The Diplomacy of Impartiality: Canada and Israel, 1958-1968

Summary and Conclusions

The second decade in Canadian–Israeli relations was characterized by a greater degree of caution and impartiality in the decision-making process than in the previous decade. The period was almost evenly divided between a Progressive Conservative government headed by a grassroots leader in its first half and by a career diplomat turned politician heading a Liberal minority administration in the second half. While, on the surface, it would appear that such clear-cut differences between the parties and their leaders would lead to divergences in foreign policy, this was not the case. In spite of Diefenbaker’s pro-Israel background and professions, the Department of External Affairs remained prudential in its approach and analyses and, if anything, became more cautious under his leadership to the point of maintaining strict impartiality in the Arab–Israeli conflict. This policy was scrupulously maintained at all levels and on all occasions within the Department of External Affairs. During the various Mackenzie King regimes of the twenties, thirties, and forties, with the interlude of R.B. Bennett’s Conservative government from 1930 to 1935, External Affairs personnel exemplified the government’s cautious approaches to issues generally, and especially in relation to the Levant. What Canada achieved as a middle class power, albeit a major one, can be seen in its best performances as a conciliator,mediator,and facilitator.These accomplishments were evident during the first decade of its relationship with the renascent Jewish sovereign country. The second decade did not witness any palpable change, regardless of the political party or leader in power.Indeed,it would not be risky to speculate and state that if any of the opposition parties had assumed power there would not have been any consequential change; perhaps, at best, there would have been nuances of change in policy.The crises in Iraq,Lebanon,and Jordan during 1958, Summary and Conclusions 100 summary and conclusions the decade’s first year hastened a greater degree of attention to Canada’s policy and practice of scrupulous impartiality. The issue of the Arab–Israeli conflict was nowhere in evidence either in the June 1957 election campaign or in that occurring of 31 March 1958. This was not the case with the Tories in relation to Joe Clark and the Progressive Conservative campaign of 1979. Because there did not appear to be a diplomatic device such as that afforded by the United Nations Emergency Force to the Department of External Affairs in the previous decade, which had enabled them to proceed cautiously and impartially, the events tended to require a greater degree of close examination. II The meeting of the Canadian and Israeli deputy ministers at the beginning of 1959, and the Heads of Missions European meetings at the end of October of that year, brought the impartiality theme into clearer focus.While emphasizing the similarities with Israel in cultural matters, common principles, and personal ties, Ottawa stressed the need for UN co-operation as a means of broadening support for Israel,which,in historical retrospect,turned out to have almost the opposite result. While mutual concessions were a sine qua non of a negotiated peace, the Department of External Affairs deferred to the longheld Arab perspective that Israel had “to make the real conciliatory gesture,” a position analogous to those of Britain’s Foreign Office and the US Department of State. This principle was to remain for decades the guideline for Canada in focusing on methods to diminish the effects of the Arab–Israeli conflict. By regarding Israel as a non-indigenous element in an Arab Middle East and as part of the Occidental world, there were those whom believed Israel had to show more initiative. Some officials in the Department of External Affairs felt that Israel automatically had to assume the role of noblesse oblige and take a forthcoming position in relation to concessions. The October 1959 meetings found Canada’s diplomats thinking that Israel was somewhat short-sighted regarding the Arabs in general and the uar in particular. Ottawa’s predilection for the UN was consistent with its policy orientation , but was not shared by Israel. The government’s sensitivity to the Arab Palestinian refugee was another instance of consistency in Ottawa’s policy during both the stewardships of Sidney Smith and Howard Green at the Department of External Affairs. There summary and conclusions 101 was, however, no equivalent sensitivity vis-à-vis Jewish refugees from Arab lands, an issue...