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>> 111 5 Reconciling Testimony A Work in Progress The most resonant conclusion about reconciliation from the amnesty hearings is as fraught as it is direct: sincere disclosure is necessary for reconciliation. In testimony after testimony, when victims and their families responded to the perpetrators during the amnesty hearings, they reiterated the need to know who perpetrated the destructive acts, who gave the orders, what was done, and why. When perpetrators who were directly implicated in the crimes failed to testify or when those who testified failed to make sincere disclosure, victims and their families rejected reconciliation and recommended against amnesty. The parliamentary act that created the TRC showed foresight in joining truth and reconciliation in the title of the commission and in placing truth first. Without institutional requirements to enforce truth gathering and without diligent efforts from the perpetrators to provide truth, it is unreasonable, even inhumane, to expect reconciliation from the victimized . For victims to begin the process of reconciling with the perpetrators , they needed to perceive the perpetrators’ efforts as honest—and difficult. The testimony could be flawed and missing critical details, but if victims witnessed a sincere attempt at full disclosure, then reconciliation became possible. Contrition, however expressed by the perpetrators , also promoted reconciliation. Denial, protective revisions, and an unwillingness to confront transgressions were destructive to the process of reconciliation. With its limited time frame and mandate, the TRC focused on promoting the beginnings of reconciliation, encouraging further work by individuals and organizations in parallel with the hearings and 112 > 113 Table 5.1: Specific Cases Studied in the Qualitative Analysis of Reconciling Testimony Case 1, part 1: Killing of Griffiths Mxenge and Sizwe Khondile Hearings: November 5–7, 1996, Durban Applicant: Dirk Coetzee Victim: Charity Khondile, mother of Sizwe Khondile, as represented by her advocate Case 1, part 2: Killing of Griffiths Mxenge Hearings: January 20–21, 1997, Johannesburg Applicants: Dirk Coetzee, David Tshikalanga, Almond Nofomela Victim: Akanyang Daniel Maponya Cases 2 and 3: Killing of Joe Tsele; killing of Brian Ngqulunga and interrogation of Scheepers Morudu Hearings: February 24–26, 1997, Cape Town Applicants: Brigadier Jan Hattingh Cronje, Captain Jacques Hechter, Captain Willem Mentz, Warrant Officer Paul van Vuuren Victims: Legina Mabela, Tholakele Catherine Ngqulunga (wife of Brian Ngqulunga), Scheepers Morudu Case 4: Murder of Amy Biehl Hearings: July 8 and 9, 1997, Cape Town Applicants: Mongesi Manqina, Easy Nofemela, Ntombeki Peni, Vusumzi Ntamo Victims: Parents of Amy Biehl, Linda Biehl and Peter Biehl Case 5: St. James Church massacre Hearings: July 9–10, 1997, Cape Town Applicants: Bassie Mkhumbuzi, Thobela Mlambisa, Gcinikhaya Christopher Makoma Victims: Lorenzo Victor Smith, David Jacobus Ackerman Case 6, Part 1: Killing of Ashley Kriel and torture of activists Hearings: July 14–16, 1997, Cape Town Applicant: Captain Jeffrey T. Benzien Victims: Tony Yengeni (demonstration of “wet bag” torture), Ashley Forbes, Gary Kruse, Bongani Jonas, Peter Anthony Jacobs, Michelle Ashua (sister of the late Ashley Kriel) Case 6, Part 2: Killing of Ashley Kriel and torture of activists Hearings: October 20–21, 1997, Cape Town Applicants: Captain Jeffrey T. Benzien, Major General Johannes Griebenauw Victim: Niclo Pedro Psychologist expert witness: Sarah Kotzé Additional victim testimony: August 5, 1996, Melanie Adams Case 7: Mduduzi Gumbi and Robert Zuma Hearings: July 28–29, 1997, Pietermaritzburg Applicants: Mduduzi Gumbi and Robert Zuma Victim: Recoria Judith Dlamini Case 8: Bheki Mbuyazi Hearings: August 1, 1997, Durban Applicant: Bheki Mbuyazi Victims: Unnamed family members related to the killed victims 114 > 115 share. To forgive, people must move away from defining themselves in direct relation to the perpetrators, and away from defining perpetrators only in terms of the injuries they caused (Rowe et al. 1989). Molly Andrews (2000) drew a clear distinction between what she termed unilateral forgiveness and negotiated forgiveness. According to Andrews, unilateral forgiveness is “contained entirely within an individual ” in private consultation with one’s beliefs, with no response required of the perpetrator (76). Negotiated forgiveness transpires through dialogue between the perpetrator and the victim, with the perpetrator disclosing the crimes and taking responsibility, and the victim contextualizing the behavior of the perpetrator and trying to understand the perpetrator’s world. Thus, victims and perpetrators need each other to accomplish negotiated forgiveness. Mellor, Bretherton, and Firth (2007) described negotiated forgiveness as “reaching out to others and looking into oneself” (18). With regard to truth commissions, this distinction between unilateral forgiveness and negotiated forgiveness should be maintained—but relabeled. In the context of truth commissions, unilateral forgiveness is forgiveness, and negotiated forgiveness is reconciliation...

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