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335 15 No Ambush, No Defeat The Advance of theVanguard of the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 7 June 1944 Marc Milner It is virtually an article of faith in the Normandy campaign literature that the vanguard of the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade (hereafter 9 Brigade) was ambushed and defeated by 12 SS Hitler Youth Panzer Division on D+1. These young Nazi fanatics, led by battle-hardened Eastern Front veterans, took the naïve Canadians by surprise, denied them their ultimate objective and sent them packing.1 For many historians, the defeat of 9 Brigade is also evidence of the flawed nature of Allied leadership and combat capability, and yet more proof of the superior fighting skill of German forces.2 These ideas have proven powerfully enduring. Ironically, the Canadian Army’s own official history is largely to blame for the very negative interpretation of 9 Brigade’s battle on 7 June. Charles Stacey’s The Victory Campaign devoted seven pages to the battle: four and a half setting it up, and most of two analyzing why the brigade “had been caught off balance and defeated in detail.”3 In Stacey’s view, the brigade fought with “courage and spirit, but somewhat clumsily” against “an unusually efficient German force of about its own strength, it had come off second best.” The result was a “severe local reverse” that—in words that damned all Canadian efforts in the days after D-Day—“helped to ensure that Caen remained in German hands.”4 In fact, Stacey never did a full work-up on the battle. His account of the actual battle with 12 SS on D+1 consists of one eighteen-line 336 No Ambush, No Defeat paragraph, and six of those lines are devoted to the brigade consolidation at the end of the day. His entire description of the struggle for Authie is eleven words: the vanguard “fought hard but were overrun: only a few men got away.”5 Given this assessment by the Canadian official historian, it is hard to blame others for picking up the tone. A closer look at the events of D+1 tells quite a different story. It reveals that the vanguard of 9 Brigade fought an enemy at least three times its size to a standstill, and did so largely without the crucial component of AngloCanadian doctrine: artillery support. Stacey admitted the latter point but claimed that the guns were simply out of range.6 He was wrong: at least three Canadian field regiments were within range for much of the battle. In the event, the outcome of the battle resulted in the establishment of the 9 Brigade fortress on the only ground suitable under the circumstances. The brigade’s ultimate objective of Carpiquet, and its alternate position between Buron and Authie,7 were untenable without the 3rd British Division in line on their left. Finally, in the process 9 Brigade met and defeated a portion of the panzer forces that the 3rd Canadian Division had been tasked with destroying. So maybe 9 Brigade did all right on D+1 after all. The task for the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division on D+1 was clear: it was to establish brigade fortress positions astride the Caen–Bayeux highway on either side of the Mue River “to meet the anticipated counter attack.”8 This was in keeping with the Allied expectation that German panzer formations, located generally east of Caen, would launch their counteroffensive against the landings across the excellent tank country north and west of the city. As a COSSAC appreciation of 22 October 1943 observed: “The country NORTHWEST of CAEN is very suited to tank action, and it is therefore in this area that the panzer battle should be staged in order that the landing forces may be driven into the sea.”9 A SHAEF estimate completed on the eve of D-Day echoed that concern, noting that the armoured division now believed to be around Argentan (actually 21 Pz near Falaise) “would be employed in battlegroups in direct attack on the Allied bridgehead and might advance either EAST of the R. MUE … or attempt to seize the high ground NORTH of the R. SEULLES in the area BANVILLE-CREPON-BAZENVILLE.”10 The latter was most easily reached by moving up the west side of the Mue River. So the Canadians did not “push boldly” inland on D+1 “despite” the danger of [13.59.243.194] Project MUSE (2024-04-24 23:25 GMT...

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