Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War

3 Rebellion: In Pursuit of Radical Transformation, November 1970–July 1971

3 REBELLION In Pursuit of Radical Transformation, November 1970–July 1971 Salvador Allende embraced the idea that his election represented a turning point for inter-American affairs. On the night of his election victory, he had spoken elatedly to thousands of supporters in downtown Santiago and declared that countries around the world were looking at Chile.1 And they were, but not necessarily with the admiration that Allende implied. Beyond Cuba, and across the Americas, his election simultaneously sparked jubilation, terror, respect and apprehension. While the majority of Latin America’s leaders adopted moderate postures toward Chilean events, others were far more alarmist. Brazilian military leaders, in particular , began referring to Chile as “yet another country on the other side of the Iron Curtain,” only more dangerous because it was so close.2 Or, as one Brazilian Air Force general put it just over a month after Allende was elected, “the international communist offensive, planned a little more than two years ago in Cuba, through OLAS [the Organization of Latin American Solidarity], finds itself in marked development in this continent . . . . Taking advantage of the painful state of underdevelopment or disagreements from some and the most pure democratic idealism from others, international communism comes demonstrating its flexibility . . . in the conquest of power, using either violence and coup d’états, or legal electoral processes. . . . We will be, without doubt, overtaken by the ideological struggle that we face, [which is] now more present, more palpable and more aggressive.”3 Indeed, to seasoned Brazilian Cold Warriors—far more so even than their contemporaries in Washington—Allende’s victory was not merely a Chilean phenomenon but the embodiment of something more ominous and antagonistic. So much so, that the Brazilians even briefly considered breaking off diplomatic relations with Santiago before they decided this might offer Allende a convenient enemy around which he could rally support.4 74 REBELLION As we have seen, the Nixon administration had similar concerns about boosting Allende’s chances through overt hostility. Although it could not completely hide its coolness toward Chile’s new government, from early 1971 onward the Nixon administration increasingly played a clever game when it came to hiding its hand. In this respect, the contrast with the period immediately after Allende’s election could not have been starker. From a frantic and chaotic series of failed efforts to try and prevent Allende assuming power, the United States’ policy toward Chile now assumed an aura of confidence. Reaching out to the Brazilians and focusing on what it—and they—could do to turn back the tide in the ideological struggle that engulfed the Southern Cone was one astute way to reassert influence in the region. And in Brazil, Washington found a useful and fanatically anti-Allende ally that was already pursuing its own regional strategy to uphold ideological frontiers against revolutionary influences. Although the incoming Chilean government was not prepared for the degree of enmity it would have to deal with, it nevertheless recognized that La Vía Chilena would probably face some kind of hostility in the Americas . Yet, as regional players jostled to reassert their positions in a changed inter-American setting after Allende’s election, Santiago’s new leaders were somewhat belatedly debating how to approach the outside world. The Unidad Popular’s election manifesto had pledged to assert Chile’s economic and political independence and to show “effective” solidarity with both those fighting for their liberation and those constructing socialism .5 But when Allende entered La Moneda, and his ministers, diplomats, and advisers moved into their new offices, what this would mean in practice was unclear. The Unidad Popular coalition’s leaders faced a myriad of opportunities and challenges as they began formulating Chile’s international policy. On the one hand, as we saw in the introduction, the evolution of superpower détente, the United States’ ongoing difficulties in Vietnam, frustrated development in Latin America, and Washington’s failure to address this, all suggested that the early 1970s would be an opportune moment to pursue radical transformation at a domestic, regional, and international level. On the other hand, Allende had limited room for maneuver on account of receiving only 36.4 percent of the popular vote, which left his position at home relatively weak and potentially unstable, especially in the shadow of Schneider’s murder. In this context, Allende and the UP’s leaders therefore feared that external intervention in Chilean affairs could magnify domestic difficulties. Consequently, they needed time, space, and continuing [3...