Building a House in Heaven: Pious Neoliberalism and Islamic Charity in Egypt

4. Privatizing Islam

Privatizing islam is the production of a market-oriented Islam that generates new institutional forms. It is a manifestation of pious neoliberalism and in the case of Egypt is a response to a nationalized or statist Islam. Using security as a pretext, the Egyptian state gradually escalated its intervention in Islamic institutions throughout the twentieth century. The state intruded in Islamic institutions of all kinds, but its interference in mosques and the co-optation of waq f most poignantly illustrate the consequences of such an intervention. Mosques and awqaf formed the bedrock of Ottoman Egypt through Mohammad Ali’s modernization of Egypt in the early twentieth century. After the 1952 revolution, decades of state intervention by the Ministry of Endowments undermined the independence of these religious institutions and eventually led to their privatization .Wealthyindividualshistoricallyfundedwaqf,andtheseendowments provided social services to the public. Recognizing the great capacity of waqf, Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized and bureaucratized the institution, leading to its eventual demise as an institutional form.1 In its place emerged Western-style foundations established from 2002 onward by a new bourgeois class that had made its money during the rapid privatization of stateowned industries in Egypt from the 1970s until about 2010. In the past, most mosques were built with awqaf funds, and communities frequently collected donations to transform their small prayer rooms into mosques. There are two kinds of mosques in Egypt, private (ahli) and governmental (hukumi). Today, most are governmental mosques and even privately funded mosques (masagid ahliyya) eventually become governmentalized. The state recognized mosques as a critical space of community and Islamistorganizingandthereforethroughaprocessofannexationputcommunitymosquesandtheirimamsunderstatecontrolinthenameofnational security. While Hosni Mubarak wanted the ministry to annex all mosques, he allowed elites to establish privately funded mosques. Foundations and privately funded mosques are a key part of a privatized Islam in Egypt, but • CHAPTER 4 • Privatizing Islam • 77 • globally an Islamic sector is the most visible marker of privatized Islam. The Islamic sector is a multi-million dollar market for religious goods and services provided by Islamic businesses that market their products as such. It includes publications and multimedia, educational institutions and products, businesses for Islamic goods from halal meat to fashion, entertainment, art, and religious gatherings. In Egypt, the development of this industry complemented the growth of daʿwa and enabled Islamism to flourish despite an authoritarian regime that was hostile to Islamic entities . These new private religious spaces and institutions played a critical role in the promotion of pious neoliberal subjectivity. Managing Mosques During the January 25 uprising of 2011, the congregation of millions of people in mosques at Friday noon prayers constituted a major organizing opportunity that led to mass protests across the nation. After the sermon (khutba, pl. khutab), people left the mosque and went straight to Tahrir Square. Sermons held after the Friday midday prayers are a key space for disseminating ideas because they give the preacher a weekly captive audience . Most preachers gained popularity and clout by speaking to the everyday issues that matter to people.2 The mosque thus was a critical space for organizing the fall of the regime in 2011. During the eighteen days of the January uprising, then Minister of Endowments, Mahmoud Hamdi Zaqzouq , specifically warned Egyptians against using mosques to launch protests against Mubarak.3 Mosques served as a communal gathering point and thus authoritarian leaders felt particularly threatened by this space. During the 1990s, Mubarak attempted to gain authority over the piety movement by nationalizing nongovernmental (private) mosques and requiring all daʿiya to attend a state-run two-year training program.4 Toward the end of the Mubarak regime, the mosque came to signify tensions over social identity and ethical consciousness, while the Friday sermon became the heart of public discourses over religion. The state consequently tried to extend regulation over both.5 In my interview with a manager at the Ministry of Endowments, I asked about the ministry’s management of mosques. His response: In order to ensure that there isn’t any type of political motives or other undesirable motives and to ensure that mosques are led 78 PRIVATIZING ISLAM down the clear, right path, we centralized the administration over them. That way we appoint the imam, and test them to ensure they are capable of the task and that they have good aims. . . . There is a system in place in each district and each manager is responsible for monitoring a certain set of mosques. They monitor...