Cataclysm: General Hap Arnold and the Defeat of Japan

2. Planning for the Defeat of Japan

57 2 Planning for the Defeat of Japan American war planning designed to oppose Japanese aggression was nothing new. Early in the twentieth century, the Joint Army and Navy Board had promulgated a series of color designations for various countries . Japan was assigned the code color Orange. Over the years, these Orange plans were revised, outlining strategies by which Japan could be defeated. Between the wars the Navy took the lead, with help from Army planners, to evolve theoretical plans to defeat Japan. Despite this early concern about Japan with its threat to American interests, corroborated in the 1930s by virulent Japanese aggression against China, it should be emphasized that Anglo-American planning in World War II rested on the firm, early decision—made in the ABC-1 discussions in January– March 1941, well before the United States entered the war—that Nazi Germany was the main enemy, Europe the decisive theater: “It should be a cardinal principle of American-British strategy that only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted from operations against Germany.”1 Thus, the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff took the view “that Germany is the prime 58 Cataclysm enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated, the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow.”2 In the Pacific, the United States, at least initially, would fight a defen­ sive, holding action against the Japanese. “I am convinced,” said Lieutenant General Arnold, “that a blow against Germany is of first importance. The strength of Japan is relative, the strength of Germany is absolute.”3 He felt that the air offensive should quickly be directed against the critical objectives of Germany’s internal structure for these reasons:4 help the Soviets by diverting German air strength; support the invasion of the Continent; impair Germany’s ability to wage war by striking her industry and communications; and protect the “only existing base from which we can launch air or ground attacks directly against Germany.” Precision daylight bombing, according to Arnold, “as planned by the Eighth Air Force and which it is equipped and trained for, can be estimated conservatively as having twice the effectiveness of the broad, area-target, night bombing for which the RAF is equipped and trained.”5 He firmly believed (and Spaatz and Eaker concurred) that German morale could be broken with the result that Allied troops would have a comparatively easy time apply­ ing the final touch. After Germany fell, Japan could be knocked out with­ out great difficulty.6 Considering Allied global requirements , U.S. air leaders realized that a simultaneous air campaign against Germany and Japan would be impossible. On May 6, 1942, President Roosevelt reiterated the over-arching Allied strategy of a defensive holding operation in the Pacific, emphasizing that this was the responsibility of the United States. The exceptions to this defensive posture, according to Roosevelt, were interdic­ tion of Japanese lines of communications and the bombing of Japan’s home islands. Here it is appropriate to note the JCS-approved strategy of the Pacific war that has been described as “island hopping,” with Army ground forces, Navy, and Marine forces taking the lead. MacArthur and FDR, however, had a most willing collaborator in Hap Arnold. Early in the war, Arnold had been quick to recognize the importance of combining surface action with air strength in order to “apply direct pressure” against Japan. Arnold emphasized to the president that in his view the strategic plan was to capture bases “from which air power can hit at the heart of Japan.” The advancing of bases, PlanningfortheDefeatofJapan 59 according to Arnold, “must be relentless and must be limited only by the availability of forces not required to crush Germany.”7 Here Arnold emphasized the approved strategy of defeating Germany first. He realized , he informed Roosevelt, “the drain of this plan on the Nation’s productive capacity, but I have every confidence in it.”8 It was important to destroy more enemy ships and planes than the Japanese could replace. The president stressed that “combat against Japanese ships and planes must be sought out in order to hasten the attrition of Japanese arms.”9 It was also important to keep as many Japanese forces as possible occupied in China. Roosevelt’s empha­ sis on bombing the Japanese home islands should be noted here; he kept coming back to it throughout the war, up...