Canada and the Second World War: Essays in Honour of Terry Copp

17. Operation Smash and 4 Canadian Armoured Division’s Drive to Trun

391 17 Operation Smash and 4 Canadian Armoured Division’s Drive toTrun Angelo Caravaggio In Fields of Fire (2003), Terry Copp concluded that historians had underrated the First Canadian Army’s contribution to the Allied campaign in Normandy. He noted that Canadians “played a role all out of proportion to its relative strength among the Allied armies.”1 On Canadian generalship in the final stages of the Normandy campaign, Professor Copp maintained that it was not possible “to argue that any of the three Canadian divisional commanders passed the test of battle [near Falaise],” though he conceded that it was “not clear how much this failure of leadership at the divisional level mattered.”2 The command decisions of Generals B.L. Montgomery and Omar Bradley were more instrumental in the final outcome when the Allies failed to close off the final escape route of two German armies to the east of Falaise. Commenting on Major-General George Kitching, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, Copp stated that “assigning major responsibility for the events of 17–21 August to the senior commanders [Montgomery and Bradley] does not explain or excuse the command failures that marred the record of 4th Armoured Division during this crucial period.”3 In particular, Copp remains critical of Kitching’s decision to advance “his entire division on a single axis to the Falaise–Trun road” during the push to Trun on 17 August.4 Copp’s assessment reflects the current body of literature, which is critical of the performance of Maj.-Gen. Kitching and his division’s drive to Trun. These assessments, however, have been made without a true understanding of the complex series of orders issued by the 2nd Canadian Corps5 from 15 392 Operation Smash and 4 Canadian Armoured Division’s Drive toTrun to 18 August 1944 that shaped the actions of the division. The 4th Armoured Division’s drive to Trun, formally know as Operation Smash (Op Smash), was not a thrust along a single axis but a well-thought-out plan that had been devised and executed based on the best available tactical intelligence. This chapter will demonstrate that the leaders of the 4th Armoured Division were responsive, adaptive, and resilient in responding to the constantly changing tactical situation in their successful drive to Trun. The 4th Division6 entered the line south of Caen on 31 July 1944 as an untested combat formation. The division conducted a series of minor operations against Tilly-la-Campagne and La Hogue between 1 and 7 August 1944 before taking part in its first major operation, Operation Totalize, on 8 August. Totalize was a 2nd Canadian Corps operation designed to break through the German defences around Caen with the original intent of capturing Falaise. This operation was launched on the evening of 7 August. The 4th Division was tasked with participating in Phase II; its objective was to capture Point 195, a feature that dominated the Caen–Falaise highway located approximately 16 kilometres into German territory. After three days of intense fighting, the division captured Point 195, but at great cost. The division went into Totalize at full strength, reporting a compliment of 328 tanks of all types, 869 officers, and 15,383 other ranks. Two days later, even with reinforcements in men and tanks, the division was down to 824 officers and 14,248 other ranks. One battle group, Worthington Force, had suffered significant casualties during the fight for Hill 140, losing 47 of their 55 tanks as well as 250 men.7 Four other units—the Governor General’s Foot Guards (GGFG), the Canadian Grenadier Guards (CGG), the Lincoln and Welland Regiment, and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada (Argylls)—after capturing and holding Point 195 for two days, were reporting effective strengths below 85 percent. Of greater concern was that four of the division’s eight regimental/ battalion commanding officers were replaced or became casualties between 8 and 13 August. Major R.A. Keane took over command of the Lake Superior Regiment, Major W.T. Cromb was given the Lincoln and Welland Regiment, and Major R.A. Bradburn took over the Algonquin Regiment, while Major C.E. Parish commanded the British Columbia Regiment.8 After one week of fighting, the 4th Division entered the next phase of operations with a new cadre of commanding officers whose time in command could be measured 393 Angelo Caravaggio at...