Hell in An Loc: The 1972 Easter Invasion and the Battle That Saved South Viet Nam

4. Prelude to the Battle of An Loc

64 While the battle was raging in Loc Ninh, President Thieu, on April 7, convened a meeting of the corps commanders at the Independence Palace in Saigon to assess the national military crisis. Present at the meeting were Gen. Tran Thien Khiem, the prime minister, Gen. Cao Van Vien, Chairman of the JGS, Gen. Dang Van Quang, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the four corps commanders. By that time, President Thieu and ARVN/JGS believed that the main thrust of the enemy Easter Offensive was in MRI. I Corps, in fact, was reeling from enemy multi-divisional assaults and the overextended 3rd Division was forced to retreat behind the Cam Lo River. The 57th and 2nd Regiments, outgunned and outnumbered, had fallen back to the new defense line extending from Dong Ha to RN 9. The 56th Regiment and the 147th Marine Brigade—the latter was under the tactical control of the 3rd Division—also suffered heavy casualties and had to abandon two strategic positions on the western flank of the 3rd Division. To make matters worse, Lt. Col. Pham Van Dinh, the 56th Regiment commander, had just surrendered to the enemy at the former U.S. Camp Carroll with the remnants of his regiment. A promising young officer, Dinh had distinguished himself during the 1968 Tet Offensive and was awarded the U.S Silver Star for heroism during the fight to retake the Citadel of Hue. His betrayal dealt a heavy blow to the morale of ARVN troops at a very critical time. Four Prelude to the Battle of An Loc 65 Prelude to the Battle of An Loc In MRII, the situation was relatively quiet after the collapse of Tan Canh at the end of March and the first elements of ARVN’s 23rd Division had already arrived at Kontum in an effort to stop the NVA’s thrust toward Pleiku, the seat of II Corps headquarters. President Thieu and JGS fully realized that, due to An Loc’s close proximity to Saigon, the fall of this provincial capital would place the three attacking NVA divisions at a striking distance from the capital. However, the intensity of the attack in MRI, the massive use of artillery and missiles, the heavy casualties of the 3rd Division , and the fact that the attack on Quang Tri was directed by the NVA High Command itself, convinced President Thieu that the two northern provinces were the main objective of the enemy’s socalled Great Offensive. In any event, during that fateful meeting at the Independence Palace, General Minh, III Corps commander, requested additional units to help cope with the ongoing attack in Binh Long province . Minh also stressed the importance of establishing a defense line around Saigon in case An Loc was overrun and an additional division could be used for that purpose.1 He was asked to leave the room while the war council discussed his request. Minh was later recalled into the room to be informed that the 21st Division in IV Corps will be put under his command to relieve An Loc. In addition, the 1st Airborne Brigade—which was providing security to the Independence Palace—and the 81st Airborne Commando Group, two of the few uncommitted units in the JGS general reserve , would be attached to III Corps for the defense of An Loc. During the meeting, Gen. Dang Van Quang, Assistant to the President for Security, had convinced President Thieu that the loss of a capital city so close to Saigon would be a disastrous loss of face and a big blow to the morale of the army.2 It should be noted that Quang was General Minh’s mentor. A former commander of the 21st Division, Quang recommended Minh to succeed him at that position when he was appointed IV Corps commander in 1964. Quang, Minh, and Hung, the 5th Division commander, were members of the so-called “Delta Clan.” They were all strong supporters of President Thieu who, himself, had preceded Quang as IV Corps commander. General Minh was indeed fortunate to have a mentor 66 Hell in An Loc who had the ears of the President and thus was in a good position to help him in time of need. At first, President Thieu had considered putting one division from IV Corps under JGS general reserve for possible deployment in MRI to help retake the lost territory north...