In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications and Confederate Defeat

CHAPTER TWELVE: The Fifth Offensive

{ 160 } ChaPTer Twelve The Fifth Offensive Grant began to plan his next move as earlyas September 12, envisioning a strike for the South Side Railroad with another to seal off Wilmington, North Carolina , as a blockade-running port. Hewas ready to orderan offensive by September 27 but postponed the movement against Wilmington. Instead, he wanted a strong effort by Butler’s army north of the James River and a similarly strong movement by Meade against the South Side Railroad. Butler might be able to break the Confederate position and perhaps enter Richmond, and Meade could target either the railroad or Petersburg itself. One thing was definite: Grant wanted Meade to dig in and hold any position he took.1 The two commanders were free to work out the operational details of their strikes. Meade planned to send two divisions from the Fifth Corps, two from the Ninth Corps, and a cavalry division, about 25,000 men, across Boydton Plank Road as far as the Appomattox River if possible. Butler planned a twopronged attack with 26,600 men against the 6,000 Confederates north of the James. Birney’s Tenth Corps and the black division of the Eighteenth Corps would cross at Deep Bottom and attack New Market Heights from the south, then head up New Market Road to Richmond. The white divisions of Ord’s Eighteenth Corps would cross over a new pontoon bridge at Aiken’s Landing, attack the Confederate Outer Line defending Richmond where it stretched inland from Chaffin’s Bluff, and advance on Richmond along Osborne Turnpike. Butler’s plans represented a change in Federal tactics. In bypassing Bailey’s Creek, the obstacle that had stymied Hancock’s operations twice already, Butler would attack the main defenses of Richmond for the first time in the campaign .2 Birney went into action early on the morning of September 29, crossing the pontoon bridge at Deep Bottom and operating west of Bailey’s Creek. He began to close with 1,800 Confederates in the New Market Line, contending with slashings, abatis, and chevaux-de-frise. The Rebels were stretched so thin The Fifth Offensive { 161 } that intervals of fifteen feet separated the soldiers in some places. Paine’s black division of the Eighteenth Corps launched the first attack, repelled by heavy obstructions and Gregg’s Texas Brigade. A few black troops managed to make it onto the parapet but were easily subdued. Not long after this repulse, Gregg received word that Ord’s column had attacked the Outer Line and he pulled his men out of the works. Just then, Paine renewed his attack and penetrated the New Market Line.3 Gregg’s readiness to withdraw indicates the high priority the Confederates placed on the Outer Line. The complex history of this defensive system began when engineer officer William Elzey Harrison constructed a line of fifteen batteries connected by an infantry trench crossing Osborne Turnpike, Varina Road, Mill Road, and New Market Road in June 1862. Batteries No. 7, 8, and 9 were later consolidated, strengthened, and converted into Fort Harrison. A secondary defense line, planned by William Proctor Smith in October and November 1862, started from Harrison’s Line at a point between Batteries No. 9 and 10. Heading northwest, it had two big works: the Coles Run Battery (later renamed Fort Johnson) and Smith’s Battery. Then in the summer and fall of 1863, the Confederates made an addition to this complex. Harrison’s Rear Defense Line started on the James upstream of the river batteries at Chaffin’s Bluff and stretched east to Coles Run Battery. It enclosed the bluff area by guarding an approach from the north. At the same time, Jeremy F.Gilmer planned an extension of the Intermediate Line to connect with Chaffin’s Bluff. It began where Osborne Turnpike and New Market Road joined at the Intermediate Line and extended south to the Coles Run Battery. A work called Mill Road Battery (later renamed Fort Gregg) was placed just south of that road, while Fort Gilmer appeared north of the road. Finally, the Confederates constructed a Secondary Line on the right wing of Harrison’s original 1862 line. It stretched from Fort Harrison to the right, ending at Battery No. 2. This new work was placed some distance behind Harrison’s original work in the summer and fall of 1863 to take advantage of more suitable ground and shorten the line of defense.4 Ord caught the Confederates by surprise when he...