In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications and Confederate Defeat

CHAPTER SEVEN: The Third Offensive

{ 78 } ChaPTer seven The Third Offensive By about July 10, Early’s raid into Maryland compelled Grant to send the Sixth Corps and eventually plan to divert the Nineteenth Corps to protect Washington , D.C. He also worried that Early’s rapid movements might compel him to send even more troops from Petersburg.This led Grant to abandon all thought of conducting siege approaches. When Early skirmished outside the forts around Washington on July 11–12 and then retired across the Potomac, Grant was relieved of an immediate need to attack. Grant learned that Burnside was nearly ready to charge his mine by July 23. He also received alarming reports of heavy fighting in Georgia, where Gen. John Bell Hood’s Confederate Army of Tennessee took the offensive against Maj.Gen.WilliamT. Sherman’s army group.On July 20, Hood struck the Army of the Cumberland north of Atlanta, catching it by surprise while it crossed Peachtree Creek. Although repulsed, the Confederates demonstrated a boldness not yet seen in the Atlanta campaign. On July 22, Hood outflanked Sherman ’s left wing east of Atlanta by striking the Army of the Tennessee. Through luck and hard fighting, the Federals saved the situation and repulsed Hood again, but there was every prospect of another Confederate attack.1 These events produced a strong desire at Grant’s headquarters to prevent Lee from sending reinforcements to Georgia. Grant asked Meade’s opinion on the feasibility of attacking after Burnside sprung his mine. Meade agreed with Duane that Burnside could take Pegram’s Salient, but Confederate artillery might tear into the flanks of the Ninth Corps advance unless Warren also advanced toward the Gregory House. They also feared that the Confederates had a second line on the crest of the ridge behind Pegram’s Salient. While Meade recommended against an attack, he admitted the need foraction and was ready to try it.2 Grant told Meade that if the attack took place, it would have to be done with maximum force and penetrate as deeply as possible, but the men should The Third Offensive { 79 } promptly retreat if they could not break through all Confederate defenses. The Eighteenth Corps and a division of the Tenth Corps could support Burnside. Grant intended to sleep on it before making a decision, but he wanted Burnside to spring his mine in any case. If nothing else, Meade could also raid the Weldon and Petersburg Railroad.3 A heavy rain descended on the night of July 24, filling trenches and bombproofs , but Grant rode out the storm thinking of his next move. After a month of waiting, he decided to launch a complex operation that incorporated Burnside ’s mine in a multilayered plan filled with options. He would use the bridgehead on the north bank of the James River at Deep Bottom to push large numbers of troops around Lee’s left flank. If that did not work, a massive infantry attack following the mine explosion might break the Confederate line near its center. Grant could decide whether to make his major effort north or south of the river at the last minute.4 The next day, Grant told Meade to start loading Burnside’s mine but to wait until ordered to spring it. Encouraging reports from a new signal station , confirmed by interviews with deserters and captured Rebels, indicated that the Confederates had a series of detached artillery and mortar emplacements rather than a continuous line of defenses along Jerusalem Plank Road. Meade asked Burnside for a detailed plan of attack and received it on July 26. It seemed possible that all the elements of this complex operation could be brought together in time to make it work.5 firsT deeP BoTToM, JUly 26–29 GrantorganizedtheThirdOffensiveasatwo-phasedoperation.First,Hancock’s Second Corps and two divisions of cavalry under Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan would advance from the fortified bridgehead at Deep Bottom. Sheridan would ride northwest and tear up the Virginia Central Railroad north of Richmond, burning the bridges across the Chickahominy and the South Anna. Hancock would advance toward Chaffin’s Bluff, the anchor of Richmond’s Outer Line, to support the cavalry.There was a remote possibility that Sheridan could enter Richmond; if so, Hancock was to help him as much as possible, or he should cover Sheridan’s retreat if necessary.6 Foster’s brigade of 2,000 men had held the fortified bridgehead at Deep Bottom since the night of June 20. Lee had wanted...