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103 4 Arnold Places LeMay in Command In July 1944, Brigadier General Hansell, then the Chief of Staff, Twentieth Air Force, wrote to the Joint Staff Planners: “Sustained B-29 operations against the aircraft industry of Japan from bases in the Marianas willcommenceonorabout1November1944.Withinthreemonthsthereafter , the effects of these attacks will begin to be felt.” As it turned out, in a great irony, Hansell in effect had written his own epitaph as commander of the XXI Bomber Command. As noted, the XX Bomber Command’s B-29 Matterhorn operation led by Wolfe and then LeMay, established under great pressure from Roosevelt, suffered from major logistical difficulties. Similarly, operations in the Marianas under Hansell got off to a slow start. Arnold, already seem­ ingly anticipating a race in the summer of 1945 to force Japan to surren­ der without an invasion, had been quite clear in his marching orders to Hansell. The AAF commander termed the effort to knock Japan out of thewarwiththeB-29campaignasthe“TheBattleofJapan.”Hereminded Hansell that he was “watching you from day to day with the greatest anticipation .” Arnold reminded Hansell that “we have a big obligation to meet … 104 Cataclysm we must in fact destroy our targets and then we must show the results sothepubliccanjudgeforitselfastotheeffectivenessofouroperations.”1 This was vintage Arnold: get the job done quickly and then we shall show the results to the American people. Arnold had an extraordinarily sensitive ear to the citizenry. No other U.S. commander who was also a member of the Joint Chiefs sustained such oversight on his operational commanders in the field. It almost seemed that Arnold was attempting to will success in the B-29 offensive, in the same fashion that he had hectored Eaker in Europe and then sent him reluctantly packing to command in the Mediterranean. In LeMay, he found a commander who understood clearly the pressure that Arnold was under in Washington. This was no mean feat on LeMay’s part. Early on, in India commanding the XX Bomber Command, LeMay wrote to Arnold on October 19, 1944, that “I shall continue to expend all my efforts to give you the results you desire and expect.” Moreover, in the Pacific war, LeMay from the start never hesitated to spell out operational problems, but always made it a point to emphasize to Arnold what was being done to solve them. LeMay made clear to Arnold that he was not satisfied with the weight of bomb loads, something uppermost in Arnold’s mind. The B-29’s capacity suffered from insufficient power in the R-3350 engines. Bomb load was limited by gross take-off load: “The take-off is a very serious problem with the B-29 and is the high point of any flight.”2 Thus, LeMay had the ability to keep Arnold up to date on his problem-solving moves. There were additional difficulties, LeMay emphasized. Combat crews lacked experience in the theater: “their experience with the B-29 prior to arrival in this Theater was sadly lacking. Many crews had never dropped a bomb from the B-29 and very few had flown it in formation.”3 Prior to October 1944, thirty-five percent of LeMay’s total B-29 flying time occurred in cargo operations to the Chengtu area. LeMay, however , instituted a training program to correct the situation. Runways in China, made of limestone, tended to be dusty or muddy, and were slow for take-offs. However, these difficulties, which affected bomb capacity, were being corrected. Nonetheless, the single, most critical element remained engine improvement. LeMay put it starkly: “The B-29 airplane ArnoldPlacesLeMayinCommand 105 is capable of a considerable higher performance than the R-3350 engine … will permit, as the maximum gross operating weight is limited by the power available for take-off and climb. Until more power is available, we cannot fully capitalize on the capabilities of the airplane.” Overall, LeMay summarized: The principal factors which have adversely affected our range and bomb capacity are being corrected. It is reasonable to assume that we are now in a position to capitalize on past experience. This, together with the advent of cooler weather and the contemplated future changes in engine cooling, should permit a substantial increase in bomb loads over those carried on the initial operations of the Command.4 Arnold not only prodded his field generals, but consistently stoked competition between his commanders. On November 17, 1944, he wrote to LeMay, noting the significant improvement in B-29 operations, especially when it...

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