Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle

Question Seven

QUESTION SEVEN Text of Aristotle: “For each single thing does not seem to be other than its substance, and the quiddity is said to be substance of each.” (Metaphysics VII, ch. 6, 1031a 15-16). Is the quiddity the same thing as the subject that has it? [Arguments Pro and Con] 1 [1] That it is not: Bk. III On the soul: 1 “Magnitude is different from than what it is to be such... and flesh is other than what it is to be flesh.” 2 Also, Bk. VII of this work in the chapter ‘On the parts of the definition’: 2 “In whatever is thought of as having matter, the individual subject is not the same thing as its quiddity.” But all natural things are thought of as having matter, because they have this [i.e., their quiddity] in this [i.e., in matter]. 3 Also, in the same chapter: 3 just as in naturals there is something besides the quiddity of the species, so in mathematicals; but every genus having matter is not the same as that to which it belongs. 4 Also, if the quiddity and that to which it belongs were the same, then the quiddity would be able to be generated, just as that to which it belongs. Bk. VII, in that comment: “Of those things which come to be, the quiddity....” 4 says the opposite: neither the species nor the quiddity is generated. 5 To this it is said 5 that the subject that has the quiddity is not generated, but the singular is generated per se, and this is not the quiddity per se, because it has in itself individual matter. 1 Aristotle, De anima III, ch. 4, 429b 10-11. 2 Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, ch. 11, 1037b 1-5. 3 Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, ch. 11, 1036b 33-1037a 2. 4 Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, ch. 7, 1032a 12-26. 5 Cf. Averroes, Metaphysica VII, com. 26 (ed. Iuntina, VIII f. 83ra): “... Cum declaratum est quod generatum componitur ex materia et forma, et quod est aliud ab eis, illud igitur quod generatur est hoc individuum demonstratum in actu...”; cf. Siger of 132 THE METAPHYSICS OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS 6 To the contrary: generation per se is a change into substance, just as alteration is a change into quality, and no movement or change ends up per se with a being per accidens. Therefore, generation per se will end up with something in the category of substance, otherwise it would be [generated] into a being per accidens. Hence, only something per se will be generated to which quiddity belongs per se. 7 Another answer to this claims 6 that what is generated in neither the quiddity of the form nor the quiddity of the species, but the quiddity of the singular per se. 8 To the contrary: [1] either the quiddity of man absolutely is the whole quiddity of this man, or [2] in the quiddity of this man there is something other than in the quiddity of man. If the first be true, then the quiddity of man is generated per se only insofar as it is considered by the intellect, and we are not speaking in this fashion. If the second be true, then [the individual] could be defined through that added feature, which is against what the Philosopher says in Bk. VII 7 against Plato; there he proves with three arguments that the singular is not defined. 9 Also, to the main point: if it were the same, then the quiddity of a white man would be the same thing as the white man; and if this were so, then [white man] would be the same thing as man. Proof of the implication: when it is said “A white man is a white man”, ‘white’ does not remain except by reason of man. 10 The Philosopher holds the opposite. [I.—BODY OF THE QUESTION A.—THE OPINION OF OTHERS] 11 [2] To the question one answer says that the quiddity is that which is collected from the predicates “in quid,” as is stated in Bk. VII ch. ‘De magnis’: 8 {{“The formula, therefore, in which the term itself is not present but its meaning is expressed, this is the formula of the Brabant, Metaph. VII, q. 17 (ed. A. Maurer p. 357): “... dico quod generatio non solum requirit fieri ex materia sed etiam ex individuali materia.” 6 Cf. Henry of Ghent, Quodl. IV q. 4 (f. 91CD). 7 Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, ch...