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7  Overview of the Military Situation to the Middle of September The first year of war failed to produce a military decision anywhere. None of the enemies surrounding the Central Powers had been defeated. Turkey’s entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers in the fall of 1914, as well as Bulgaria’s alignment in the late summer of 1915, represented political achievements to be sure, but these developments were offset by Italy’s defection to the Entente, which was a serious setback. At the same time, the positions of Rumania and Greece remained uncertain and wavering. The enemy blockade was affecting the economic situation of the Central Powers ever more seriously. Commercial warfare by submarine never became entirely effective because pressure from the neutral states—especially the United States— meant it was employed only intermittently. Also, serious diplomatic altercations between Germany and the United States over submarine incidents made it ever more doubtful that the United States would remain neutral. Furthermore, despite the OHL’s ongoing efforts, there was no possibility of opening peace negotiations. Thus military operations had to continue. Notwithstanding his original plans, at the beginning of 1915 General von Falkenhayn was forced to transfer the offensive emphasis to the East—a development that he hoped would be only temporary. By the middle of April he had decided to keep the war’s focus on the Russian Front because of the precarious situation for Germany’s allies in the Carpathians and Italy’s threat to enter the war on the side of the Entente. Thus the army on the Western Front continued to protect the Eastern Army’s back. This remained the case even though the Chief of the General Staff pursued only limited operational objectives on the Eastern Front until the summer. At the suggestion of Mackensen’s staff and General Conrad, these operational objectives were temporarily expanded. In the middle of July Falkenhayn hoped to bring about a decision in the East by defeating the main Russian forces in Poland through a combined offensive on the German and Austro-Hungarian portions of the front. By month’s end, however, he had abandoned hope of “totally defeating Russia.” Once again, he limited the objectives in the East, even though a decisive campaign against Russia seemed especially favourable, given OberOst’s proposal to move the centre of gravity from the Narew to the Njemen so as to attack the enemy’s northern flank as well as its rearward support system. Falkenhayn was concerned that the considerable forces necessary for such a broad offensive would render impossible deployments to other fronts, thereby threatening plans to launch the Serbian campaign.Above all, however, he doubted that the operation would be a resounding success. So he withheld his approval of OberOst’s plan. The need to begin the campaign against Serbia in order to establish a link with Turkey appeared all the more urgent when, at the beginning of August, renewed British and French landings on the Gallipoli Peninsula again threatened the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, Falkenhayn pressed for a conclusion to the diplomatic negotiations with Bulgaria as well as for a conclusion to the offensive against Russia. In the meantime, operations on the Eastern Front were no longer resulting in decisive successes. On the Eastern Army’s left flank, OberOst’s long-sought offensive against the Russian Army’s northern flank finally began at the beginning of September—albeit belatedly and with insufficient forces. By the middle of the month it was blatantly obvious that the attack across the Wilna had failed to meet expectations. The enemy had been able to intercept the deep flanking attack and had evaded the blow through a timely retreat. Army Groups Prinz Leopold and Mackensen, positioned in the centre of the Eastern Front, pressed after the retreating Russian Army in a frontal pursuit through Poland, but on reaching the western edge of the extensive Rokitno Marshes, they finally discontinued their advance and established permanent positions. On the Eastern Army’s right flank, the AOK’s attempt to liberate Eastern Galicia and to decisively defeat the Russians on their Southwest Front failed, as the attack stalled quickly in the face of Russian counterattacks. Thus, by the middle of September the Central Powers’main combined offensive had perhaps dealt a severe blow to the Russian forces’ combat effectiveness, but it had not brought about their total defeat. 238 part iii: summer and autumn [3.22.181.209] Project MUSE (2024-04-23...

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