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65 chapter 3 The Cubans in Angola Jonas Savimbi Friend and foe alike acknowledged the intelligence and charisma of Jonas Savimbi . “Savimbi is an impressive figure,” the U.S. ambassador in Zambia reported after meeting him in January 1975. “Savimbi is very intelligent,” MPLA leader Lúcio Lara agreed. He was also a gifted military commander. Unlike Neto, who spent very little time with his guerrillas inside Angola during the war of independence, Savimbi, as a South African journalist observed, “spent most of his time leading his troops in the field.” Savimbi himself boasted, in a clear swipe at Neto, “I alone remained in the bush for six years.”¹ He failed to mention, however, that he had spent several of these years working with—not against—the Portuguese. “Jonas Savimbi was a very ambitious man, and he led a small group [in eastern Angola],” recalled General Francisco da Costa Gomes, the Portuguese commander in chief in Angola from May 1970 through August 1972. In early February 1972 Savimbi proposed that UNITA and the Portuguese “cooperate” against the MPLA, which had established a strong presence in eastern Angola. “We would be willing to provide guides to enemy zones,” Savimbi wrote to the Portuguese authorities. “I am sure that with our cooperation the MPLA . . . would be eliminated from the East.”² He proved to be a valuable ally: UNITA, a Portuguese officer remarked, “gave the Portuguese forces the decisive weapon in that kind of war: information about the guerrilla base camps [of the MPLA].”³ The arrangement came to an abrupt end, however, when a Portuguese general exceeded his authority. “In the last quarter of 1973,” Costa Gomes writes, “we broke the agreement [with Savimbi].” Joaquim da Silva Cunha, who was Portugal’s defense minister, explains what had happened: in September 1973 a 66 The Cubans in Angola new Portuguese commander in eastern Angola, General Abel Barroso Hipólito, launched an offensive against UNITA, “despite his instructions.”⁴ This was what transformed Savimbi, the collaborator, into the freedom fighter. “It was sheer lunacy,” another Portuguese general laments. “UNITA was on our side, but Barroso Hipólito said that for him all the Angolan rebels were the same.” Barroso Hipólito was recalled to Lisbon. “I sacked him,” says Costa Gomes, who had become the chief of the general staff of the Portuguese armed forces. Contacts between Savimbi and the Portuguese authorities were reestablished early in 1974. “Things were, therefore, on the way to returning to the previous situation and negotiations were under way,” Silva Cunha writes, when Prime Minister Marcelo Caetano was overthrown on April 25, 1974.⁵ UNITA was far weaker than the country’s two other rebel movements—the MPLA and the FNLA. “Unlike the other two main groups, UNITA had only a small armed force (600–800 men) on April 25 [1974],” U.S. consul general Tom Killoran reported from Luanda. “These men had much less combat experience than FNLA or MPLA troops.”⁶ A few days after Caetano’s ouster, however, Savimbi took advantage of the festive mood of the Portuguese troops to carry out his most successful military operation. UNITA captured an entire company of Portuguese soldiers, disarmed and stripped them, so that they returned completely naked to their barracks.⁷ With that brilliant stroke, Savimbi burnished his credentials as a freedom fighter. Without wasting time, the freedom fighter turned to Pretoria for help. With increasing zest, he regaled wary officials from South Africa’s Military Intelligence and Bureau of State Security with his vision of an independent Angola that would join South Africa in an anticommunist bloc. He told them that he knew where SWAPO’s camps in southern Angola were and that he was “absolutely ready” to help the South African Defence Force (SADF) “attack, detain or expel” SWAPO from the territory. In return, he wanted South African military aid to help him seize power in Luanda.⁸ Pretoria obliged and launched Operation Savannah. First came weapons, then instructors, and finally, on October 14, 1975, South African troops invaded Angola to crush the MPLA. The Cuban intervention forced the South Africans to leave Angola, but they left with a high regard for Savimbi. They were dazzled by his personality and his eloquence. He had proved his loyalty: UNITA detachments had clashed with SWAPO and he had honored his pledge “to supply guides in order to move against SWAPO.” He had worked well with the SADF commanders and had been willing to listen to their advice. “The climate of cooperation between the...

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