Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II

Endnotes

221 Introduction 1. Cited in Russell Frank Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Cam­ paign of France and Germany, 1944–1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), xix. 2. This correspondence can be found in the Dwight D. Eisenhower and Walter B. Smith papers at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. 3. WalterBedellSmith,Eisenhower’sSixGreatDecisions:Europe,1944– 1945 (New York: Longmans, 1956), 532. 4. HarryC.Butcher,MyThreeYearswithEisenhower:ThePersonalDiary of Captain Harry C. Butcher, USNR, Naval Aide to General Eisenhower, 1942 to 1945 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1946). 5. The original manuscript of the book without the omissions is still available at the Eisenhower Library and has unfortunately never been published in its unedited form: Harry Butcher Diaries Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Pre­Presidential Papers, Box 165+166, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. Endnotes 222 Command Culture 6. George S. Patton and Paul D. Harkins, War as I Knew It (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1995). The book was first published in 1947. Ladislas Farago, The Last Days of Patton (New York: McGraw­Hill, 1981). 7. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1947; reprint, 1948). 8. Keith E. Eiler, Mobilizing America: Robert P. Patterson and the War Effort, 1940–1945 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 459–450. 9. Clark’s own account, for example, fits exactly that description: Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950). 10. Bernard Law Montgomery of Alamein, The Memoirs of Field Mar­ shal Montgomery (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2005). 11. Weigley,Eisenhower’sLieutenants.Themilitaryhistorianwasinspired by an earlier work, Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command (New York: Scribner, 1942). 12. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 432. 13. Ibid., 589, 594. 14. Ibid., 433. 15. Ibid., 729. 16. Letter from Paul M. Robinett to his father J. H. Robinett, February 26, 1943, Paul M. Robinett Papers, Box 10, Folder General Mili­ tary Correspondence, January–May 1943, B­10/F­8, George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, Virginia. 17. Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Perfor­ mance, 1939–1945, Contributions in Military History (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1982). 18. Ibid., 168. 19. Ibid., 168. 20. Ibid., 168. 21. John Ellis, Cassino: The Hollow Victory (New York: McGraw­Hill, 1984). 22. John Ellis, Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War (New York: Viking, 1990). Endnotes 223 23. Ibid., 331. 24. Ibid., 532, 534. 25. Ronald Spector, “The Military Effectiveness of the U.S. Armed Forces, 1919–1939,” in Military Effectiveness: The Interwar Period, ed. Allan Reed Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988), 76. 26. Allan Reed Millett, “The United States Armed Forces in the Second World War,” in Military Effectiveness: The Second World War, ed. Allan Reed Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988), 76. 27. Ibid., 77. 28. Ibid., 74. 29. Ibid., 61. 30. RichardOvery,WhytheAlliesWon(NewYorkCity:Norton,1995). There are numerous errors in Overy’s book: Dwight D. Eisenhower was not born in “Abiline,” Kansas, but in Denison, Texas. He was raised in Abilene, Kansas (p. 144). Ike could not have been pro­ moted to the Pentagon three weeks after Pearl Harbor because the Pentagon was not finished before 1943 (p. 261). Overy states that “Axis forces did little to alter the basic pattern of their mili­ tary organization and operational practice, or to reform and mod­ ernize the way they made war” (p. 318). This sentence is—at least in respect to the Wehrmacht—completely erroneous. The structure of the German divisions, the officer corps, as well as the operational way to wage war had changed greatly from 1939 to 1945. “It is in­ conceivable that a Marshall or an Eisenhower, with no combat expe­ rience between them, could have won supreme command in either the German or Japanese war effort.” (Ibid.) That is a comparison of apples and oranges. Marshall was chief of staff of the army and comparable officers on the German side—like Franz Halder—had even less combat and command experience than Marshall. There were other German army and army group commanders who had lit­ tle or no combat experience, like Albert Kesselring and Friedrich Paulus, both field marshals. It is methodologically problematic for 224 Command Culture both Ellis’s and Overy’s book that for the German side they largely rely on post­war writings of German officers. 31. Ibid., 318. 32. Ibid., 325. 33. Ibid., 318. 34. Charles E. Kirkpatrick, “‘The Very Model...