Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle

Question Eight

QUESTION EIGHT Text of Aristotle: “The words ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’ are applied to something on the assumption that there is a first, (i.e. a beginning, in each class) because they are nearer some specified beginning.” (Metaphysics V, ch. 11, 1018b 9-11). Is this the common meaning of “prior”: prior is that which is closer to the beginning? [Arguments Pro and Con] 1 That it is not: “Time is the number of motion according to before and after.”1 But in time there is no beginning; therefore, etc. 2 Also, in things that can be produced through generation, i f generation was without a beginning, one generating [parent] is prior to another, and nevertheless, none is first. 3 Also, if what was closer to the beginning was prior, then the beginning itself is not prior to what stems from it, because if it were, this is with respect to some [other] first principle, according to you; therefore, the principle [of beginning] has a beginning; and this is incongruous, because there would be an infinite sequence of principles. 4 Also, it does not seem necessary to assume a first because of “prior” except where there is a greater and a greatest; but this is false in the case of numbers. 5 Also, prior and posterior is more remote from this “now” and, nevertheless, he [Aristotle] speaks of ‘our using this “now” as a source or beginning’,2 therefore, not every prior is closer to the beginning, but sometimes it is more remote. 6 To the contrary, there is what the Philosopher says here and in Bk. IV3 against those denying principles. 1 Aristotle, Physica IV, ch. 11, 219b 1-2. 2 Aristotle, Metaphysics V, ch. 11, 1018b 15-20. 3 Aristotle, Metaphysics V, ch. 11, 1018b 9-11; IV, ch. 4, 1006a 1-18. 472 THE METAPHYSICS OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS [I.—TO THE QUESTION] 7 It is said that this description is apt; but it pertains in different ways to those things that are prior according to an essential order and those that are prior according to an accidental order.4 For in essentially ordered things nothing causes without something that is first in an unqualified sense, but in accidentally ordered things this is incidental, because that something precedes this revolution of the heavens is accidental to it, since it could have existed even if the previous revolution had not occurred, to assume the impossible. Hence the entity of all such is not from some one thing that is first in an unqualified sense, as is the case in essentially ordered things where all depend upon some one first. Hence, prior in accidentally ordered things is asserted on the basis of a relationship to something that is first, not simply, but with reference to it, and this incidentally. In essentially ordered things prior is asserted with respect to something that is simply first and is the cause of this and of all posterior things. [II.—REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS] 8 To the first,5 it is said or could be said, perhaps, that regarding time we assign arbitrarily what is “prior” and, also, what is taken as a beginning. 9 To the contrary: then time will not be in the category of quantity and then the first motion will be without time or its motion would depend upon the soul. 10 Therefore, another answer is given that in time there is a beginning apart from the soul, that is not simply first; also it would not be with the soul. But there is there a beginning with respect to some posterior and prior, because this day begins with the morning and the first hour is closer to the beginning of the day than the third morning hour. 11 Against this: if in time as such there is no beginning, but in some part of it with respect to another part, then time as such does not 4 Cf. supra, Bk. II, qq. 4-6, nn. 80-101. 5 Cf. supra, n. 1. BOOK V QUESTION EIGHT 473 have either a prior or posterior, but only with respect to some parts. This is incongruous, because the following definition pertains to the whole per se (and the parts only per accidens) because “Time is the number of motion according to before and after.”6 12 Also, time is a continuum; hence, some “now” as such is prior there...