The Twenty-five Year Century: A South Vietnamese General Remembers the Indochina War to the Fall of Saigon

I Corps Forward

291 13 I corps forward SHORTLY AFTER THE VICTORY OF Quang Tri, General Truong asked me to assume the command of the Northern Theater. Since the recapture of the Quang Tri Citadel in September, the situation had stabilized along the Thach Han River, north of Quang Tri. There were only small unit-sized contacts in the mountains west of RN1, as the Airborne Division and the 1st Division were expanding westward in an effort to capture as much ground as possible before a peace agreement was reached in Paris. Because the Airborne and the Marine Divisions were overextended and had suffered heavy casualties and because we had no more strategic reserves, we were unable to cross the Thach Han River to recapture the city of Dong Ha and the territory extending from the Thach Han to the Ben Hai River. This river constituted the southern limit of the old DMZ as specified by the 1954 Paris Peace Agreement. My new title was Commanding General, I Corps Forward. I had a staff and a reduced headquarters unit, including a communication detachment. Col. Le Khac Ly, valedictorian of the first class at the National Defense College, and a native of Hue, was assigned as my chief of staff. The Corps Forward Command organization was later confirmed by an order from the Joint General Staff. It would be used in MRs whose size, geographical features, and tactical situation would prevent the main Corps Headquarters from effectively controlling the operations in the entire MR. On the surface, this new command structure seemed to make sense, as MRI, with a to- 292UUU THE TWENTY-FIVE YEAR CENTURY tal number of five divisions and two distinct theaters, was no doubt the most important MR in the country, and an additional command structure to handle the two northern provinces appeared justified. However, I had a feeling that this new alternate organization was specially created to fit my rank and to avoid having to appoint me as commander of another army corps. I took solace in the fact that history has shown that there is a political side to most important military decisions. And in Viet Nam, as in most other developing nations, the political aspect seemed to carry more weight. Although, for political reasons, I was denied the command of a corps, I was nonetheless very proud to have under my command the three finest divisions of the Vietnamese Army. In the meantime, the negotiators in Paris appeared to be heading toward some kind of peace agreement. In January 1973, the Paris Agreement was finally signed after the Americans exerted heavy pressure on President Thieu and after President Nixon wrote a personal letter to Thieu assuring him of continued American support and assistance in the post-settlement period. In his letter, President Nixon also promised that the United States would intervene militarily in case of severe violations of the Agreement by North Viet Nam. Toward the end of January, President Thieu ordered I Corps to capture the strategic port of Cua Viet on the mouth of Quang Tri River before January 28, 1973, the date of implementation of the Paris Agreement. During the 1972 Offensive, the port of Cua Viet, where NVA’s 5th Naval Regiment was stationed, had been heavily used by NVA to bring their supplies by naval and commercial ships from Hanoi. The capture of this strategic port would prevent NVA from building up their supply reserves for a new offensive in the event they decided to violate the Paris Agreement. At the time of the peace accord, the tactical situation was somewhat stabilized along the Thach Han River, west of Quang Tri City, and to the east along a line roughly perpendicular to the coast line. Cua Viet was twenty kilometers north of the line of contact. The attack was to be carried out by the Marine Division because Cua Viet was located in the latter’s zone of responsibility. The attack was scheduled to begin on January 26, two days before the 1973 Tet. To carry out the mission of capturing Cua Viet, I CORPS FORWARD 293 General Lan, the Marine Division Commander, organized a special task force consisting of the 4th Marine Battalion and elements of the 1st Armored Brigade. As the task force was put under the command of Colonel Tri, the deputy division commander, it was called “Task Force Tango,” named after its commander. In order to...