Germany’s Western Front: 1914: Translations from the German Official History of the Great War, Part 1

XV The OHL, 3–4 September

While first, second, and third armies spent the first days of september attempting to push the French across the Marne and away from Paris in a southeasterly direction, the German centre—Fourth and Fifth Armies—advanced steadily southwards .1 On the evening of 1 September, Fourth Army issed orders to continue the pursuit from the line Vouziers–Briquenay along both banks of the Marne . At 22:00 the next night, Duke Albrecht reported to the OHL that the line Somme-Py–Autry had been acquired and that on 3 September the pursuit would continue as far as Courtisols–Courtémont . In a confidential letter to his generals, Albrecht wrote: The same enemy which we defeated in the Battle of Neufchâteau has twice counterattacked and then slipped away without major losses—especially in prisoners and war materiel . The last time he put up very little resistance on the Aisne; his strength seems to be broken and the break-up of his forces seems to have begun . As much as our men should be given a day of rest, at this time that would be a grave mistake that would return to haunt us . We must instead stay hard on the enemy’s heels; the fruits of our victory must be harvested . However, to accomplish this goal we must engage 1 This is a summary translation of DW III, Chapter 8, “Operations of Fourth and Fifth Armies, 2–4 September 1914,” 255–75; DW III, Chapter 9: “The Offensive of the German Left Wing (Sixth and Seventh Army) Against Nancy–Epinal to 4 September,” 276–302; and DW III, Chapter 9: “The Offensive of the German Left Wing (Sixth and Seventh Army) Against Nancy–Epinal to 4 September,” 293–301 . XV Pp The OHL, 3–4 September 468 part ii: from the sambre to the marne the enemy with determination . When his rear guards do attempt to stop the army, our response must be most spirited . It is insufficient to respond from a distance with artillery; this will not tie down the enemy . Therefore, the other arms must also be used . And we must not allow any separation between our forces and his to develop . If the enemy turns to run, he must be kept closer than we have allowed up to now .’2 On 3 September, sweltering heat and lime dust from the dry roads in the Champagne as well as French counterattacks in the forests around Somme-Py and Souain and heavy artillery fire around Châlons made the advance most difficult . As the Germans moved steadily forward, they found themselves inclining into a deep echelon formation to the right . Duke Albrecht von Württemberg believed that this held promise, for aerial reconnaissance suggested that it might be possible to push a large part of the enemy’s retreating forces off their southern and southwestern direction of retreat and toward the southeast and against the rear of the French fortresses . While awaiting permission to change his direction of pursuit, he issued orders at 22:30 for his lead corps to advance on Marson, Coupeville, and Auve while a reserve corps moved on Valmy, where it might link up with Fifth Army . A continuation of the advance to Herpont would depend on whether an actual battle developed for Ste . Ménehould .3 The next day, the army’s advance met little resistance and made significant gains . A radio message from the OHL at 11:00 informed Fourth Army Headquarters that its plan to pursue the enemy in a southeasterly direction had been approved by the Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army . To accomplish this, Fourth Army’s right wing would advance via Vitry-le-François toward Montierender while Fifth Army’s right moved on Morley via Ste . Ménehould–Revigny . Late that evening, Duke Albrecht sent the following message to the OHL: In front of Fourth Army, only weak enemy detachments remain . This afternoon a strong enemy, estimated at almost two corps, was spotted by a pilot on the Givry–Nettancourt–Revigny–Bar le Duc road .… During the morning enemy 2 DW III:258. 3 DW III:258–61. the ohl, 3–4 september 469 forces withdrew from Epernay towards Fère Champenoise; in the evening bivouacs observed in Vertus and to the south . In the morning, strong enemy forces were located behind the Marne between Châlons and Vitry la Ville but these...