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[ CHAPTER 3 ] A West Point for the Navy? The War of 1812 was a testing ground for U.S. Army and Navy officers. The army’s performance was generally poor and an embarrassment to the nation in the eyes of many Americans. In a war that witnessed the ultimate national disgrace—the burning of the country’s poorly defended capital at the hands of the British—the navy was the one bright spot. The victory of the frigate Constitution, nicknamed “Old Ironsides” for the way British cannonballs seemed to bounce off its hull, over the HMS Guerri- ère in August 1812 sparked an outpouring of national pride. “Don’t give up the ship”—Captain James Lawrence’s dying order to his men on board the frigate Chesapeake—became a rallying cry for the navy and the nation. Oliver Hazard Perry’s victory in the Battle of Lake Erie in September 1813 and Thomas Macdonough’s triumph on Lake Champlain a year later further fueled the public’s adoration of the navy. Lake Erie and Lake Champlain took their places alongside Lexington and Concord, Bunker Hill, Saratoga, and Yorktown in the hearts of the American people. The performance of army and navy officers inevitably led to an examination of both services’ system of officer education. West Point, founded ten years before the outbreak of the war, existed on a very limited scale; it had not yet produced enough officers to influence the army’s performance in the war. West Point graduates, however, generally did better than their fellow officers who lacked formal military education. This fact led to a reappraisal of the importance of formal education for U.S. Army and Navy officers. [ 70 ] A West Point for the Navy? The Idea of a Naval Academy The naval success of the United States, in one contemporary observer ’s words, “reflected the greatest honour upon the national character.”1 “Our Naval triumphs have astonished an admiring world . . . we have seen again and again the British Lion cowering beneath the American Eagle,” proclaimed Virginia congressman Thomas Gholson with more than a touch of exaggeration. As Indiana congressman William Hendricks explained, “The navy of the United States, since the late war, has been the peculiar favourite of the nation. Previous to that war, the bravery and skill of our seamen . . . had not fully developed themselves to the American people. Until then, the people of the United States were opposed to an extensive or permanent [naval] establishment, and the naval armaments of former times were only intended for temporary purposes.” Thomas Jefferson added his praise in a letter to John Adams: “I sincerely congratulate you on the success of our little navy; which must be more gratifying to you than to most men, as having been the early and constant advocate of wooden walls.” Not wishing to portray himself for posterity as an enemy of the now popular navy, Jefferson added: “If I have differed with you on this ground, it was not on the principle, but the time.”2 Despite the navy’s success during the War of 1812 and its immense popularity with the public, there had been serious problems with the Navy Department ’s organization and its management of the war effort. Jefferson’s emphasis on the use of gunboats had proved ineffective in wartime. The navy’s administrative structure needed an overhaul, and there were questions concerning the adequacy of the professional education provided for naval officers. This situation prompted Secretary of the Navy William Jones to initiate reforms while the war was still going on. A veteran of the Revolutionary War, Jones had fought in the battles of Trenton and Princeton and served at sea on a privateer commanded by Thomas Truxtun. After the war, he became a merchant in his hometown of Philadelphia and served one term in the U.S. House of Representatives. He had previously turned down the navy secretaryship when Thomas Jefferson offered it to him in 1801. When James Madison asked him to take it during the War of 1812, Jones accepted out of duty. He was a strong supporter of the nation’s second war against Britain and felt obligated to serve his country.3 Jones had an expansive but pragmatic vision for the U.S. Navy. In the short term, during the War of 1812, he called for reversing the Jeffersonian emphasis on gunboats and concentrating instead on acquiring fast-sailing sloops and brigs that were quicker to build than ships of the...

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