Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle

Question Twelve

QUESTION TWELVE Text of Aristotle: “The question might be raised why some things are produced spontaneously as well as by art, e.g. health, while others are not, e.g. a house. The reason is that in some cases the matter which governs the production in the making and producing of any work of art and in which a part of the product is present —some matter is such as to be set in motion by itself [and some is not of this nature].” (Metaphysics VII, ch. 9, 1034a 8-10) In the matter of natural things is there some part of the form to be generated that actively cooperates in the generation of the composite? [Arguments Pro and Con] 1 [1] That there is such: There are two ways to prove this: First, otherwise the form would come to be from nothing. 2 The second way is based on the fact that generation is something natural, and this is confirmed in many ways. 3 First, by the definition of nature in Bk. II of the Physics. 1 That in which there is motion is not called the principle, but the motion in which that principle or that motion exists. Neither does this seem to be understood simply of a passive principle alone: [1] Because form is said to be more nature than matter, according to Bk. II of the Physics. 2 [2] And because then there would seem to be no difference between natural and artificial things, a difference which he [Aristotle] postulates there [in the Physics], 3 because artificial 1 Aristotle, Physica II, ch. 1, 192b 20-23; One manuscript inserts a note here: “where it is said that ‘nature as first and per se—not per accidens—is the principle of motion.’ This cannot be understood of the material principle, because in this definition nature is distinguished from that in which there is motion which, properly speaking, is the subject or matter; therefore it must be understood of the form. Or, if it be understood of both, namely matter and form, it will be more truly understood of the form, which more principally is and is called ‘nature,’ than matter, as is clear from Bk. II of the Physics.” 2 Aristotle, Physica II, ch. 1, 193b 6-7. 3 Aristotle, Physica II, ch. 1, 193b 8-12. 170 THE METAPHYSICS OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS things as artificial do not have a principle of motion whereas natural things do. It is evident that artificial things have a passive principle, otherwise it would become impossible that they come to be. 4 [3] Because then in the last chapter of the second book Aristotle puts it this way: 4 “That if a house had been a thing made by nature, it would have been made in the same way as it is now by art.” 5 And even plainer in the same chapter: 5 “And if the shipbuilding art were in the wood, it would produce the same results by nature.” It is obvious that ship-building is an active principle. 6 In the same place he also says 6 that “those things are by nature which by a continuous movement originated from an internal principle ,” etc.; [by the ablative] ‘by which,’ he seems to understand an efficient cause. 7 [4] Also, because in Bk. VI of the Metaphysics: 7 Aristotle proves that natural philosophy is not practical, arguing this point from its objects, because the principle of things that can be made is in what is making them, whereas in natural things the principle is in what is moved. 8 [5] Also, because in Bk. II of the Physics, 8 Aristotle reduces chance and fortune to nature and intellect; it is evident to him that chance and fortune are efficient causes per accidens; therefore, the other [nature] is per se efficient. 9 Finally, this is confirmed by that text from III Ethics: 9 “Compulsory are those actions where the cause is in the external circumstances and the patient contributes nothing.” This definition seem to apply to natural generation, except [when] the patient cooperates in the action. 4 Aristotle, Physica II, ch. 8, 199a 12-15. 5 Aristotle, Physica II, ch. 8, 199b 28-29. 6 Aristotle, Physica II, ch. 8, 199b 15-17. 7 Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, ch. 1, 1025b 19-28. 8 Aristotle, Physica II, ch. 5, 197a 33-35. 9 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea III, ch. 1, 1110b 15-17. [18.222.179.186] Project MUSE (2024-04...