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10. Cities, Subsidiarity, and Federalism
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291 10 CITIES, SUBSIDIARITY, AND FEDERALISM LOREN KING 1. Introduction My aim here is to use the city as an analytic category, a lens through which to examine the principle of subsidiarity and the justification of federalism. I will argue that two powerful justifications for subsidiarity seem as if they should be mutually supporting but in fact pull us in different directions with respect to the justification of particular institutional strategies for realizing autonomy for distinct groups. I conclude by drawing out some implications of my analysis for the justification of federalism. I begin by explaining the ideas of subsidiarity and federalism, and explaining my chief aims more fully, before turning to cities to advance my analysis. 2. Subsidiarity and Federalism Subsidiarity, when applied to politics, counsels that decisions be made at the lowest feasible scale of organization. As a principle, the idea admits of several distinct formulations and is often taken to be consonant with federalism.1 To see why, consider the argument —although doing so will first require clarification of what is meant by “federalism,” and then reflection on why subsidiarity might be thought of as a complementary idea. We can usefully distinguish, as several scholars have, between federalism as describing a normative commitment to nonunitary 292 Loren King territorial political arrangements, and federal systems or federal arrangements as descriptive categories subsuming particular ways of realizing federalism, such as federations, confederations, leagues, and other kinds of unions that involve territorially variegated structures of authority.2 Under federal arrangements, powers and responsibilities are distributed, by constitution or treaties, between a central authority and smaller territorial authorities, and the latter have more than merely administrative functions: they possess distinct governments with legislative and executive powers. The latter condition is constitutive: a state with a highly decentralized administrative apparatus is not a federation if regional authorities are merely administrative conveniences, possessing no independent legislative and executive powers. Scholars have found in Western political thought several distinct rationales for federalism: facilitating harmonious and mutually supportive relations between the several vital spheres of human association (Althusius, Montesquieu); preserving liberty against authority, or worse, tyranny, while also enjoying the security of a larger state (Montesquieu, the American Federalists); the enhancement of democratic virtues and their exercise, by bringing power closer to the people (Tocqueville); and securing peace between peoples and republics (Kant, Mill).3 Among one tradition of scholarship, federalism is chiefly about limiting government excesses and promoting efficient service provision. For others, particularly comparative political scientists and some theorists, federalism is often considered as a promising way to address significant group differences that play out territorially, such as national, ethnic , and linguistic identities concentrated within a particular geographic region.4 In some cases, groups with territorially distinct identities have their own civic associations and governing institutions , and might find themselves considering union with other groups. The stories of American and Canadian federation roughly fit this narrative. In other cases, whether by legacies of conquest or past treaties, a distinctive group finds itself within a broader political union and may seek more autonomy, recognition, or redress for past injustices.5 Now, if you think that many political issues typically matter at different spatial scales and for different constituencies, and if you further believe that political decisions ought generally to be made [3.239.59.193] Project MUSE (2024-03-19 07:28 GMT) Cities, Subsidiarity, and Federalism 293 as close as possible to those most directly and persistently affected by them and who have a legitimate claim to have influence over those decisions—which is to say, you affirm subsidiarity as an attractive ideal—then you will likely also affirm federalism as a rough approximation of that ideal. Issues of local and regional concern are dealt with by states or provinces (or länders, or cantons, etc.), while issues of broader import are left to the central authority. A reasonable approximation, perhaps, but federalism, as typically studied and practiced, is insensitive to a glaringly obvious feature of the world. Cities are ubiquitous to every human civilization , and they are vital to the culture and economies of existing national states. Cities and their surrounding regions are the spatial scale at which a great many people experience the consequences of political decisions most directly. Yet cities are rarely given their due in existing federal arrangements and are rarer still in scholarly treatments of either federalism or subsidiarity. I am interested in the relationship between cities and subsidiarity . In exploring that relationship, I hope to cast some...