Cataclysm: General Hap Arnold and the Defeat of Japan

7. Who Was Hap Arnold?

207 7 Who Was Hap Arnold? In the Pacific, a time compression evolved in the strategic bombing campaign .1 Only two months of the incendiary campaign had passed between LeMay’s Tokyo raid in March and the defeat of Nazi Germany in May 1945. With the intensive B-29 campaign, Arnold and the American airmen overcame Japan’s will to continue in less time than was the case with Germany. Ironically, what Arnold hoped for in Europe evolved in the Pacific: the B-29 incendiary campaign crumbled Japan. The evolution of the B-29—going back to the report of the Kilner board well before U.S. entry into World War II—perfectly followed the march of aircraft technology. General Arnold and the Army Air Forces specifiedtherequirementforaverylong-rangebomberthatfarexceeded the B-17 in all important categories. Based on the AAF doctrine of highaltitude precision bombing, the B-29 would fly higher, farther, and with a greater bomb load. There was no doubt that from early on, and through the war, Arnold and the air leadership viewed the potential success of the revolutionary B-29 as proving the case for a postwar independent Air Force. Arnold went so far as to admonish Haywood Hansell, his 208 Cataclysm B-29 commander of XXI Bomber Command, that the results of his bombingcampaignwoulddeterminethefutureoftheArmyAirForces .Theirony of the campaign was that LeMay, who succeeded Hansell, only had success when he area-bombed with incendiaries at low level at night over Japan, a stunning departure from the original specifications and doctrine. Thus,thestrategyandtacticsofstrategicbombingclearlycametobebased upon the dual impetus of technology and circumstance—what would work at the time and place. In this regard, as I have noted earlier, the AAF’s early strategic bombing doctrine was found wanting in both Europe and the Pacific. Escort fighters proved to be a necessity in Europe where tactics and targeting evolved haltingly, leading to enormous frustration on Arnold’s part. In the Pacific, as Norstad and Hansell pointed out, target data was atfirstsomewhatscarceandconstantlyrequiredmodification,culminat­ ing in LeMay’s area bombing offensive in the spring and summer of 1945. Just prior to the dropping of atomic bombs, the AAF had finally concluded that an eleventh-hour bombing campaign against the railroad system might bring Japan down. The reasons for the Japanese surrender will always remain a matter of controversy. Early Allied war plans stipulated that top priority would be assigned to the defeat of Germany. And after Germany’s capitulation in May 1945, it was anticipated, and emphasized by directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that an invasion of the Japanese homeland would be necessary to bring about her defeat. In noting that Japan’s surrender in Aug­ ust 1945 came about without an invasion, and with a home army of two million men intact, the official history of the Army Air Forces made the observation: “Something new had been added to America’s experience with war—something that called for close study.”2 Whatever the rationale for Japan’s surrender, the official history commented, “it seemed indisputable that the war’s end marked one of the revolutionary turning points in the history of warfare itself.”3 The “something new” that the official historians referred to was of course the prosecution of the strategic bombing campaign. It was a campaign, as we have seen, with no boundaries, either geographical or in intensity. Historian Michael Sherry has criticized the carte blanche given LeMay in the Pacific, but the record clearly indicates that there was WhoWasHapArnold? 209 plenty of pressure and guidance from Twentieth Air Force headquarters in Washington.4 Historians have also long speculated over to what degree Arnold influenced operational commanders in the field. Conrad Crane, in his fine study of strategic bombing, suggests that “Arnold rarely wielded a great deal of direct influence especially in key operations late in the con­ flict.”5 Arnold’s influence did not obtain through operational orders, but was nonetheless pervasive. He communicated directly with Hansell and LeMay,buildingthepressureonthem.Norstad,aswehaveseen,informed LeMay that if he did not get results he would be fired. LeMay realized that “the turkey” was around his neck and that Arnold and Norstad supported incendiary attacks.6 The requirement for incendiary attacks went back to 1943 and 1944 and evolved with reports from the Committee of Operations Analysts and the Joint Target Group. The vulnerability of Japan’s urban areas to incendiary strikes was well-known long before the start of World War II. Note that the Doolittle raid in April...