Pacific Blitzkrieg: World War II in the Central Pacific

Chapter 2. The Gilberts: Parallel Operations (A Tale of Three Smiths)

46 CHAPTER 2 THE GILBERTS: Parallel Operations (A Tale of Three Smiths) A s the Americans prepared the Gilbert Islands assault, Guadalcanal ’s lessons were foremost in the planners’ minds. Although American forces were ultimately victorious, many felt that inadequate training and poor intelligence had caused a needless waste of lives. To a large degree planners took the lessons learned on Guadalcanal and successfully applied the solutions to the next phase of offensive operations. At Guadalcanal, however, the landings were uncontested. In the Gilberts, U.S. forces and their amphibious doctrine were to be tested for the first time against a heavily defended beach. U.S. forces eventually prevailed, but only after a bloody threeday contest. In fact, given the size of the forces involved the fighting on Tarawa, the key island in the Gilbert chain was some of the bloodiest and most devastating of the war. It was under this stress that the fissures between the army and marine commanders first emerged. These early cracks eventually became chasms that threatened to engulf and overshadow the joint victories that the services had forged. STRATEGIC SETTING When the Allied leaders met in Casablanca in January 1943, the prospects in the Pacific were far different from those just six months earlier. Not only had the Allied successes in the Battles of Coral Sea and Midway halted the seemingly inexorable Japanese march south, but the Guadalcanal and Papua campaigns forced the Japanese to substantially halt The Gilberts: Parallel Operations (A Tale of Three Smiths) 47 offensive operations and move to the strategic defensive. Furthermore, the Allies now possessed sufficient forces to effectively engage the enemy at four widely separated points: the Aleutians, the naval lanes between Hawaii and Midway, the South and Southwest Pacific Areas, and the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater.1 As Allied men and materiel continued to pour into the region, the Japanese were forced to stretch their limited means ever further. At Casablanca, both America and Britain reconfirmed the basic premise of Allied strategy: Germany First. While the United States remained fully committed to this priority, the Joint Chiefs were reluctant to lose the momentum in the Pacific. As Marshall argued, “We must not allow the Japanese any pause. They fight with no idea of surrendering and they will continue to be aggressive until attrition has defeated them. To accomplish this, we must maintain the initiative and force them to meet us.”2 King went on to assure the Allies that operations in the Pacific would in no way divert resources from the European theater.3 With these assurances, the British reluctantly agreed to increase forces in the area and support King’s proposal for a two-pronged attack through the Central and South-Southwest Pacific aimed at seizing and expanding holdings in the Solomons, Rabaul, Western Aleutians, Gilberts, Marshalls, Carolines, and New Guinea as well as increasing efforts in the China-Burma-India theater.4 Armed with this agreement, representatives from the three Pacific subcommands (Central, South, and Southwest) met to determine the best plan of attack. As before, MacArthur championed a drive against Rabaul, under his command of course. To support his case he came armed with a complete set of plans for the operation, codenamed ELKTON. Faced with the realities of personnel and equipment shortfalls, however, the planners decided to reduce the objectives for 1943 and focus on expanding the Allied presence in the Solomons, New Guinea, and New Britain. They also decided to avoid further intramural squabbling by postponing final determinations on who would conduct and command these operations.5 Despite their best efforts to steer clear of discussing all command issues, there were some that could not be avoided. MacArthur was given command of Tasks Two (Lae, Salamaua, northern Solomons, and New Guinea) and Three (Rabaul, New Britain-New Ireland). Since the new plan was just a variation of this original one, army planners had pushed for MacArthur claiming he was the logical choice. The navy reluctantly 48 Pacific Blitzkrieg: World War II in the Central Pacific agreed, but only after inserting language that kept all ships under navy control when they were not actively assigned to a task force.6 Everything began changing when U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) submitted the “Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan” at the Trident Conference held in Washington, DC in May 1943. This reformulation of strategic direction was not, however, a plan...