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8 The Vicksburg Campaign and Siege
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134 8 } The Vicksburg Campaign and Siege T he Vicksburg campaign evolved more from circumstances than from a coherent plan. When Grant sent Sherman down the Mississippi, it was with the intention of executing a strong, fast strike that could capture the Rebel stronghold, with no thought as to what would be done if the strike failed. Sherman’s refusal to fall back to Memphis after he faltered pinned the Federals to a forward position, close to Vicksburg, where there was little dry land to camp troops. Moreover, the army was at the end of a supply line nearly two hundred miles long in a straight line south of Memphis, dependent on dozens of river steamers. Vested with a stubborn character, Grant continued to operate in that narrow river setting after he joined the expedition, unwilling to give the impression of a strategic defeat by retiring to Memphis. He was determined to win or lose by operating at the extreme end of his logistical support system, trying to find a way to either bypass the stronghold or reach the bluffs from which it impeded Northern navigation of the great river. Grant claimed that the main reason he decided to go down and take personal charge of the campaign lay in his distrust of McClernand ’s ability to handle the situation. If Sherman had remained in command, Grant may have remained at Memphis to administer his department. After visiting McClernand at Napoleon on January 17, Grant came away with the impression that most of his subordinates shared his view. He instructed McClernand to take the troops down to Young’s Point and Milliken’s Bend, then returned to Memphis to arrange for security in his rear.1 After returning to the scene of operations at Young’s Point on January 29, Grant felt that the “real work of the campaign and siege of Vicksburg now began.” It would be a “work . . . of time, and will require a large force at the final struggle.” The enormity of the task was beginning to be felt in Washington as well. Newspaperman Charles A. Dana, sent by Secretary of War Stanton to serve as an observer in Grant’s camp, recalled the opening of the Mississippi River as “that toughest of tough jobs.”2 More troops arrived soon after Grant reached the expedition. The Vicksburg Campaign and Siege 135 Twelve to fourteen boats left Memphis on January 21 and deposited their human cargo only fourteen miles from Vicksburg on the low- lying bottomland of the stream where steamers lined the bank as “far as the eyes can reach,” according to Cyrus F. Boyd. The troops were “in a most filthy and sickly condition from being on the boats so long. No hog- pen will compare .” Boyd found the area “knee deep in black mud.” The levee— ten feet tall and twenty feet wide at the base— was the only high ground. Boyd came across many small hospitals filled with sick soldiers surrounded by newly dug graves along the levee. Still, there was an air of industry packed into this small space, with dozens of boats unloading supplies as well as men, everyone making maximum use of each square foot of available ground.3 Grant began searching for a way to get his command out of the bottomlands and moving toward the enemy as soon as possible. He pinned his initial hope on enlarging the canal across De Soto Point that Thomas Williams ’s small force had begun the previous summer during the first Federal effort against Vicksburg. Early on, despite the enormous number of troops involved and the use of steam dredges, it became clear that the canal had problems. The angles at which it joined the river at both ends were too sharp to allow enough water to flow through, and the Confederates began to construct artillery emplacements at Warrenton on the east bank of the river, directly opposite the southern end of the canal. Yet Grant continued for weeks to work on the artificial waterway, in part to give employment to his troops. The Mississippi itself impeded work on the canal when the waters rose in March due to spring rains and broke a retaining dam at the northern end. By then, Confederate artillery commanded the southern half of the canal, making it less likely that Grant would use it even if his men managed to finish the channel.4 What Grant really wanted was an avenue out of the bottomlands and up...