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“To Carry Off the Glory”: Edmund Kirby Smith in 1864 Jeffery S. Prushankin iN early 1863, the CoNfederate war departmeNt promoted thirty-eight-yearold Lieutenant General Edmund Kirby Smith to command of the TransMississippi Department. For Kirby Smith, a Floridian and a West Pointer with extensive service in the antebellum army, the assignment to department command came as a mixed blessing. As a Confederate brigadier, Kirby Smith had achieved a degree of celebrity at First Manassas. After a promotion and a transfer to district command in East Tennessee, however, he overreached during the Kentucky Campaign and fell short of his quest for martial glory. While Kirby Smith aspired to increased rank and status, the TransMississippi was so poorly organized that it bordered on chaotic. Moreover, command in the far reaches of the Confederacy offered little opportunity for Kirby Smith to build his reputation as a military leader. “I have a herculanian task before me,” he complained to his mentor Joseph E. Johnston, “no army, no means . . . no system, no order, all to be done from the beginning.”1 Kirby Smith spent much of 1863 reorganizing the department, meeting with Trans-Mississippi politicians and managing operations in the districts of Arkansas, West Louisiana, and Texas. Ultimately, he hoped to direct department resources toward a campaign to regain Arkansas and capture Missouri. Such an operation would not only secure for him the glory that had thus far eluded his grasp but also would serve to repay a political debt to Missouri and Arkansas politicians who had lobbied President Jefferson Davis to appoint him to department command. Yet as 1863 drew to a close, Kirby Smith had failed to initiate a Missouri campaign and instead grappled with the loss of territory in Arkansas and threats of invasion in Louisiana.2 In January 1864, Confederate spies advised Kirby Smith of Federal plans for a spring offensive with Shreveport as the objective. The Federals designed a pincer movement to seize the Trans-Mississippi capital, destroy Confederate Jeffery S. Prushankin 58 manufacturing and supply depots, and chase Kirby Smith’s army into Texas. The campaign was scheduled to get under way in March with thirty thousand Federals in Louisiana, commanded by Major General Nathaniel P. Banks, moving northwest along the Red River from Alexandria under the protection of Rear Admiral David D. Porter’s fleet of warships. From Arkansas , Major General Frederick Steele would lead a twelve-thousand-man Federal column south and join Banks in reducing Shreveport. District of Western Louisiana commander Major General Richard Taylor and District of Arkansas commander Lieutenant General Theophilus H. Holmes each had fewer than seven thousand troops with which to contest the invasion.3 Kirby Smith had hoped to launch a spring offensive through Arkansas and into Missouri, but the threat of an enemy invasion along two fronts forced him to postpone his plans. He realized that the Federal advance in Louisiana posed the greatest danger and advised Davis, “The only true line of operation by which the enemy can penetrate the department is the valley of the Red River.” Kirby Smith began to craft a strategy establishing Shreveport as a central position. Ideally, Confederate forces in each district would turn back the Federals. Yet if troops in Arkansas and Louisiana could not stop the enemy advance along their respective fronts, the Confederates would fall back to effect concentration at Shreveport. From there, Kirby Smith would operate along interior lines and strike each Federal column in detail. Although the plan surrendered the strategic initiative to the enemy, there was little else Kirby Smith could do in the face of two huge columns advancing on the Trans-Mississippi capital from different directions.4 To execute this strategy, Kirby Smith needed the cooperation of his district commanders, but such support was not forthcoming. In Louisiana, he directed Taylor to strengthen Fort DeRussy, located on Red River southeast of Alexandria. Kirby Smith hoped that the guns of DeRussy would prevent the Federal fleet from reaching Alexandria and thus deprive the enemy infantry of naval support. Taylor argued against the plan and insisted DeRussy would fall. He suggested an offensive strategy that included an attack against Federal ground forces before they could enter the Red River valley. Kirby Smith vetoed the proposal and ordered Taylor to fortify DeRussy. Taylor continued his protest but, upon realizing that Kirby Smith would not yield, complained of illness and asked for a furlough. Kirby Smith refused, and Taylor grudgingly began to refurbish the fort.5 Work on...

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