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325 Notes CHAPTER TWO 1.JamesP.Coan,ConThien:TheHillofAngels(Tuscaloosa:University of Alabama Press, 2004), 71–72. 2. Ibid., 86–87. 3. Ibid., 101–5. 4. Gary L. Telfer, Lane Rogers, and V. Keith Flaming, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the Vietnamese, 1967 (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1984), 96–100. http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/ Documents/U.S.%20Marines%20in%20Vietnam%20Fighting %20the%20North%20Vietnamese%201967%20%20PCN%20 19000309000_1.pdf 5.KeithNolan,OperationBuffalo(Novato,CA:PresidioPress,1991), 68. 6. Coan, 114. 7. Ibid., 129. 8. Ibid., 134–36. 9. Telfer, Rogers, and Flaming, 125–35. 10. Coan, 175–76. 326 Notes 11. Jack Shulimson, Leonard A. Blasiol, Charles R. Smith, and David A. Dawson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968 (Washington, D.C: History and Museums Division, Headquarters ,U.S.MarineCorps,1997),126–27. http://www.marines.mil/ news/publications/Documents/US%20Marines%20In%20Vietnam %20The%20Defining%20Year%201968%20%20PCN%20 19000313800_1.pdf CHAPTER THREE 1. Robert Pisor, The End of the Line: The Siege of Khe Sanh (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1982), 235. CHAPTER FOUR 1. Pisor, 34–36. 2. Edward Murphy,Semper Fi, Vietnam (New York: Ballantine Books, 1997), 3–5. 3. Loren Baritz,Backfire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 165. 4. Pisor, 134. 5. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 536–40. 6. Ibid., 549. 7. Coan, 307. 8. Baritz, 184–85. 9. Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), 717–20. 10. Pisor, 117. 11.SamuelZaffiri,HamburgerHill(Novato,CA:PresidioPress,1988), 271–72. CHAPTER FIVE 1. Pisor, 50. [3.138.174.174] Project MUSE (2024-04-25 05:14 GMT) Notes 327 CHAPTER SIX 1.EdwardF.Murphy.TheHillFights:TheFirstBattleofKheSanh(New York: Ballantine Books, 2003), 8–9. 2. Shulimson, Blasiol, Smith, and Dawson, 60. 3. Prados and Stubbe, 63; Murphy, The Hill Fights, 205–6. 4. Jack Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: the Expanding War, 1967 (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters , U.S. Marine Corps, 1982), 11–14. http://www.marines.mil/ news/publications/Documents/US%20Marines%20in%20Vietnam %20An%20Expanding%20War%201966%20%20PCN%20 19000308600_1.pdf 5. Murphy, Semper Fi, Vietnam, 93–95. 6. Pisor, 18–20. 7. Murphy, The Hill Fights, 246–52. 8. Ibid., 179. 9. Ibid., 230. 10. Karnow, 554. 11. Prados and Stubbe, 336–38. 12. Pisor, 226. 13. Ibid., 213. 14. Ibid., 218. CHAPTER SEVEN 1. Shulimson, Blasiol, Smith, and Dawson, 318. 2. Ibid., 313–15. CHAPTER EIGHT 1. Allen, 246–49. One of the biggest misconceptions of the war was thePentagon’simplementationandeventualobsessionwithabody count system that kept tabs on the number of enemy soldiers we had killed. Used by McNamara and Westmoreland as a measurementofoursuccessonthebattlefield ,everyU.S.unitwasexpected 328 Notes to meticulously count the enemy’s dead after each engagement. But in reality, all it revealed was the deepening level of our failure. CHAPTER NINE 1. Shulimson, Blasiol, Smith, and Dawson, 378–80. CHAPTER TEN 1. Baritz, 284–86. CHAPTER TWELVE 1.CharlesR.Smith,U.S. Marines in Vietnam: High Mobility and StandDown , 1969 (Washington, D.C: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1988), 27. http://www.marines .mil/news/publications/Documents/U.S.%20Marines%20 in%20Vietnam%20High%20Mobility%20and%20Standown%20 1969_%20PCN%2019000310300_1.pdf ...

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