Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle

Question One

BOOK SEVEN Texts of Aristotle: “Other things are called ‘being’ because they are ‘of being’,” etc. (Metaphysics VII, ch. 1, 1028a 18-19). “For not one of these is, or in itself is suited to be, self-subsistent, or able to be separated from substance, but rather, [if anything it is that which walks or sits or is healthy that is an existing thing.”] (Metaphysics VII, ch. 1 1028a 22-25). QUESTION ONE Is inherence [in a substance]of the essence of an accident? [Arguments Pro and Con] 1 [1] For the negative: Since it is the medium for demonstrating the inherence of a proper attribute in its respective subject, according to Bk. II of the Posterior Analytics, 1 the [knowledge of the] essence is presupposed. 2 Also, if inherence were of the essence of an accident then “This whiteness is inhering” would involve a useless repetition, for to add something to anything that already pertained to its essence would be a useless repetition. 3 Also, [if it were,] then the concept of a relation in general would not be simple, because it would include one relationship to the object and another to the subject, and thus the relation would not be a most general genus or category, for the most general genus is a simple concept. 4 Also, quantity remains in the Eucharist without inherence in any subject. 5 For the affirmative: That whereby something is formally a being is of its essence. But an accident is a being, because it pertains to being, according to 1 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II, ch. 2 and 5, 90a 7-16 and 91b 12-28. 88 THE METAPHYSICS OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS the text of Aristotle. 2 Similarly, to be sitting [the concrete] is more a being than a session [the abstract], etc. 6 Also, if this sort of ‘different’ inherence were not a substance, then it would be an accident [of the accident], and the inherence’s inherence would be another accident, and so ad infinitum. 7 Also if they [essence of the accident and its inherence] were different, therefore the concept of the accident would be in itself prior and absolute and thus able to be defined without a subject, which is contrary to what Aristotle says in ch. 3. 3 [Body of the Question] [I.—CLARIFICATION OF TERMS] 8 [2] Reply: To begin with one must distinguish what is meant by “accident.” For “accident”: [a] if it refers to what the name signifies per se, as the concept on which the name is imposed per se, i.e., “accidentality” itself, “inherence” would seem to be synonymous with this, and in this sense no question would arise. [b] If it refers to something that is called “accident” concretely, for example, quantity , then there room for a question, and hereafter it will be understood in this sense. 9 Secondly, as regards “inherence” there are two meanings to distinguish: [a] one is the actual union of an existing accident with its existing subject as a kind of act with the potential. [b] The other is an essential order or a dependence of the accident upon substance according to the essential natures of each. The first sort of inherence is evident. The second needs proof, because the demonstration abstracts from existence and from what are characteristics of a thing insofar as it exists. Otherwise demonstration would not concern its necessary aspects. There is a demonstration of some inherence of a proper attribute in its subject, and therefore, this sort of inherence is other than the first, namely, that which is the existence or a proper condition of existence. 2 Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, ch. 1, 1028a 18-19. 3 Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, ch. 5, 1031a 1-2. BOOK VII QUESTION ONE 89 10 {{It might have been customary, perhaps, to make this distinction between actual and aptitudinal inherence. The first is not always in the accident whereas the second is always there whether or not it is existing apart from its subject.—To the contrary: [there is no need for such a distinction, however, for] the aptitudinal inherence in a separated accident is not able to verify any denominative predication, as the second here can do.}} 11 Thirdly, there is a clarification of “to be of the essence.” For “to be of the essence of A” is not the same really or essentially as “to be A itself.” The first indeed implies...