws from the senses” 1 etc. 2 Also, in Bk. II On the Soul: 2 “The sense has to do with the singulars, the intellect with the universals.” From this it is argued here in multiple ways, because there are diverse objects of diverse potencies, and vice-versa.—And it is also deduced about the proportionality of the potency with respect to the object, according to the material and immaterial. The angelic intellect is entirely immaterial; the sense is entirely material; our intellect is intermediate; therefore the conditions of their objects are similar.—For it is also added, fourthly, that matter as such is unknown and the singular includes it [matter]. The major is found in this chapter, 3 and it seems [appropriate] to this notion. The minor is found in the De caelo et mundo: 4 “When I say ‘this heaven’ I speak of matter,” etc. 3 Also, the quiddity is the object of the intellect, according to Bk. III On the Soul. 5 The singular has no proper quiddity: [1] 1 Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, ch. 10, 1036a 2-9. 2 Aristotle, De anima II, ch. 5, 417b 22-23; Posterior Analytics I, ch. 31, 87b 37-39; Auctoritates Aristotelis, ed. J. Hamesse, p. 319: “Sensus est singularium, scientia vero universalium.” 3 Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, ch. 10, 1035b 11-1036a 13. 4 Aristotle, De caelo I, ch. 9, 278a 10-15. 5 Aristotle, De anima III, ch. 4, 429b 14-22. 254 THE METAPHYSICS OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS because then the singular would be definable; [2] because then there could be scientific knowledge proper [to the singular], both of which are against what Aristotle says in the penultimate chapter of Bk. VII. 6 And he argues against the second, for then there would be scientific knowlege at one time and not at another time. And also, secondly, there would be an infinity of sciences, because infinity is not repugnant to singulars. Hence it was for this reason that Plato, according to Porphyry, 7 requested silence about individuals and left them to [be handled ] by the arts. And, thirdly, one who had perfect knowledge of the most special species, would have imperfect knowledge and would be only in potency with respect to any singular, as is the case with generic knowledge [with respect to] the specific. But this consequent is attacked. For the agent with knowledge cannot most perfectly direct itself in this way in acting unless he knows most perfectly as it is possible to know what can be done. The artisan however through his art, having only universal knowledge of house [building], directs himself most perfectly in making this house, so perfectly in fact as if he had previously known perfectly about this particular house. Therefore, after the house is made, it is by nature no more perfectly known by him than in general. Answer: He who does not know, makes [whatever he makes] per accidens; singularity is joined to nature which is the per se terminus. 4 [2] Also, to the main [question], 8 if the singular were known per se, then the universal would not be known per se; the consequent is false. Proof of the implication: either the universal would be known through the same species [= 1] through which the singular is known or it would be through another species [= 2]. Now it is not through the same species [= 1] [for several reasons] [First = 1a] because if it were the same, how would it represent something under a distinct aspect as well as under an indistinct aspect? Also [Second = 1b] because either [= 1bi] this same species would be the sole species, which is both of the universal itself as well as of all the singulars; or 6 Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, ch. 15, 1039b 27-30. 7 Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium ch. ‘De specie’ (AL I6, 12; ed. Busse 6, 1317 ). 8 Cf. supra, Bk. VII, q. 14, n...