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279 chapter 11 The United States, South Africa, and Savimbi Reaganites on the Attack In late 1984, for the first time in U.S. history, South Africa became the subject of widespread debate in the United States. In his memoirs Chester Crocker writes, “With hindsight it is astounding that apartheid had never before burst upon the American public consciousness as a topic of mainstream media interest and public debate. Other Western nations . . . had experienced their own apartheid debates over twenty years earlier. . . . Where was the American body politic during the 1950s, the era during which apartheid was built? . . . Where were the protests during the early 1960s, when the Rivonia trials resulted in Nelson Mandela’s imprisonment and the banning of the ANC? . . . Americans discovered the existence of apartheid only in the mid-1980s.”¹ That Americans had discovered the evils of apartheid, albeit belatedly, complicated Reagan’s policy of constructive engagement. A growing number of members of Congress began calling on the administration to impose sanctions on South Africa. “Dear Mr. President,” Reagan wrote to PW Botha in January 1985, “the current debate in the United States concerning our bilateral relationship and your domestic policies has some internal and partisan reasons. Nevertheless , the debate does reflect genuine public feelings about sensitive issues deeply embedded in the political fabric of American society. I anticipate that in the months ahead, the Congress will propose a number of new legislative initiatives.” The administration would oppose sanctions against South Africa, Reagan promised, “but I must ask that you recognize that we will need your help in conveying to the American people the determination of your government to pursue constructive change.”² Meanwhile, a battle raged among Reagan’s supporters in the press, in Congress , and within the executive branch. Disagreement about policy toward 280 The United States, South Africa, and Savimbi southern Africa had existed since the beginning of the administration, but during Reagan’s first term the public and Congress had paid scant attention to the region, and within the administration Crocker and the Africa Bureau had been given a relatively free hand. This changed, however, after Reagan’s landslide victory in the 1984 presidential elections, which was seen as a broad mandate for bold actions in foreign policy. Developments in southern Africa, including the turmoil in South Africa, presented the administration with new challenges. The hard-liners in the Reagan camp were often called “true Reaganites ” because they claimed to represent the president’s instincts that the State Department sought to stifle. Their war cry was “Let Reagan be Reagan.” Southern Africa was one of their major battlegrounds. The Wall Street Journal argued: “A strategy that would help our real friends may not win applause from the U.N. but it would serve our interests and those of black Africa much better than anything we’ve heard from the left, or from a confused State Department .” The true Reaganites demanded that the administration adopt an even more sympathetic attitude to the embattled Botha government in Pretoria . There was one villain in South Africa, Paul Johnson explained in a much praised article in Commentary: the ANC. “Its terror campaign” sought to kill “as many” nonwhite moderates as it could, “and to frighten the rest into noncooperation [with the government].” The conservative weekly Human Events wrote, “While President Botha is moving at a fast and furious pace to end the apartheid system, Mandela remains as adamant a revolutionary as ever. He’s still a Marxist, still a man of violence, still a supporter of the Communist-run ANC.” The National Review warned, “All the reforms the Botha government has introduced . . . [would] vanish entirely on the coming to power of Nelson Mandela.”³ The true Reaganites opposed Resolution 435. They abhorred the idea of a SWAPO government in Windhoek. “South Africa’s withdrawal is not in America ’s interest,” the National Review argued, “since Namibia would fall to the Communist SWAPO guerrillas if abandoned by South Africa.” Like the South African government, they wanted the administration to help Savimbi come to power in Luanda. They poured scorn on the State Department’s contention that Savimbi could not achieve a military victory. “UNITA is close to defeating the Communist regime,” the National Security Record, organ of the Heritage Foundation, asserted. “A Savimbi victory,” Human Events explained, “would deal both Gorbachev and Castro severe setbacks in southern Africa. . . . Angola itself would be transformed from a terrorist training ground—where SWAPO and the African National Congress operate—to a...

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