The Twenty-five Year Century: A South Vietnamese General Remembers the Indochina War to the Fall of Saigon

Military Region One

263 12 military region one AFTER A BRIEF CEREMONY IN which I transferred the command of the Military Academy to my brother Tho, I boarded a C-123 transport aircraft for my trip to Danang, where the headquarters of MRI was located. Normally, the pilot would stop at Nha Trang to refuel, but as the weather forecast for MRI was good, he decided to go directly to Danang without refueling. This turned out to be a monumental mistake that almost cost our lives. As we approached the city, it was unexpectedly struck by a heavy storm. The visibility was zero and the aircraft was caught in heavy turbulence. The passengers, about one hundred of them, were mostly soldiers rejoining their units after a few days leave in Saigon, servicemen’s dependents visiting their husbands fighting in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces, and also a few reporters getting a ride to the front. The children started to panic and cry while their mothers tried to calm them. Other women prayed in silence, their hands nervously manipulating their rosaries. Sitting in the front seat just behind the cockpit, I saw the crew chief, an Air Force major, open the cockpit window in an attempt to orient himself amidst the storm. I knew that we were in trouble. I was particularly concerned that, by circling over Danang, the aircraft could bump into the Hai Van Chains just north of the airport. Quietly, I went into the cockpit and asked the major if we had any chance of landing in Danang with the aid of navigational instruments . “General,” the major replied, “I have no radar contact with the ground control tower.” I asked him if he could change direction 264UUU THE TWENTY-FIVE YEAR CENTURY and try to land in Chu Lai, approximately thirty miles to the south. “General,” he said apologetically, “we have no fuel left.” I then asked him as calmly as I could under the circumstances what he proposed to do. He said he would attempt a descent and if he missed the runway, he would direct the aircraft toward the ocean and try a forced landing on the beach. As the aircraft started its painful descent shaking violently in the middle of the turbulence, I looked out my window, holding my breath and trying to catch a glimpse of Danang hidden somewhere under the thick layers of cloud and rain. The few minutes seemed like an eternity. Suddenly, I saw the red tile roofs of houses somewhere around Danang. In a split second, the aircraft landed. It then stopped in the middle of the flooded runway, incapable of taxiing to the airport terminal because we had run out of fuel. It was a close call. When I reported to Lt. Gen. Hoang Xuan Lam, I Corps Commander , the battle was raging around Quang Tri, which was defended by the untested 3rd Infantry Division. General Lam had graduated from the École de L’Arme Blindée at Saumur, France. He was the commander of the 2nd Infantry Division at Quang Ngai, south of Danang, when the Buddhist movement erupted in MRI in May 1966. He was appointed I Corps Commander after other generals failed to restore order. General Lam had been criticized by the U.S. press for the fateful invasion of Low Laos in February 1971 where ARVN troops suffered heavy casualties. The objective of the incursion, according to the White House and the Pentagon, was to destroy NVA’s supply line to the South. President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger reasoned that if successful, the attack into Cambodia and Laos would secure the safe withdrawal of the remaining American troops in South Viet Nam. However, the troops’ movements, logistical preparations, and, most of all, the speculations of the American press, had alerted the enemy of the incoming attack. (The attack didn’t start until February 7, but by February 1, the Washington Post, the Baltimore Sun, and the New York Times reported the possibility that a strike into Laos was imminent). 53 As a result, NVA had concentrated a power- MILITARY REGION ONE 265 ful antiaircraft defense system in the area. Over one hundred U.S. helicopters were shot down during the first week and consequently the Americans substantially cut down on the number of helicopters available for troop transport and medical evacuation. Finally, on March 6, ARVN launched a successful air assault into Tchepone, the objective...