Germany’s Western Front: 1915: Translations from the German Official History of the Great War

6. Overview of the Multi-Front War during the Summer

6  Overview of the Multi-Front War during the Summer Italy’s entry into the war had dominated much of the strategic debate during the first half of the year. However, Italy proved to be a less formidable adversary than either Falkenhayn or Conrad feared. Operations on the Italian Front began soon after Italy’s declaration of war with the first of twelve Italian offensives across the Isonzo, a river surrounded by mountains just inside the Austrian border . After several initial Italian forays that resulted in the capture of Caporetto but failure at Gorizia and Tolmino, on 23 June 1915, 250,000 Italian troops tried to cross the Isonzo along the Kras Plateau. Although the Italians faced only 115,000 Austrian troops, they lost 15,000 men as masses of infantry tried to cross the river to the enemy’s high ground beyond. The Austrian casualties were only 10,000. The First Battle of the Isonzo ended in failure on 7 July, but a new offensive across the same ground was launched on the 18th. This time 260 Italian battalions faced 129 Austro-Hungarian, and again the Italians suffered horrendous casualties of 46,000 men. The second Isonzo offensive also failed to secure the river crossings and petered out by 3 August. The successes of the Central Powers on the Italian Front, against the Russian army, which was now retreating beyond the San, and against the French and British at the Dardanelles now made a campaign against Serbia more realistic. More important, Bulgaria and Rumania were dissuaded from joining Italy and the Entente. It again seemed possible that one or both powers might be induced to co-operate in a campaign against their Balkan rival.1 The General Situation to the Beginning of August On 21 May the German and Austro-Hungarian General Staff Chiefs agreed to continue to make their primary effort in the Galician Theatre and to maintain defensive positions on the other fronts. Falkenhayn was determined to adhere to this decision over the following months despite Italy’s entry into the war and the sometimes precarious situations at the Dardanelles and on the Western Front. With increased success in the Eastern Theatre, the operational goals had continuously broadened.While the initial goal in the Galician Theatre had been limited to relieving Russian pressure on Austria-Hungary’s Carpathian Front, on reaching the Wislok the pursuit had continued to the San in order “to deal the enemy a blow from which he would not be able to recover.”Afterwards, operations against the enemy were to continue east of the San “until a decision commensurate with our goals”(i.e., the final defeat of Russian offensive strength in Galicia) had been achieved. Finally, it was intended that by coordinating the Austro-Hungarian and German Eastern Fronts, the main enemy forces in Poland would be defeated and thus “a decision in the campaign” against Russia would be reached. Given these circumstances, it was clear that all available forces from the other theatres of war were needed in the East. With the increasing military requirements of the Eastern Front, the two General Staff chiefs did not hesitate to stretch the German Western Army, as well as the German Army on the Serbian Front, to their limits by withdrawing units from those sectors. From the middle of April until the first half of August these transfers amounted to no fewer than fourteen and a half infantry and reserve divisions from the West, plus three German divisions from the Serbian Front, for a total of seventeen and a half divisions. By 14 April, eight divisions had been transferred to the East. The transfer from West to East of one division on 3 May, two and a half divisions on 2 June, two on 19 July, and one on 8 August followed. Of these divisions, only two would be returned to the Western Front. Because the objectives on the Russian Front expanded only gradually, the deployment of these forces did not take place all at once but rather little by little. Thus a “campaign-deciding” result had not been achieved. 220 part ii: spring and summer 1 DW VIII: 25–33. Because of the growing need for forces in the East, all demands in the other theatres of war that exceeded minimum requirements had to be deferred for the time being. The planned offensive against Serbia, which was necessary because of the...