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the two-front War and comparison of strengths Among the nations of Europe, Germany has always been most exposed to the danger of war because of its location at the centre of the continent. This has been proved over centuries of European history. The old German Empire had to repeatedly defend itself against attacks simultaneously from the East and the West and it is no coincidence that during the last Turkish assault on Vienna, Strasbourg was taken by Louis XIV. Only too often have Germany’s neighbours quarrelled and scrambled for power on German soil itself. The Thirty Years’ War was fought on German land, endured by a country that was exhausted and impotent.1 Even after Otto von Bismarck founded the Empire, ending the infirmity and disunity of the past, the realities of Germany’s geographical location remained unchanged. Henceforth three Great Powers and five smaller states were to be the continental neighbours of the new Empire. Thus the peacetime advantages of Germany’s Central European location would become disadvantageous as the Empire became embroiled in continental politics; it would be even more so in the event of war. From the start, it was doubtful whether the Imperial government would be able to alleviate these dangers, and they gave Bismarck many sleepless nights. They only grew more oppressive as the Empire developed into a densely populated nation compelled to trade with the other industrial states. Although the possibility of war with France never vanished after the founding of the Empire, sometimes it appeared possible that the enormous Russian 1 For an introduction to the historiography of Imperial Germany, see Roger Chickering, ed., Imperial Germany: A Historiographical Companion (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996). i Pp Introduction 22 part i: the battle of the frontiers in the west Empire would simultaneously become an adversary at the Empire’s back. In such a case, Germany would have to face the extremely difficult task of being compelled to fight in both the East and the West on two fronts separated by about 1,000 kilometres. Moreover, the Empire’s 900 kilometre eastern border lacked natural defences. This meant that the areas east of the Vistula River would be gravely threatened during a Russian invasion while the Oder River would have to form the first natural line of defence. Berlin itself was only 300 kilometres from the eastern border and less than 100 kilometres from the Oder. In the West, only the Rhine afforded an effective line of defence. If it became necessary to retreat to it, large areas of the best land populated by pure Germans (kerndeutscher) would be left unprotected. Natural defences against maritime attack were afforded by the difficulties of navigating the North Sea coastline. However, the Baltic coast—four times as long—would be defenceless in many spots against large-scale enemy landings. No other Great Power, except Austria-Hungary, which was protected by high mountain walls along long stretches of its frontiers, found itself in a similarly unfavourable defensive position. As long as treaties failed to safeguard against political and economic warfare , Germany could only protect itself from the disadvantages engendered by its geographical location with strong armed forces. Therefore the German Empire found itself compelled to direct great attention and capital toward making preparations for war. The urgency of these preparations became most evident to the overwhelming majority of Germans during the years before the outbreak of war, when even our adversaries acknowledged their necessity. None other than future British Prime Minister David Lloyd George expressed this opinion repeatedly in public. As late as 1 January 1914 he told a reporter from the Daily Chronicle: The German Army is a vital necessity, not only for the survival of the German Empire, but also for the life and autonomy of the German people. Germany is surrounded by other nations each of which possess an army nearly as strong as that of Germany.We forget that we insist upon maintaining a naval superiority of 60 percent over Germany while it does not even approach this superiority against France despite having to reckon with Russia on its eastern border.2 2 Lloyd George had made similar statements on 28 August 1908: “Here we see Germany at the centre of Europe with France and Russia at its borders possessing armies bigger than its own. I should like to remind our friends who think that because Germany is afraid of us it must actually be plotting against us that it is afraid for reasons...

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