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Reform has become something of a buzzword in debates about international organization and global governance. The United Nations needs reform, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and so on. But what does reform mean to the various parties involved? What does it entail or require? How might we bring it about? What specific outcomes are associated with reform? Daniel Drezner, John Ikenberry, Richard Rosecrance, James Fearon, and Arthur Stein cut into these questions from different angles, offering important insights in the process, but many questions remain. I outline some of them below. The Role of the United States Drezner, Ikenberry, Rosecrance, and Stein all put great emphasis on the role of the United States in reviving ailing institutions or creating new ones. The implication is that, if the United States wants to bring about reform, it will do so. If it does not perceive it to be in its national interest, then reform might be difficult. Certainly, this makes sense given both the role US officials played in creating the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions and the influence a hegemon wields. Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out Patricia Goff * * * A Comment on the Effective Possibilities of Multilateralism that some changes have taken place that did not spring from US interests or actions. The most obvious example concerns the rise of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). As several authors in this volume point out, inasmuch as we acknowledge a new distribution of power, it is not characterized solely by the singular prominence of the United States, but also by the emergence of India, Brazil, China, and others as strong economic players. This is important for at least two reasons. First, this shift has already had some very real consequences. In the context of the WTO, for example, the key deal makers have changed. In the past, we looked to the Quad (the European Union, the United States, Canada, and Japan) for cues on negotiating directions. More recently, it was the Five Interested Parties (the US, the EU, Brazil, India, and Australia), and now it is the G4 (the US, the EU, Brazil, and India) whose input is decisive. This development is particularly consequential for Canada and Japan, which have lost (or relinquished) a degree of influence in the trading regime as a result. The rise of the BRICs has arguably also had an effect on the IMF. As Eric Helleiner and Bessma Momani argue (in this volume), waning US support is only one reason the IMF is losing influence and legitimacy. An equally significant explanation lies in the fact that rising powers such as Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, and various East Asian nations have found alternatives to Fund borrowing. A similar shift in power, however, has not manifested itself in other key international institutions—for example, at the United Nations, the BRICs have yet to be rewarded for their newfound status with Security Council seats. Nonetheless, in the case of both the WTO and IMF, significant change has already taken place as a result of a natural evolution in the dynamic relations among states. The rise of the BRICs is also important because it is not yet clear what kind of political actors they will be (individually or collectively). Much ink has been spilled over their capacity in terms of economic growth and exports. In the case of China, its foreign reserves and its ability to finance US debt have been analyzed in depth. Less attention has been given to the foreign policy intentions and abilities of the BRICs, which makes it challenging to predict what may or may not be possible. Much has been assumed: it is not unusual to see articles in the popular press that discuss China in terms of a Cold War scenario. Meanwhile, the foreign ministers 390 l Patricia Goff [18.226.96.61] Project MUSE (2024-04-25 10:42 GMT) of India, Brazil, and South Africa have begun their own dialogue on issues of multilateralism and reform of the UN, among other international peace and development issues. (In shifting our attention to the political, might our attention more properly alight on Russia, a country that is rarely central to BRICs-oriented conversations that spring from perceptions of economic power?) What role might they play in global institutional reform? What is their vision? What is the nature and extent of their respective commitments to multilateralism generally or to a liberal multilateral order of the kind the United States is...

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