Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II

4. The Importance of Doctrine and How to Manage: The American Command and General Staff School

115 Another cornerstone of the American professional military education system was founded by General William Tecumseh Sherman, USMA 1840, in May 1881 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Then known as “School of Application for the Infantry and Cavalry,” it went—even in later years—through several name changes, which proves the point that it “initially lacked a clearly defined purpose.”2 The problem of lacking a definite educational task would haunt the school even decades later.3 From the outset, the school ran into several problems that tainted its reputation. Though the U.S. Army had the greatest demand for officers with knowledge of professional staff work, the majority of students Leavenworth school admitted at first were lieutenants. Officers with this rank, however, were supposed to command a platoon, while the school was supposed to teach staff procedures for higher units. Becauseofthelowlevelofinstruction,therequestedreadingoutloud, and recitations the institution became known as the “kindergarten.”4 Graduates , especially those who attained honors, were teased and ridiculed by four The Importance of Doctrine and How to Manage: The American Command and General Staff School and the Overlooked Infantry School “A career officer is going to school as long as he lives.”1 —GENERAL MATTHEW BUNKER RIDGWAY 116 Command Culture theircomradesforyearsaftercompletingtheschool,becauseitwasthought that they had not accomplished much.5 Alarmed by the low reputation, everybody from Sherman downward who had an interest in the school tried to improve it. Several commandants showed the wisdom to ask their staff and instructors for suggestions. In the following years Leavenworth improved, but every step away from a kindergarten can be termed a success and does not mark automatically an excellent advanced military school.It was ratherwithin thewakeof reforms of the whole army promotion system at the beginning of the 1890s, initiated by General John M. Schofield, that commandants of Leavenworth took more vigorous actions, for example, by minimizing the daily recitations .6 They had given a Leavenworth class the appearance of a middle school and the class’s didactical value came close to zero. The hard-toremove belief of the students, however, remained “that the closer one adhered to the words of the text the better his marks were likely to be.”7 That there was much truth in that belief will be demonstrated below. ForU.S.Armystandards,rathervisionaryseniorinstructorsArthurL. Wagner and Eben Swift helped raising the overall teaching level, but also introducedseriousflaws.8 WagnerhadtravelledtoGermanytovisitPrussian schools and was no doubt influenced by that experience.9 However, when finally the applicatory method was introduced to the students he had to admit, “It was well known and practiced for more than thirty years when we took it up.”10 Under the applicatory method the student was requested to actually use—apply—what he had learned before in theoretical lessons , instead of memorizing and reciting only textbook knowledge and regulations over and over.11 When the applicatory method reached its high point at Leavenworth, it had already been phased out at the German war academy and replaced by extensive role-playing and war games.12 Put into perspective, the advances at Leavenworth can therefore be considered only relative. Unsurprisingly, just like at West Point, the didactics fell as far behind as the content of the teachings. Despite the rapid changes in weaponry and the forms of battle, “the reformers at Fort Leavenworth remained surprisingly ambivalent and at times even hostile to technical knowledge and technological solutions.”13 The Importance of Doctrine and How to Manage 117 Eben Swift allowed his students to war-game, which was common in German military schools at all levels. Like so many other examples from German military institutions, this one was watered down for American purposes.WhereasinGermanystudents“fought”throughawholeengagement , including sudden changes of assignments and tactical surprises, the American students’ task would end after the main forces had made contact .14 This, however, seemed to have been common practice in the U.S. Army of those days and even the Army War College operated in such an unimaginative and inflexible way.15 The faculty at Leavenworth did nothing to change this unfortunate procedure.16 Only in the year 1939 would a continuous series of theoretical engagements be fought by the students.17 In Swift’s opinion, modern weaponry made the outcome of the battle predictable after the units were positioned. Not only did this attitude failtochallengehisstudentsmentallybutitbecamealso“anexcusetoignore complex problems.”18 Only in the 1930s would multifaceted war games be introduced, but here again they were highly...