The Antietam Campaign

2. General McClellan's Bodyguard: The Army of the Potomac after Antietam

B R O O K S D . S I M P S O N -» - < ^ GeneralMcClellan's Bodyguard The Army of the Potomac after Antietam As night fell across the fields and farms surrounding Sharpsburg, Maryland, on September 17,1862, officers and men of the Army of the Potomac who had survived that day's bloody work paused to reflect on what they had endured. Brig. Gen. Marsena R. Patrick, whose brigade of New Yorkers had battled across David Miller's cornfield that morning, surveyed the battlefield with Brig. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, only recently recovered from his wound at Seven Pines. Patrickjudged the day's battle "one ofthe severest ever fought" and remarked on the dead bodies that covered the ground. It was not clear what the morrow would bring. No one knew if the slaughter would lead to anything. But Patrick offered posterity a glimpse into what he expected when he commenced his diary entryfor September 18: "We were not attacked last night, &: this morning Sumner told me that McClellan's orders were ''not to attack' & if possible havere-inforcements come up—It seems to be fairly understood, that only Madcaps, of the Hooker stripe, would have pushed our troops into action again without very strong reinforcements —We had all that we could do to hold our ground yesterday & ifwe had attempted to push the enemy, today, with the same troops, we should have 45 General McClellan's Bodyguard been whipped." Tomorrow, reinvigorated by rest and reinforcements, would be the day to push ahead. During the i8th, Patrick learned that a good friend, Col. Henry W. Kingsbury, had fallen while directing the men of the nth Connecticut to advance against the Lower Bridge the previous day. "The loss of no one has affected me so deeply," Patrick mourned. "He was a noble fellow! His poor Mother will feel that life is now valueless." Kingsbury's ghost haunted the brigade commander that night as he struggled to sleep. "I prayed much of the night—prayed for my country— prayed for my children—prayed for myself—It was a night of wrestling with God—Did he hear?" Dawn came, bringing news that the Confederates were nowhere to be found. Eventually Patrick received orders to march, but after a series of stops and starts his men covered less than two miles before setting up camp for the night in an open woods. Patrick slept well that night.1 Patrick's experience is revealing to students of the operations of the Army of the Potomac during and after the Antietam campaign. Recent scholarship has reemphasized the army's failure to build on what it had gained on September 17 by dealing a death blow to Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. "The salient feature of the entire Maryland campaign ... was McClellan's opportunity to inflict a catastrophic defeat on Lee's army," observed Gary W. Gallagher, summarizing the conventional wisdom, in 1989. "No other commander on either side during the Civil War enjoyed a comparable situation." Nowhere was this opportunity more evident than on September 18:"But once again McClellan lacked the fortitude to let his loyal soldiers seek complete victory. . . . The Army of the Potomac possessed the requisiteelements to deliver the fatal blow."2 But did it?Was the Union failure to close out the war in the East in September and October 1862 simply attributable to the shortcomings of its commander? Or was there something deeper, more problematic about that army's psychology, that, whatever McClellan's contributions to shaping it, transcended him? Considerable evidence suggests that in the seven weeks between Antietamand McClellan's removalfrom command the qualities ofhesitation, intrigue, and wariness toward civil superiors epitomizingthe generalwere characteristic ofhis army as a whole. If T. Harry Williams is correct in labeling McClellan "the problem child of the Civil War," perhaps it is only fair to add that the Army of the Potomac remains the problem army ofthe CivilWar. Certainly Bruce Catton erred in titling the first volume of his trilogy on that organization Mr. Lincoln's Army, unless he did so with tongue in cheek, for to some extent it always remained General McClellan's army. John Pope discovered as much during the Second Manassas campaign and claimed that the failure of McClellan's generals to cooperate with 46 General McClettan's Bodyguard him contributed decisively to that campaign's sad outcome (this also conveniently concealed Pope's own bumbling). Some two years later, Ulysses S. Grant would also learn what it was like to be an outsider when he traveled east to oversee the army's operations while at the same time assuming the responsibilities of generalin -chief. By then changes in personnel meant that a good number of the soldiers who had served under McClellan were no longer with the army, and the majority of the men who voted in 1864 cast their ballots for Lincoln. That did not surprise one western general who visited Grant's headquarters: "The men areright in sentiment , though many leading officers are McClellanized."3 The distinction was important. To a large extent the officer corps of the Army of the Potomac was as much a reflection as it was the creation of the army's first commander. Perhaps McClellan impressed on his army the peculiar qualities of his personality and character, but it would be wrong to hold him entirely responsible for the attitudes of his officers and soldiers. Rather, many of his men shared his perspectives toward war and politics. A good number of them demurred on the question of whether to renew the attackon September 18,and more than a fewactually expected Lee to strike back. Nor was there much dissent expressed about the army's failure to launch a vigorous pursuit. During the next seven weeks, many generals, officers, and enlisted men complained about the pressure placed on them by the public, press, and president to do something. It was not unusual to hear that the army had become the plaything of politicians, editors, and other incompetents. Strong political overtones surfaced in the army's response to Lincoln's preliminary emancipation proclamation and to McClellan's removal on the heels of the fall elections. It is worth noting that other major Union field armies experienced their share of friction and internal rivalries. In the Army of the Tennessee, for example, the presence ofgenerals who were politicians or had close political connections shaped relations among its leading officers. But no one ever expressed concern that any Unionforce except the Armyofthe Potomac mightactually march on Washington to protest administration decisions, or worried that any other army's leadership conspired to thwart the administration's prosecution of the war. If the problem with the Army of the Potomac resided merely with George B. McClellan, it would be easy to remedy; however, many Republicans and others in the North suffered anxious doubts precisely because the problem extended far beyond army headquarters. One might excuse Marsena Patrick and his fellow officers and men for their hesitation to renew the offensive on September 18. Few soldiers in the Army of the Potomac had ever seen anything resembling the battlefield at Antietam. The area stretching from the Miller Cornfield to the Bloody Lane proved especially 47 General McClellan's Bodyguard disturbing. Rufus Dawes of the 6th Wisconsin characterized the scene as "indescribably horrible," the worst of the war. Untold others agreed. "The slaughter upon both sides is enormous," Lt. Frank A. Haskell of the newly christened Iron Brigade told the folks back home in Wisconsin. "All hands agree that before they had never seen such a fearful battle," affirmed Haskell. "I hope you may never have occasion to see such a sight as it is. I will not attempt to tell you of it." Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams, interim commander of the Twelfth Corps, was staggered by the number of dead bodies he encountered in riding over the field. William H. Powell, viewing bodies so black that they might be mistaken for African Americans, turned away from the "marred and bloated remains" and concluded that "this was war in all its hideousness." A Connecticut soldier, recalling the horrors of the battlefield after the sun set on September 17,remarked, "Of all gloomy nights, this was the saddest we ever experienced."4 What the officers and men of the Army of the Potomac experienced that night and the following day was indeed unusual. Because while most of the army was composed of combat-hardened regiments, fewveterans had previously found the opportunity to explore a battlefield immediatelyafter fighting ceased. In most of its earlier engagements—including the recent battles of Second Manassas and South Mountain—the army had either retreated or, less frequently, advanced immediately after the struggle. McClellan's decision to remain in place along Antietam Creek meant that his soldiers saw up close the carnage resulting from the war's bloodiest single dayof combat. The experience stayed with them. Although the Army of the Potomac would see action on many another battlefield,its veterans invariably singled out as especially memorable what they saw, heard, and smelled on the night of September 17and the followingdays. If many observers found the sight ofmangled corpses repulsive, they nonetheless were encouraged by the fact that a large proportion of the grotesque forms wore gray uniforms. The vast majority of McClellan's men believed that they had more than held their own against Lee's veterans on September 17, and a good number declared that they had won a victory. "We feel that a death blow has been given the rebel army ofVirginia," a private enthused, adding that at last the Confederates "found that they are not invincible." George W. Whitman of the 5ist New York,one of the two regiments that had taken what was to become known as Burnside's Bridge, agreed. "[A]s near as I can find out the rebels havebeen terribly cut up within the past few days," wrote the New Yorker.He added that Confederate prisoners, confessing that "the late raid into Md. was a desperate thing," offered that "they had to do something as they were in such a bad fix inVirginia that the war will soon have to be brought to a close." Oliver W. Norton, a private 48 General McClellan's Bodyguard Civilians gawk at Antietam's human wreckage while northern burial parties labor to clean up the battlefield. Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, October 18,1862 in the 83rd Pennsylvania, cheered, "The victory is ours, and the enemy took advantage of an armistice granted them to bury the dead and care for the wounded, to ingloriously retreat across the river."5 McClellan's men debated the need for additional Union attacks. Few had the stomach to contemplate an immediate renewal of operations; only in hindsight did some second-guess McClellan. "Now that it is all over you will hear that we ought to have advanced the next day," observed staff officer Alexander S. Webb. "Well I say that myself but no one thought so at the time." George G. Meade, commanding the First Corps in place of the wounded Joseph Hooker, told his wife that "our army was a good deal broken and demoralized—so much so that it was deemed hazardous to risk an offensive movement" until reinforcements arrived.6 Lee's departure changed matters. General Williams anticipated the commencement of a new campaign: "If it goes on with the same bloody issues as the past two weeks have seen, there will be nothing left from privates to generals."7 Learning that Lee had recrossed the Potomac, Lt. Elisha H. Rhodes exclaimed, "Thank God Maryland is clear and free from the Rebel Army. The old Armyof 49 General McClellan's Bodyguard the Republic can fight after all, and I think that the Rebels found it out this time." Two days later, however, he added, "Oh, why did we not attack them and drive them into the river?" A few soldiers actually argued that they would not need to fight again. "The impression among our soldiers is that the war is finished," observed one New York private, who arrivedjust days after the battle. "They think the battle of Wednesday [September 17] the greatest of the war and decisive." That impression quickly dissipated. As September drew to a close, the New Yorker noted that "everyone is surprised that McClellan does not move faster. We want to finish up everything before going into winter quarters"— of course, if everything was "finished up" there would be no need for winter quarters.8 Once it became clear that Lee had gone away only to fight another day, officers and men began to review the management of the battle in an effort to discover whether more could have been accomplished. Able at last to reflect on recent events, Alpheus Williams, with memories of his post-battle inspection still fresh in his mind, concluded that "we punished the Rebels severely in the last battle." But that did not satisfy him. Someone had blundered: "If McClellan's plan had been carried out with more coolness by some of our commanding generals, we should have grabbed half their army. But we threw away our power by impulsive and hasty attacks on wrong points." That it was the commanding general's responsibility to ensure that such things did not happen escaped Williams. "Our men fought gloriously and we taught the rascals alesson,which they much needed after Pope's disaster," the general wrote. "They out-numbered us without doubt, and expected to thrash us soundly and drive us allpellmell back to Washington."9 After several weeks of gathering and weighing information, Charles S. Wainwright , Hooker's chief ofartillery, concurred that any blame for failing to seize the opportunity presented at Antietam lay in the fumbling execution of McClellan's plan by his subordinates. Hooker had blundered by precipitating a skirmish on the evening of the i6th, then by oversleeping the following morning, and finally by advancing without waiting for Edwin V.Sumner's Second Corps to move into position—"an attempt to get all the glory himself." In turn, Sumner failed to deploy his men in timely fashion. "There seems to be no doubt that if McClellan's orders had been carried out," maintained Wainwright, "had Sumner been on time, and Hooker not too anxious to do it allhimself, the attackwould have been so complete a success that but little of the rebel army would have escaped." Finally , Burnside's inability to do anything until the afternoon allowed Lee to shift his men back and forth to check the piecemeal assaults. "Antietam was a victory, and a glorious one when you consider that but seventeen days before this army was running most disgracefully from the same troops over which they were now victorious," the artillerist concluded. "Why it was not a more complete victory 50 General McClellan's Bodyguard : Marylanders in Frederick cheer McClellari as he leads his army in pursuit of the rebels prior to Antietam.The battle did little to dim the heroic image of their commander held by many officers in the Army of the Potomac. Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, October 4,1862 seems to me to be owing to the three cases of disobedience of orders on the part of corps commanders, especially to Sumner."10 Not everyoneagreed. Lt. Robert Gould Shaw,who participated in theadvance across the Miller Cornfield,was a bit bemused. "The resultofthe battle was, that we remained in possession of the field, and the enemy drew off undisturbed," he informed his father. "Whether that is all we wanted, I don't know; but I should think not." Nevertheless, he was not anxious to hold McClellan responsible: "[T]he enthusiasm of the troops for him is great, and that they will fight under him better than under any one else, isproved by the difference between thisbattle and those around Manassas." Perhaps, he conceded, "Little Mac" was not "a very great general," but "he is the best we have."'' 51 General McClellan's Bodyguard Joseph Hooker offered a typicallyvigorous opinion. Recovering from a wound suffered as he directed operations on the Union right during the battle's initial phase, Hooker freely voiced his belief that had he not been hit, "he could have driven the enemy into the river." The general also spoke harshly of McClellan's failure to renew the offensive on September 18. He was not alone in this. An officer in the 5yth New York expressed astonishment that "the whole line was not engaged simultaneously." This man deplored the fact that the Union offensive followed "the old McClellan method of fighting in detail, one corps at a time, the rest of the army looking on." Although hejudged the result a Union victory, he was surprised that McClellan did not renew the battle on the i8th: "Lee's army ought not to have gotten away so easily, but should have been pushed to the wall, and fought without mercy every day. From experience, however, we know that General McClellan is not equal to great occasions, and therefore it is useless to expect brilliant results while he is m command." Hooker's criticism might have carried more weight but for his reputation as a braggart who often deprecated the accomplishments of others. "I wish I could tell when Hooker is really speaking the simple truth," remarked Wainwright, "but he so universally finds fault with everybody, not under himself, that one can attach but little consequence to what he says. From what I can learn, nearly if not quite all our other generals expected Lee would make an attackon us yesterday. They saytoo that our men were used up, and that they could not have been got up to attack with any hope of success."12 Much of this exercise in hindsight was to be expected, as second-guessing is inherent in assessing military operations. A good number of officers and soldiers wondered why Lee was not decisively defeated on September 17or brought to battle again on September 18 -19; far fewer blamed McClellan for what happened. Oliver W. Norton, tired ofpress criticism directed at the army's commander, contemplated resorting tofisticuffswith the general's stay-at-homecritics, admitting that he would "lay myself liable to indictments for assault and battery pretty often " if there were as many critics as he had been told. It would be far better if the folks at home left the fighting to the generals and the soldiers rather than to the editors and the politicians. General Meade concurred. "Now, ifthere is any common sense in the country," he observed, "it ought to let us have time to reorganize and get into shape our new lines, and then advance with such overwhelming numbers that resistanceon the part of the enemy would be useless."I3 On September 22, 1862, Abraham Lincoln issued a proclamation declaring that on January 1,1863, he intended to free all slaves living in areas under Confederate control. The proclamation horrified McClellan. "I cannot make up my 52 General McClellaris Bodyguard mind to fight for such an accursed doctrine as that of a servile insurrection—it is too infamous," he told his wife. He was finding it "almost impossible ... to retain my commission & self respect at the same time," especially while Lincoln kept Edwin M. Stanton as secretary of war and Henry W. Halleck as general-in-chief. Little Mac also found repulsive Lincoln's September 24 declaration suspending the writ ofhabeas corpus, which "at one stroke of the pen" rendered the republic a "despotism." If anyone harbored doubts about supporting the cause, it was the commander of the Army of the Potomac. General William F. Smith, who loved to tell embarrassing stories about his superiors, later claimed that McClellan had drafted a letter of protest to the president, destroying it only after Smith opposed the idea. Although one might question Smith's account, McClellan had shared with Lincoln his opinions on civil policy when the president paid a visit to Harrison 's Landing in July. It is not altogether unlikely that he contemplated doing it again.14 In later years much would be made of how officers and soldiers responded to news of the preliminary emancipation proclamation. FitzJohn Porter, commander of the Fifth Corps and McClellan's close friend, informed Manton Marble, editor of the DemocraticNew York World, that "[t]he proclamation was ridiculed in the Army—caused disgust, discontent, and expressions ofdisloyalty to theviews of the administration and amount, I have heard, to insubordination."IS The document undoubtedly sparked controversy, but not nearly as much as Porter and some later observers would suggest. Moreover, it would be amistake to suppose that the response was overwhelmingly negative; far more soldiers questioned the measure's utility. One officer in the Iron Brigade reported that the proclamation took "well with the army here." General Williams, for one, "was prepared to sustain any measure" that "would help put an end to this cursed rebellion ." "There is no fear, however, that slaves will be freed any faster than our troops get possession of Rebel territory, and this was the case before the proclamation ," stated Williams. "I don't think matters are much changed by that document ." Oliver Norton, who believed that McClellan would do his duty regardless of his political sentiments, approved of the proclamation but did not "think it is going to scare the South into submission." George Whitman agreed, pointing out that the president "has got to lick the south before he can free the niggers." Writing from the camps of the 2nd Massachusetts, Lieutenant Shaw, son of two abolitionists , concurred. "For my part, I can't see what practical good it can do now," he told his mother. "Wherever our army has been, there remain no slaves, and the Proclamation won't free them where we don't go.... I don't mean to say that it is not the right thing to do, but that, as a war measure, the evil will overbalance the good for the present.'1 '' In fact, believed Shaw, it might cause the Confederacy to 53 General McClellan's Bodyguard intensify the war effort and make this "a war ofextermination" by punishingYankee prisoners. Wainwright, himself no advocate of emancipation (he thought it one ofthe Radical Republicans' "vile notions"), remarked that although he heard little discussion of the proposal, "all think it unadvised at this time; even those most anti-slavery."16 More problematic was the suspicion that politicians stood ready once more to interfere with military affairs. A meeting of northern state governors at Altoona, Pennsylvania, to discuss war measures provoked considerable alarm. Many of those who traveled to Altoona were unhappy with the Lincoln administration, in part because it was not earnest enough in striking against slavery. In issuing the preliminary proclamation, the president muffled criticism ofhis policy, but some soldiers were convinced that deeper forces were at work. They cursed "fearfully" over the assemblage of "Abolition" governors, aware that at least some of them desired McClellan's removal. "They believe with all their hearts in McClellan," one new recruit remarked of the men loyal to their commander, "and are unwilling to be slaughtered in the experiment of muddle headed politician generals." What would the politicians ask for next? The immediate resumption of military operations? Robert Shaw declared that "the army certainly needs rest," adding, "Heaven preserve us from a winter campaign!" Should editors continue to cry "On to Richmond," Shaw thought it would be best to let them "come down and try it themselves."17 There were sound reasons for a short-term delay. Immediately after the battle the army welcomed new regiments to the fold. It would take time to absorb them and commence their field training—and at these tasks McClellan reputedly excelled. "Gen. McClellan is an indefatigable officer in organization," noted Williams, who had thirteen rookie regiments to handle. "Nothing seems to escape his attentionor his anticipation," wrote Williams approvingly. "Every endeavor is made, and constantly kept up, to enforce drill and discipline and to create anesprit de corps and confidence. I have met no officer at allhis equal in this respect."18 Whatever the merits of pausing to train raw troops, within less than ten days after the battle a careful observer could detect the excuses that would be raised to justify inaction during the next five weeks. First was the issue of comparative army strengths. The impression prevailed in the army that the contending forces were at best "about equal," as Wainwright estimated it; others argued that Lee and his men significantly outnumbered Little Mac. Second was the army's need to be resupplied. Officers repeatedly complained that they were running short of essentials and that the replenishment promised by headquarters—or by Washington —had not materialized. This was the beginning of a long-term problem that plagued the army for the next six weeks. Richard B. Irwin, a staff officer, 54 General McClellan's Bodyguard recalled that the army "needed nearly everything before beginning a fresh campaign ofits own choice." In Irwin's eyes, the fault laywith the authorities in Washington , who wanted McClellan to take the offensive without providing him with the means to do so— or at least to succeed.19 If some of the officers and the men of the Army of the Potomac thus distrusted the government's willingness to send supplies needed to win on the battlefield, a growing number of administration officials were concerned that McClellan's subordinates had no intention of moving in any case. A comment by Maj. John M. Key, who worked in the War Department, gaveplausibility to this impression. In conversation following the battle, Major Key responded to a query concerning McClellan's failure to pursue the rebels. Such a movement "is not the game," remarked Key, because it would run contrary to a plan to exhaust the resources of both sides as a prelude to a negotiated peace that would preserve slavery and reunite the Republic. Normally listeners would treat this as nothing more than an idle, if careless and rash, comment, but Key's brother, Col. Thomas M. Key,was on McClellan's staff. Maj. Levi C. Turner shared Key's response with others. For anyone predisposed to wonder about the Army of the Potomac's behavior, Key's conversation quickly raised questions about exactly what was going on. On the evening of September 25, Lincoln confided to his private secretary, John Hay, that "he had heard of an officer who had said they did not mean to gain a decisive victory but to keep things running so that they, the Army, might manage things to suit themselves." Lincoln stated further that he "should have the matterexamined and if any such language had been used, his head should go off."20 The next day Lincoln wrote Key,askinghim to confirm or deny the story in the presence of both the president and Major Turner. On September 27 the two officers appeared at the White House. Turner repeated his story, adding that he nevertheless believed Keywas loyal to the Union. Keyaffirmed his loyalty but did not contradict Turner. A dissatisfied Lincoln ordered Key dismissed from the army, adding if there was any "game" being played "to have our army not takean advantage of the enemy when it could, it was his object to break up that game."21 That very day, after discussing the incident with Lincoln, Postmaster General Montgomery Blair decided to warn McClellan about Key. The president, he wrote, was deeply disturbed by Key's assertion that "the plan was to withhold your resources so that a compromise might be made which would preserve Slavery & the union at the same time." Both Blair and his father, the aged Francis Preston Blair, urged McClellan to accept emancipation as a product of the war, but the general ignored them. Instead he gathered several generals to discuss the matter, claiming that political advisers and army friends were asking him to come out in open opposition to the policy. It was a strange conversation, for those 55 General McClellan's Bodyguard assembled immediately pointed out that if McClellan followed such advice, he would find himself in Key's shoes, accused of insubordination—if not treason. Besides, they added, any portrayal of the army as united in anger over the proclamation was clearly overdrawn, and precious few would support any formal protest. Backing down, McClellan sought to cover his tracks by saying that he would ponder what to do.22 Lincoln did not worry that McClellan would turn the army on Washington. The same hesitation that had sacrificed the fruits of victory at Antietam would suffice to safeguard the Republic. There was disgust and disdain but not concern in his observation that the general "was doing nothing to make himself either respected or feared." YetLincoln thought it best to see things for himself, and so on the morning of October 1 he headed toward Harpers Ferry, arriving at noon. McClellanjoined him there in the afternoon to review soldiers. The next day Lincoln traveled north to visit McClellan's headquarters, where he alternated between conferring with the general and his corps commanders and visiting portions of the army. Wainwright was disappointed to see the "great Mogul" arrive in an army ambulance "with some half-dozen Western-looking politicians." The sight prompted the New York aristocrat to snarl: "Republican simplicity is well enough, but I should have preferred to see the President of the United States traveling with a little more regard to appearances than can be afforded by a common ambulance, with his long legs doubled up so that his knees almost struck his chin, and grinning out of the windows like a baboon. Mr. Lincoln not only is the ugliest man I ever saw, but the most uncouth and gawky in his manners and appearance ." A private in the 20th Maine seemed equally unimpressed, reporting that "old Abe Lincoln was ... [as] homely as a stump fence."23 The president toured the battlefield with McClellan as his guide. Perhaps he did not understand the slight to his host when he appeared less than attentiveas the general pointed out the features of the field from his command post at the Pry House, but Lincoln made matters worse when hefinallypiped up, "Let us go and see where Hooker went in"—as ifhe wanted to explore in detail where a fighting general led his men, instead of remaining distant from the field with a commander who pretended to direct matters. That Hooker's criticisms of McClellan's handling of operations were well known served to increase Little Mac's illconcealed annoyance with his superior. Even more frustrating, when McClellan and his escort arrived at the location of the Union right flank, the president had disappeared. McClellan dispatched one staff officer after another to find the errant chief executive; as dusk came, the general finally discovered that "Mr. Lincoln had suddenly changed his mind, and driven back to camp."24 Lincoln's behavior also annoyed other officers. Patrick noted that the entire 56 General McCldlan's Bodyguard First Corps—none other than Hooker's command—had waited all afternoon to be reviewed. At last,John Reynolds, the new corps commander, and Meade attempted to "hunt up" the president, only to learn that after his abbreviated battlefield tour he had "ran away, in an Ambulance, & drove to Sharpsburg, without putting off the Review, or saying a word to McClellan." Four hours ofwaiting thus went for naught, and the men "marched hungry and thirsty back to camp." The president kept Hooker's heroes waiting the following day as well, finally arriving some four hours after he was scheduled to appear. His actions were inexcusable . Whatever his problems with McClellan, his erratic behavior was unfair to the soldiers, who expressed exasperation with such "damn foolishness!"25 Lincoln's actions left a bad impression with McClellan's supporters, although perhaps they were beyond influencing in any case. It is unclear exactly what the president sought to find out during his visit. Anythingmore than a cursory review of the army would have revealed that the men needed supplies, especially shoes and clothing, but Lincoln's later comments suggest that he was not concerned with such things. Although he allowed himself to be photographed with detective Allan Pinkerton, who helped provide McClellan with informationthat bolstered the general's extravagant estimates of Confederate numbers, the president made his own assessment of McClellan's strength, which he concluded exceeded 88,000 men (he excluded the Twelfth Corps from his estimate).26 Meade thought that Lincoln's purpose in paying a visit "was to urge McClellan on, regardless of his views, or the condition of the army. I think, however, he was informed ofcertain facts in connection with this army which haveopened his eyes a little, and which may induce him to pause and reflect before he interferes with McClellan by giving positive orders." Alpheus Williams came away from a conversation with the chief executive rather pleased. "He really is the most unaffected , simple-minded, honest, and frank man I have ever met," Williams confided to his wife. "I wish he had a litde more firmness, though I suppose the main difficulty with him is to make up his mind as to the best policy amongst the multitudes ofadvisers and advice."Williams thus distinguished betweenLincoln the man and Lincoln the leader; perhaps, he concluded, Lincoln was not quite up to negotiating the disagreements between military leaders and politicians.27 Lincoln's visit to the front would later become the subject of political attack when Democrats claimed that he cracked jokes and asked others to sing merry songs as he passed by the site of the late battle. For many scholars, however, the most revealing moment of the visit came when Lincoln looked over the tents surrounding army headquarters early one morning. Illinois secretary of state Ozias Hatch, who cast his eye over the same scene, was surprised when Lincoln asked him what he saw. Why, responded a somewhat puzzled Hatch, he supposed it Lincoln and McClellan confer during the president's visit to the Army of the Potomac in early October 1862. Library of Congress 58 General McClellan's Bodyguard was the Army of the Potomac. "No, you are mistaken," Lincoln replied; "that is General McClellan's bodyguard."28 Most scholars have interpreted the remark as a dig against McClellan, but in fact the comment applied just as truly to the entire army. The president sensed that he was not in altogether friendly territory. Bodyguards, after all, protect people from all threats. Lincoln's visit represented one of these threats; so, in a larger sense, did an anxious administrationand the army's critics among Republican politicians and editors. Officers and men knew that McClellan's precarious standing with his superiors prior to Second Manassas had not improved appreciably because of what had happened in September. They knew as well that pompous John Pope, with his ideas of taking the war to the southern people, more closely fit Lincoln's idea of a general. They resented Pope for nearly destroying the army (or so its members thought) and for sacrificing McClellan's favorite volunteer brigade of New York Zouaves at Second Bull Run. From the president's perspective, his comment betrayed a sense ofuneasiness that the army gave its primary loyalty to McClellan and not to the Republic, an understandable attitude in light of recent events, especially the Key incident. The encounter between Lincoln and McClellan neither resolved their mutual distrust nor cleared up misunderstandings and miscommunication. McClellan believed that he had explained the problems he confronted in preparing to take the offensive, and he later claimed that Lincoln was willing to allow him time to prepare. Thus he must havebeen unnerved whenjust two days after the president left he received an unequivocal wire from General Halleck: "The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. You must move now, while the roads are good." Obviously something had gone seriously awry,for the condition of the roads was irrelevant to an armywhose soldiers lacked shoes. Had Lincoln not seen the condition of the men? Did he not understand the need to rest and refit?29 McClellan might have protested that Lincoln and his advisers were being unreasonable in their demands, but he found another wayto strike back— awaythat could serve only to increase the obstacles to cooperation between the capital and headquarters. The lack of soldiers' comment about the president's emancipation edict during his visit suggested that whatever controversy it had sparked, much of it had died down. Nor had the president heeded McClellan's advice to pursue "a conservative course" on the issue. In the wake of Halleck's October 6 telegram , McClellan decided to lash back. On October 7, after consultation with William H. Aspinwall, a businessman and Democratic supporter who advised the general on political matters, he issued General Orders No. 163, reminding his officers and men that they were to obey the decisions of civil authorities and that 59 General McClellan's Bodyguard continued discussion of the wisdom of such measures served only "to impair and destroy the discipline and efficiency of troops. . . . The remedy for political errors , if any are committed, is to be found only in the action of the people at the polls." A copy of the order went to Lincoln, who knew, as did McClellan, that in a week voters would travelto the polls in Iowa, Ohio, Indiana, and Pennsylvania. Little Mac's sense of timing was deliberate and his message loud and clear: the army was not happy with emancipation, but the voters would have to do something about it.30 "Jeb" Stuart's Confederate cavalry soon blunted whatever force McClellan's message may have had. Stuart had decided it was time to ride around the Army of the Potomac again, and on October 10 his troopers crossed the Potomac, reaching Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, that night. The following day they destroyed stores and railroad equipment. That done, Stuart dashed back across the Potomac on October 12,completing his circuit around the befuddled Federals. The exploit embarrassed McClellan and angered Lincoln, who needed no such incident on the eve of the fall elections. Still, McClellan did not move; again he called for supplies, including remounts for his cavalry, which had struggled to corner Stuart. Betrayingimpatience, Lincoln offered a lengthy reply. Reminding McClellan that during their conference he had warned the general of his "overcautiousness ," the president asked: "Are you not over-cautious when youassume that you can not do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?" Lincoln then offered a series of observations on the military situation, each of which was designed to convince the general that he could achieve something, but only if he moved. "It is all easy if our troops march as well as the enemy," concluded Lincoln, "and it is unmanly to say they can not do it."31 Although Lincoln thought it was time for the army to do something, not everyone agreed. To be sure, some generals were beginning to have second thoughts. Writing of McClellan, George Meade observed, "I think myself he errs on the side ofprudence and caution, and that alittlemore rashness on his part would improve his generalship." But Meade considered Stuart's raid to be more than an embarrassment. The rebel cavalryhad destroyed "a large amountofclothing destined for this army,which the men are greatlyin need of, and without which they can hardly move." Other commanders seemed content with what McClellan had achieved. "I hope we shall not have a second Antietam immediately," Alpheus Williams wrote, "unless the salvation of the Union depends upon it. I think we are fighting and have fought battles enough to save this Union, if they had been properly directed." Most officers and men welcomed the chance to refit and rest as they occupied the appropriately named Pleasant Valley, which nestled between 6o General McClellan's Bodyguard This northern engraving portrayed "Stuart's rebel cavalry, after their successful raid into Pennsylvania." Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, November i, 1862 Elk Mountain and the South Mountain range just northeast of Harpers Ferry. Some men pointedly noted that they lacked sufficient clothes, shoes, and blankets , but, asserted an optimistic Lieutenant Rhodes, "we do not complain, as it is all for the Union." Rumors of battles and movements reverberated through the ranks, but aside from efforts to check the progress ofJeb Stuart's cavalrymen as they rode circles around the army, little happened. "We only half believe any thing we hear down here, unless we see for ourselves," a new recruit noted. "Any little thing serves to start great stories."32 "With allour efforts it seems almost impossible to get the troops into good condition for the field," Williams observed. "Old regiments are much reduced and disordered, if not demoralized by loss of officers, by battle and disease. Majors are commanding brigades and lieutenants, regiments. While this lasts an efficient force cannot be made, and ifwe advance we shall soon retrograde." For the time being, thought Williams, it was best to sit in place. "Yet I see by the newspapers that an uneasy and impatient public are demanding an immediate advance," con- 6i General McClellan's Bodyguard tinued Williams. "[Tjhese anxious souls know nothing of our preparations, nothing of the force or resources of the enemy. It would seem as if they thirsted for blood; for stirring accounts of great battles. No sooner is one story of bloody fights grown cold than the outcry is for another." A fewdays later, the general observed that "the public pressure is terrible" to do something. "The public knows nothing of our actual strength or preparation," he growled. "If we fail, that same dear public will howl our condemnation."33 The concern about refitting the army was justified. "There seems to be an unaccountable delay in forwarding supplies," Williams complained. "We want shoes and blankets and overcoats—indeed, almost everything." But nothing Williams could do hastened their arrival. "I see the papers speak of our splendid preparations. Crazy fools! I wish they were obliged to sleep, as my poor devils do tonight, in a cold, shivering rain, without overcoat or blanket," under a leaky tent; "I wish these crazy fools were compelled to march over these stony roads barefooted , as hundreds of my men must ifwe go tomorrow. When will civilians who know nothing of our preparation or the force and strength of the enemy learn to leave war matters to war men, who have means of knowing their duties, their capabilities , and their chances?"34 Other officers echoed such sentiments. "The papers, I see, are getting veryimpatient ," Charles Wainwright sourly remarked, "and the old cry as to McClellan's slowness is againbeing raised. I was much surprised at first myself that we did not cross the river at once, but the more I know of the condition of the army, and other matters, the less certain does it appear that we could have done so to advantage ." Once more supply shortages were to blame. Wainwright lacked sufficient ordnance, fresh horses, and even horseshoes. Although Meade recognized that McClellan's position was "most precarious," he added, "At the same time they do not, or will not, send from Washington the supplies absolutely necessary for us to have before we can move." His horses needed to be shod and fed;many of his men still lacked shoes. Meade insisted that "it is hard the army should be censured for inactivity,when the most necessary supplies for their movementare withheld, or at least not promptly forwarded when called for."35 Although some scholars have been all too willing to dismiss McClellan's complaints concerning supply shortages as part of an "old game" of delay, excuse, and procrastination, comments from officers such as Williams, Wainwright, and Meade suggest more than a maladjusted personal psychology at work. Commanders failed to make timely requisitions in anticipation of shortages; in turn, supply lines had become rather tangled, with materiel sitting untouched along the route between Washington and the army. None ofthis was a tribute to McClellan's 62 General McClellan's Bodyguard reputation as a master of logistics and organization. Still, the general appeared more intent on complaining about circumstances than changing them. Once more it seemed as ifhe would not move until everythingwasjust right.36 Officers and soldiers, smarting under the growing demands of the public and press to do something, snapped back that the folks at home and the politicians in Washington simply did not understand war. "The war will not end until the North wakes up," Rhodes asserted. "As it is now conducted it seems to me to be a grand farce. When certain politicians, Army contractors and traitors North are put out ofthe way,we shall succeed. General McClellan ispopular with theArmy, and we feel that he has not had a fair chance." Wainwright agreed. "The papers are full ofreports ofMcClellan's removal, and I fear they will prove only too true," he observed. "His enemies are very bitter, and will see no good in him, though there is not a doubt that no other man in the country could have saved Washington last month." Perhaps Little Mac was no Napoleon, "but I do think he is head and shoulders above any other man we have."37 Here and there, however, appeared signs of impatience. "We ought to have force enough now, to go right ahead and balsmather the seceshers," Lieutenant Whitman argued. "I dont like the idea of fighting over the same ground three or four times but I suppose its all right."Joshua L. Chamberlain found it curious that "something seems to strike all the vigor out of our armsjust at the point of victory." In a similar vein, Lt. Josiah Favill observed: "The Newspapers are getting anxious about another campaign, and it does look as though we were wasting valuable time, although none of us is particularly anxious for another fight."38 In late October, McClellan readied to move but remained concerned about the condition of his cavalry's mounts. He forwarded to Washington a complaint about weary horseflesh, as if to suggest that the supply problems he confronted were not a product of his imagination. What followed demonstrated that his problems with the president were quite real. At last unable to restrain himself, Lincoln issued a sarcastic retort: "Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything?" Patiently McClellan explained what his men had done, but Lincoln stood firm, observing that the Confederate cavalry had outperformed their counterparts in blue. The general defended his cavalry again; Lincoln finally backed down, although he made it clear that he was unhappy to hear that McClellan's horsemen needed fresh mounts after the army's "more thanfiveweeks total inaction." Of the first Lincoln telegram, an angry McClellan said, "[I]t was one of those dirty little flings that I can't get used to when they are not merited." He was tired of "the mean & dirty character ofthe dispatches I receive." Such exchanges revealed that 63 General McClellan's Bodyguard the relationship between Lincoln and McClellan had deteriorated to the breaking point.39 Under such circumstance it was understandable that some soldiers questioned whether McClellan favored offensive operations. "We understand the present advance has been ordered peremptorily by the President, who is disgusted with McClellan's torpidity, and is bound to make him take the offensive," reported one New York officer. Rumors circulated that Lincoln was on the verge of removing McClellan. "The general has many friends in the army," noted one lieutenant, "who will be sorry to part with him, and even those of us who have no great faith in his abilities, are attracted to him through long association, and will feel the change, as another link broken in the chain of friendship, which, in the army, is highly developed." Civilians behind the lines simply could not understand an army's needs; politicians and editors played upon that ignorance in their unreasonable insistence that something be done immediately. "I wish those northern editors, who have been striving to poison the public mind against McClellan, had to sit in my present position to write their infamous editorials," one New York private grumbled. Matters looked far more complex when one was at the front. "No one is better pleased than myself with this advance, but human endurance has its bounds even in this soldier and they have been far overstepped by northern civilians when talking about a winter campaign." Charles H. Brewster, an officer in the 10th Massachusetts, agreed. The army lacked supplies; the men had just thrown away that day's rations of "wormy bread and stinking pork"; soldiers needed clothes and shoes. "I wish our dear friends at the North who have forced McClellan to move had to share our comforts with us," Brewster snarled. "I reckon that the US is about played out, as they cannot feed clothe or pay us, but it makes no difference if everyone that remains at home can get a political office."40 McClellan's advance proved time-consuming. It was not until November 2 that most of the army was across the Potomac. Lee shifted his men in response to the advance, so that by November 5 Longstreet's corps blocked the Union route to Richmond. If McClellan was eager to get between Longstreet and Jackson, who was still in the Shenandoah Valley,he showed little sign of it. Meade expressed confidence that in light of the superior strength of the Union army, "victory is sure to be ours."41 As dusk came on November 7, Charles Wainwright wondered about the outcome of the New York election three days earlier. That state's gubernatorial contest pitted Democrat Horatio Seymour against Republican James S. Wadsworth, who held a major general's commission and was known to favor emancipation. 64 General McClellaris Bodyguard "A few days will now show whether they have been waiting until this election is over in order to remove McClellan." Wainwright and others would not have to wait even that long, for later that night Brig. Gen. Catharinus P. Buckingham arrived at armyheadquarters with orders relievingMcClellanand naming Ambrose Burnside as his replacement. Secretary ofWar Stanton, who had hand-picked the general to perform this task, shared with him his concern about McClellan's patriotism and loyalty. In turn Buckingham exploited the divisiveness in the army's high command by warning Burnside that ifhe turned down the top spot, it would be offered toJoe Hooker.42 The orders Buckingham carried had their origin in a directive issued by Lincoln on November 5— the day after the fall elections. Although that very day the president had reassured a dissatisfied Illinois colonel (who had just been elected to Congress as a Democrat) that "in considering militarymerit,it seems to me that the world has abundant evidence that I discard politics," he had acted with aneye on the political calendar. Muchwould be made later ofthe fact that McClellanwas finally advancing and that battle with Lee might soon bejoined, but Lincoln had lost all faith in his general. Neither man trusted the other; both were all too willing to ascribe base motives to the other's actions. It is only fair to add that this state of affairs was not entirely due to McClellan. Indeed, there was good reason to question Lincoln's assessment of generals at this time, both his selection of the reluctant Burnside as McClellan's successor and his earlier endorsement ofJohn A. McClernand's project to capture Vicksburg (a plan that was designed to promote McClernand at the expense of Ulysses S. Grant). Far less debatable was the president 's October 24 decision to remove Don Carlos Buell from command of the Army of the Ohio, a move that should have placed McClellan on alert.4s "The Army is in mourning & this is a blue day for us all," Marsena Patrick sadly noted. "It is known that his removalwas planned & to be carried into effect the moment the Elections were over—They did not dare to remove him before the Election." Other officers and soldiers quickly linked the timing of the removal to the political calendar, citing it as yet another example of improper interference in army affairs. Had Lincoln wanted to act on military grounds, observed George Meade, he could have sacked McClellan immediately after Antietam: "This removal now proves conclusively that the cause is political, and the date of the order, November 5 (the day after the New York election) confirmsit." Others seconded this assessment. "There are those who insist that it is from incompetence that he has been removed,"John Haley ofthe lyth Maine, a newcomer, observed. "But the soldiers, who are not so steeped in prejudice that they can see nothing but party, claim he had submitted to one reduction after another of his forces until he has a smaller army than Lee although we are the attacking party. The sol- 65 General McClellan's Bodyguard diers believe he has accomplished nothing short of a miracle in saving his army." A Pennsylvania infantryman feared the change would "cause much dissatisfaction in the army," adding, "I never sawmen have so much confidence in a man as the soldiers have in McClellan." Other critics bluntly voiced their anger. "There is but one opinion upon this subject among the troops and that is the Government has gone mad," reported General John Gibbon, who hadjust ascended to division command. "It is the worse possible thing that could have been done and will be worth to the south as much as a victory." Few disagreed. "I think everyone in the army regrets it," Robert Shaw noted, "except, perhaps, some envious majorgenerals ."44 In expressing regret over McClellan's removal, officers and men did not necessarily argue that he was a great general. Gibbon offered that the men "fight better under him than they do under anybody else"—although the only other general who had directed elements of the army in combat wasJohn Pope. "Perhaps McClellan has too much of the Fabian policy," Alpheus Williams admitted, "but injudging of this one must not forget that he has been placed in circumstances where to lose the game would have been to lose all." Williams knew where to place the real blame: "My idea is that the cursed policy of this war has its origin at Washington. Old fogyism has ruled in every department. Trepidation for the safety of the Capital seems to have paralyzed all faculties of preparation and promptness." Robert Shaw manifested a similar attitude. "The newspapers and other jackasses can talk forever," he wrote home, "but I shall still be persuaded that it is our Government that has failed and not our Generals."45 To those officers and men who were critical of political interference,McClellan 's removaloffered ample confirmationof their belief that Abraham Lincoln was all too willing to make the army the puppet of partisan concerns. To remove the beloved general just as the army commenced an advance suggested just how much Republicans feared what a successful McClellan might do. "The general query is, why was he taken from us at such a time, if at all?" wondered one Wisconsin private. "The prevailing opinion among the officers and men is that the Administration is awfully inefficient, beside having no inclination to do that which would hasten the termination of the war." It wasjust more evidence that the politicians in charge could not be trusted. "This change produces much bitter feeling and some indignation," commented Elisha Rhodes. "McClellan's enemies will now rejoice, but the Army loves and respects him." But Rhodes would have nothing to do with any movement to keep the general in command: "Like loyal soldiers we submit."46 Not everyone was willing to submit. Some talked of turning the army against Washington, but McClellan, his nickname notwithstanding, proved to be no 66 General McGlellan's Bodyguard Napoleon. To equate the demands for action with the Newburgh Conspiracy of the Revolutionary War is to go too far;Lincoln's frequent references to the possibility of mutiny revealed his deep distrust of the officer corps, an understandable but unworthy reaction. One must distinguish between these alarmist reactions and the very real discussions among line officers who were prepared to resign their commissions. Members of some of the army's best regiments counted themselves among the latter, including individuals in the 1st Minnesota and the Iron Brigade's 6th Wisconsin. It was not the prospect of emancipation as a war aim that sparked this response; it was a sense that the administration had played politics once too often with the army. Many officers and men who would have nothing to do with talk of resignation nevertheless agreed that the timing ofMcClellan 's removal indicated that political pressures, not military concerns, explained Lincoln's decision. That it could be a decision undertaken for primarilymilitary reasons but timed according to the political calendar escaped them. When regimental commanders got wind of the intentions of some of their subordinates, they did what they could to dissuade them, and in the end whateverthreatexisted of the army's dissolving dissipated, leavingonly grumbling.47 George McClellan left his army as he had led it—deliberately. On November 9-10 he reviewed his command one last time. As the general rode past the long lines, most of the men cheered long and loud. Marsena Patrick, who observed that "the Troops love him with a devotion almost idolatry," called for them to cheer as McClellan reviewed the Provost Guard. Similar scenes occurred down the line, despite orders prohibiting such displays of affection. A private in McClellan's favorite volunteerregiment, the 5th New York,looked at the general, then "felt for the first time in a long while a decided sensation of enthusiasmburning in the ashes ofmy defunct patriotism." Brig. Gen. Thomas Meagher ordered theflagbearers ofhis Irish Brigade to fling down their banners as avivid symbolic protest; McClellan directed them to pick them up, which served to endear him even more to the brigadier. "Ah!" he wrote Democratic adviser S. L. M.Barlow. "If the gentlemen of the White House could have seen what I sawthis morning— could have heard the cheers from those 100,000 soldiers which rent the air and deadened the artillery itself as the parting salute was fired — they would have felt that a mistake or crime has been committed by them, which the Army of the Union will never forgive." Such comments—as well as the person to whom they were directed—suggest that a good number of the army's generals were already immersed in politics, perhaps too much so for their own good. Other observers drew a different lesson from the review. As one lieutenant, no fan of McClellan's, sadly observed, "The parade showed up a wonderfully fine looking body ofmen which, under a capable leader, could do almost anything."48 67 General McClellan's Bodyguard Artist Alfred A. Waud sketched McClellan, accompanied by his successor, Ambrose E. Burnside, waving his hat as he reviewed his troops in the field for the last time. Library of Congress Stories would circulate for years that McClellan discouraged efforts to protest his removal. Talk ofa march on Washington wasjust that, nothing more, and in any case, in light of the army's past track record one wonders whether the dissenters would have soon found themselves explaining their failure to move against a superior opponent and expressing a preference for a spring campaign. Talk of mass resignations in several regiments posed a more serious threat. By staying around to participate in final reviews, McClellan allowed his men to vent their displeasure and cool off. Many officers and men remained bitter about the administration and the press, but diey decided to stayand stick it out. Still, many of them smarted under the impression that they served in a "shamefully abused army." A member ofthe Iron Brigade remarked, "The last time Abraham visited his children, they gave him a very cool reception, but I venture the next will be more so.49 68 General McClellan's Bodyguard Circumstances reinforced the impression held by many officers that it was politics , not military performance,that led to Little Mac's removal. The train designated to take him awayfrom the army had carried GeneralJames S. Wadsworth, Seymour's defeated rival, to camp. McClellan had devotedly hoped for the general 's defeat, for he possessed a thorough "contempt for the man" and regarded him as "a vile traitorous miscreant." Wadsworth, whose abolitionist sentiments and closeness to Lincoln were known throughout the army, reported that he was going to advise the new army commander. "Well!" Patrick exclaimed in disgust. "Perhaps it is all right, but I think the Administration adds insult to injury." The next day FitzJohn Porter took his leaveof the army to answer charges ofinsubordination pressed by Pope; his replacement as Fifth Corps commander was none other thanJoe Hooker, perhaps McClellan's most vocal uniformed critic.50 The shadow of McClellan's removal (and the reaction to it) lingered long over the army. Andrew A. Humphreys was a case in point. He had let others know of his unhappiness over the removal; nevertheless, the following month, at Fredericksburg , he led his division with courage and skill against Marye's Heights. For that he expected to win promotion to major general. Burnside urged the promotion on Lincoln, who apparently consented. When nothing happened, however, Humphreys took it upon himself to visit Lincoln, only to find that the president had no recollection of the conversation with Burnside. Humphreys concluded that Republican senators would have nothing to do with confirming the promotion of a McClellanite. After Gettysburg he reluctantly accepted a position as Meade's chief of staff, convinced that politics blocked his chance to become a corps commander.51 Humphreys's experience was typical of officers identified as McClellan men. For the remainder of the war, those who had been warm supporters of thegeneral wondered whether it cost them professionally—among them John Sedgwick, Gouverneur K. Warren, and Winfield Scott Hancock. Those three men commanded the army's infantry corps when it marched forth in the spring of 1864, a fact that helps one assess the validity of their concerns. For at least one of them, McClellan became the symbolic victim of political interferenceby an unreasonable president arid a carping press that simply did not understand the realities of war. About the time Joseph Hooker assumed command of the army in January 1863, Warren wrote a lengthy essay in which he attributed reports of the demoralization of the army to the failure of Burnside and Hooker to shower all of the troops with the samelove and devotion they reserved for their old commands. McClellan had done so, he said, but "those who live in Washington city,who have never heard the hiss of an enemy's bullet, who live in an atmosphere of envy, mal- 69 General McClellan's Bodyguard ice, and all uncharitableness" had failed to appreciate what manner of man they had in McClellan.52 So it would always be, to some extent, with the Army of the Potomac. Not everyone who served in its ranks would have welcomed Lincoln's characterization ofthe army as "McClellan's bodyguard," but they would have interpreted the president's remark as a caustic comment typical ofa man who did not understand war. What shaped the peculiar character of this army was not simply the imprint of the character and personality of its first commander. The legacy of that general 's troublesome relationship with the authorities in Washington also played a role, as did a pervasive belief that Republican newspaper editors and, to a lesser extent, the northern public held unreasonable expectations for the army. Many generals, officers, and men shared McClellan's reluctance to renew battle along Antietam Creek on September 18;many echoed his complaints about the feebleness of resupply efforts during October; many agreed that a winter campaign was out of the question; and a good number questioned the degree to which political demands influencedmilitary decisions. McClellan mayhave reinforced these tendencies , but they endured long after he left. Perhaps so many members of the Army of the Potomac cherished their association with George B. McClellan in part because he was indeed one of them. NOTES 1. Marsena R. Patrick, Inside Lincoln's Army: The Diary ofMarsena Rudolph Patrick, ed. David S. Sparks (New York: Yoseloff, 1964), 150-52. 2. Gary W. Gallagher, "The Maryland Campaign in Perspective,"in Antietam: Essays on the 1862 Maryland Campaign, ed. Gary W. Gallagher (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989), 89-90. 3. T. Harry Williams, Lincolnand His Generals (New York: Knopf, 1952), 25; Bruce Catton, Grant Takes Command (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), 383. It is worth noting that Grenville M. Dodge,who served in the Western Theater, used the term "McClellanized" to indicate an outlook grounded in certain political sympathies. John Y. Simon offers a different understanding of the term in "Grant,Lincoln, and Unconditional Surrender," in Lincoln's Generals, ed. Gabor S. Boritt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 170,181, although he fails to define exactly what he means by the expression(which Grant himself did not employ). 4. Bruce Catton, Mr. Lincoln's Army (GardenCity, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1951),316, 318-19; Haskell to "Dear Brothers, and Sisters," September 22,1862, in Frank L. 70 General McClellan's Bodyguard Byrne and Andrew T. Weaver, eds., Haskell of Gettysburg: His Life and Civil War Papers (1970; reprint, Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989), 48; Alpheus S. Williams, From the Cannon's Mouth: The Civil War Letters of GeneralAlpheus S. Williams , ed. Milo M. Quaife (Detroit: Wayne State UniversityPress, 1959), 130; William H. Powell, The Fifth Army Corps (1895; reprint, Dayton, Ohio: Morningside, 1984), 302-3. 5. Seymour Dexter, Seymour Dexter, Union Army: Journal and Letters of Civil War Service in Company K, 23rd New York Volunteer Regiment..., ed. Carl A. Morrell (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland and Co., 1996), 107; George Washington Whitman, Civil War Letters of George Washington Whitman, ed. Jerome M. Loving (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1975), 69; Oliver W. Norton, Army Letters, 1861-1865 (Chicago : O. L. Deming, 1903), 121. 6. Stephen W. Sears, George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon (New York: Ticknor 8c Fields, 1988), 320; George G. Meade, The Life and Letters of General George Gordon Meade, 2 vols. (New York:Scribner's, 1913), 1:311. 7. Williams, From the Cannon's Mouth, 133. 8. Elisha Hunt Rhodes, Allfor the Union: The Civil War Diary and Letters of Elisha Hunt Rhodes, ed. Robert Hunt Rhodes (1985; reprint, New York:Vintage, 1991), 73-74; Edward King Wightman, From Antietam to Fort Fisher: The Civil War Letters of Edward King Wightman, 1862-1865, ed. Edward G. Longacre (Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson UniversityPress, 1985), 39, 44. 9. Williams, From the Cannon's Mouth, 134-35. 10. Charles S. Wainwright,A Diary of Battle: The Personal Journals of Colonel Charles S. Wainwright, 1861-1865,ed. Allan Nevins (New York:Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962), 111-13. 11.Robert Gould Shaw, Blue-Eyed Child of Fortune: The Civil War Letters of Colonel Robert Gould Shaw, ed. Russell Duncan (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992), 242, 245. 12.Wainwright, Diary of Battle, 103-4;Josiah Marshall Favill, The Diary of a Young Officer (Chicago: Donnelley, 1909), 188,191. 13.Norton, Army Letters, 123; Meade, Life and Letters, i:3ii. 14.George B. McClellan to Mary Ellen McClellan, September 25,1862, McClellan to William H. Aspinwall, September 26,1862, in George B. McClellan, The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan:Selected Correspondence, 1860 -1865, ed. Stephen W. Sears (New York:Ticknor Sc Fields, 1989), 481-82; William F. Smith, Autobiography of Major General William F.Smith, ed. Herbert M. Schiller (Dayton, Ohio: Morningside , 1990), 57-58. Smith shared the story during the war; eventually it made itsway to the ears of Lincoln's private secretary,John Hay. SeeJohn Hay, Lincoln and the Civil War in the Diaries and Letters of John Hay, ed. Tyler Dennett (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1939), 216-18. The story in Hay's diary differs in marked particulars from that in Smith's autobiography, offering grounds to treat it with skepticism. 7i General McClellan's Bodyguard 15. Sears, McClellan, 325. 16. LanceJ. Herdegen, The Men Stood Like Iron: How the Iron Brigade Won Its Name (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 199; Williams, From the Cannon 's Mouth, 142; Norton, Army Letters, 125; Whitman, Civil War Letters, 71;Shaw, Blue-Eyed Child of Fortune, 245; Wainwright, Diary of Battle, 109,113. 17.William B. Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors(New York:Knopf, 1948), 253- 61; Wightman, From Antietam toFort Fisher, 44-45; Sears, McClellan, 324; Shaw, Blue-Eyed Child of Fortune, 244. 18.Williams, From the Cannon'sMouth, 135-36. 19.Wainwright, Diary of Battle, 107,108; Richard B. Irwin, "The Removal of McClellan," in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, ed. Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel, 4 vols. (New York: Century, 1887-88), 3:102-3. 20. Hay, Lincoln and the Civil War, 50-51. 21.Abraham Lincoln, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P. Easier, 9 vols. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953-55), 5: 442~4322 . Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam (NewYork: Ticknor &. Fields, 1983), 322-23. 23. Hay, Lincoln and the Civil War,51;Wainwright, Diary of Battle, 109; Wightman , From Antietam to Fort Fisher, 48; Alice Rains Trulock, In the Hands of Providence : Joshua L. Chamberlain and theAmerican Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 79. 24. Wainwright, Diary of Battle, no. 25. Patrick, Inside Lincoln'sArmy, 155-56; Herdegen, Men Stood Like Iron, 200; Alan D. Gaff, On Many a Bloody Field:Four Years in the Iron Brigade (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 197. 26. "Memorandum," October 1-3,1862, in Lincoln, Collected Works, 5:448. 27. Meade, Life and Letters, i:317; Williams, From the Cannon'sMouth, 136. 28. Don E. Fehrenbacher and Virginia Fehrenbacher, eds., Recollected Words of Abraham Lincoln (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), aoi. 29. Irwin, "Removal of McClellan," 103. 30. Warren W. Hassler Jr., General George B. McClellan:Shield of the Union (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), 302-3. Most accounts fail to note the sequence of events during the first week of October, tending to treat separately the army's discussion about emancipation, culminating in the McClellan order, the Lincoln visit, and the Halleck telegram. However, the origins of McClellan's order and the role that Democratic political adviser William Aspinwall had in its issuance were known in Washington almost immediately. See Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, ed. Howard K. Beale, 3 vols. (New York: Norton, 1960), i: 163. 31.Hassler, McClellan, 303-5; Lincoln to McClellan, October 13,1862, in Lincoln, Collected Works, 5:460-61. 32. Meade, Life and Letters, 1:3ig; Williams, From the Cannon'sMouth, 137; 72 General McClellan's Bodyguard Rhodes, Allfor the Union, 76;Joel Molyneux, Quill of the Wild Goose: Civil War Letten and Diaries of Private Joel Molyneux, ijlst P. V., ed. Kermit Molyneux Bird (Shippensburg , Pa.: Burd Street Press, 1996), 43. 33. Williams, From the Cannon's Mouth, 138-39. 34. Ibid., 140. 35. Wainwright, Diary of Battle, 114-15; Meade, Life and Letters, i = 320-21. 36. Sears, Landscape Turned Red, 326-27;Joseph T. Glatthaar, Partners in Command : The Relationship betweenLeaders in the Civil War (New York: Free Press, 1994), 88-92; Sears, McClellan, 332-33; Kenneth P.Williams, Lincoln Finds a General , 5 vols. (New York:Macmillan, 1949-59), 2:466-67. 37. Rhodes, Allfor the Union, 76; Wainwright, Diary of Battle, 115-16. 38. Whitman, Civil War Letters, 72; Trulock, In the Hands of Providence, 86; Favill, Diary of a Young Officer, 196. 39. Abraham Lincoln to George B. McClellan, October 25, 26, 27,1862, in Lincoln, Collected Works, 5:474, 477, 479; McClellan to Lincoln, October 25, 26,1862, in McClellan, Civil War Papers, 508-9; McClellan to Mary Ellen McClellan, October 26, 29,1862, in ibid., 511, 514-15. 40. Favill, Diary of a Young Officer, 198-99; Dexter, Seymour Dexter, ill; Charles Harvey Brewster, When This Cruel War is Over: The Civil War Letters of Charles Harvey Brewster, ed. David W. Blight (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1992), 188-89 [letter dated November 5,1862]. 41. Meade, Life and Letters, 1:324. 42. Sears, Landscape Turned Red, 340. 43. Abraham Lincoln to William R. Morrison, November 5,1862, in Lincoln,Collected Works, 5:486. 44. Patrick, Inside Lincoln'sArmy, 173; Meade, Life and Letters, l= 325; John W. Haley, The Rebel Yell and the Yankee Hurrah: The Civil War Journal of a Maine Volunteer , ed. Ruth L. Silliker (Camden, Maine: Down East Books, 1985), 50; Frederick Pettit, Infantryman Pettil: The Civil War Letters of Corporal Frederick Pettit, ed. William Gilfillan Gavin (Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane, 1990), 36;John Gibbon, Recollections of the Civil War (1928; reprint, Dayton, Ohio: Morningside, 1988), 96; Shaw, Blue-Eyed Child of Fortune, 255. 45. Gibbon, Recollections, 99; Williams, From the Cannon's Mouth, 151; Shaw,BlueEyed Child of Fortune, 259-60. 46. Herdegen, Men Stood Like Iron, 214; Rhodes, Allfor the Union, 80. 47. Michael C. C. Adams, Our Masters the Rebels: A Speculation on Union Military Failure in theEast, 1861-1865 (Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, 1978), 117-23; Richard Moe, The Last Full Measure: The Life and Death of the First Minnesota Volunteers (New York: Henry Holt, 1993), 204-5; Herdegen, Men Stood Like Iron, 21213 ;Gaff, On Many a Bloody Field, 201-2. 48. Patrick, Inside Lincoln'sArmy, 174; Thomas P.Southwick, A Duryee Zouave 73 General McClellan's Bodyguard (1930; reprint, Brookneal, Va.: Patrick A. Schroder Publications, 1995), 93; Sears, Landscape Turned Red, 342-43; Favill,Diary of a Young Officer, 201. 49. Herdegen, Men Stood Like Iron, 214. 50. Sears, Landscape Turned Red, 332; Patrick, Inside Lincoln's Army, 174-75. 51.Henry H. Humphreys, Andrew Atkinson Humphreys: A Biography (Philadelphia :John C. Winston, 1924), 173, 2OO-202; Abraham Lincoln to Ambrose E. Burnside ,January 28,1863, in Lincoln, Collected Works, 6:81. 52. Emerson Gifford Taylor, Gouverneur Kemble Warren: Life and Letters of an American Soldier (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1932), 100. ...