Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle

Prologue: The Nobility and Causes of the Science of Metaphysics

PROLOGUE THE NOBILITY AND CAUSES OF THE SCIENCE OF METAPHYSICS Text of Aristotle: “All men by nature desire to know.”1 [I.—THE NOBILITY OF THE SCIENCE OF METAPHYSICS] 1 [1] At the beginning of the Metaphysics which we have in our hands, the Philosopher sets forth this proposition indicating the dignity and nobility of this science, as will become clear as we proceed. To see this, we must first explain the proposition itself, and second apply it to the conclusion we have in mind. [A.—CLARIFICATION OF THE PROPOSITION] 2 In general there are two ways to make this proposition clear; one is a posteriori, the other a priori. [1.—A POSTERIORI] 3 The Philosopher gives a certain a posteriori indication when he writes:2 “A sign of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness, they are loved for themselves,”—as if to say, the senses are loved naturally not only insofar as they are useful for sustaining life, but as cognitive. He proves this in the text3 by the fact that we naturally love that sense most which gives us the most knowledge, namely sight. He says it is the most cognitive sense for two reasons, first because of the certitude of the knowledge it gives and second because of the variety of what we know by means of it. The certitude stems from its immateriality. The more immaterial a cognitive power is, the more certain is its knowledge. More objects are also known through 1 Aristotle, Metaphysics I, ch. 1, 980a 21. 2 Ibid. 980a 21-23. 3 Ibid. 980a 25. 4 THE METAPHYSICS OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS this sense, because all bodies, both celestial and terrestrial, have their share of light and color. This is not the case, however, with the other sensible qualities, namely the tangible, the audible, and the like. 4 Hence, the force of this proof of Aristotle lies in this. If we love naturally the more cognitive senses, not because they are useful for life, but because of the knowledge they give, then it follows that what we naturally desire more is to know, for this knowledge is more noble than sense knowledge and is that toward which sense knowledge is ultimately ordered. [2.—A PRIORI: THE OPINION OF THOMAS AQUINAS] 5 [2] [Exposition of the opinion] Second, certain persons4 give three a priori clarifications of the aforesaid proposition. First in this way: Everything imperfect naturally seeks its perfection, as one can glean from Bk. I of the Physics, the last chapter .5 But the soul of man is of itself imperfect as to its intellectual power, since this is like a blank slate on which nothing is depicted, according to the Philosopher in Bk. III On the Soul.6 Therefore, it naturally desires knowledge, which is the perfection of this power. 6 Secondly, they explain it thus. Everything naturally wants to function in its own proper fashion, like the heavy body that wants to descend. The function or operation proper to man is to know or understand, because this is what distinguishes him from everything else. 7 Thirdly, in this way. Everything seeks to be one, or be joined, with its source. Man, however, becomes one with the separate substances [i.e. the pure spirits] by knowing, as the Philosopher proves in Bk. X of the Ethics, ch. 10.7 For in the contemplation of the truth we most resemble these separate substances, and he concludes this is what our happiness consists in. Therefore, man naturally desires to know. 4 Thomas, Metaphysics I, lect. 1, nn. 2-4, ed. Parma XX, 247ab. 5 Aristotle, Physics I, ch. 9, 192a 16-19. 6 Aristotle, De anima III, ch. 4, 429b 31-430a 2. 7 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea X, ch. 8, 1177b 26-31; 1179a 22-32. BOOK I PROLOGUE 5 8 [3] [Refutation of the opinion of Thomas] It does not seem that these three proofs, insofar as they are valid, are much different from each other. For there is a twofold act, namely, a first act and a second act, as is clear from Bk. II, On the Soul.8 And so there is a twofold perfection , one that is first, another that is second. The first is the form or habit [i.e. the science], the second is its operation. Everything naturally desires both perfections, since the operation is the...