Dispatches from Pakistan

New Wine in Old Bottles

4 NewWineinOldBottles aasim sajjad akhtar following the sensational discovery of Osama bin Laden in the garrison town of Abbotabad in May 2011, it has become more difficult than ever to write about Pakistan without digressing into superficial narratives about religious militancy, the machinations of the country’s military, and the vagaries of regional geopolitics. It is true that much of what is projected about Pakistan—or not, as the case may be—can be explained by the fact that mainstream politics is so deeply riven by intrigue. Pakistan is easily misunderstood thanks to the ethnocentrism that runs through much “analysis” that originates in western metropolises , whose writers seem obsessed with the motivation of actors in the current Great Game being played out in Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan. There is indeed a strangely positive fascination with the secretive and often brutal conduct of Pakistan’s security apparatus. Pakistan’s ruling bloc, for its part, is just as prone as its imperial patrons to project simplistic narratives. Yet, conspiracy theories exist because conspiracies do take place, even if the prototypical “foreign hand” theories cultivated by the military establishment and its loyal lackeys in the media and academy dominate over more subversive narratives . I believe that it is only possible to make sense of the complex new wine in old bottles 5 wrangling of “great men” by probing the tremendous social change that has and continues to take place across the length and breadth of the Pakistani social formation. Relatedly, rationalizing the Pakistani military’s apparent duplicity in dealing with its erstwhile protégés requires some serious thinking about the sociological bases of the state. My objective in this essay is to provide insight into the political economy of change and the ideological and social polarizations in Pakistan. In doing so I hope to show why certain intellectual trends predominate .The political economy of war and neoliberalism, and a deeply embedded system of patronage, needs to be understood if meaningful explanations are to be forged for why Pakistan is a hotbed of religious militancy, why a seemingly divided and militarized state remains powerful , and why substantive political transformation is unlikely in the short run. “The Unplanned Revolution” A handful of Pakistani scholars have been attempting over the course of many years to counter the perception that Pakistani society has changed little in the more than six decades since the end of colonial rule. This perception is propagated widely by the urban, educated elite in its caricaturing of the rural “masses” and the omnipresent “feudal” lord. A static social structure produces an intrinsically “corrupt” political leadership, constituted primarily of the all-powerful “feudals.” The dissident view posits that the old “feudal” incumbents are increasingly challenged by the commercial nouveau-riche, the social formation is no longer primarily rural, and labor and capital are both highly mobile.1 I concur that the deepening of capitalism in society has forever changed patterns of social and political exchange, and what is emerging on the other side is a picture of both extreme differentiation and ever more ruthless competition for what are considered scarce economic and political resources.The manipulations of the state—and particularly the military—and piecemeal political realignments that have taken place to accommodate new contenders for power have polarized politics along ethnic and religious lines. Those who talk class politics, having always 6 Aasim Sajjad Akhtar found it hard to establish their niche within Pakistan, are now struggling to be heard in a society wracked by sectarian and ethnic conflict. This state of affairs—widening social (including class) chasms, noholds -barred competition in the battle for political and economic resources, and increasingly incongruous and conflict-ridden politics— has intensified in the past decade. I believe that there are a few important factors that underlie this increased polarization that have also helped consolidate the broad secular trends of urbanization, enhanced labor and capital mobility, and the expansion of a commercial middle class. It is now well established that the reaction of western governments and international financial institutions (IFIs) to the September 11 attacks has had great bearing on Pakistan’s polity, economy, and society. However, there has been near silence—both within the popular media and in scholarly circles—on what might be called the “political economy of war.” In short, an already huge underground smuggling economy that has thrived on the Pakistan–Afghanistan border for the...