The Theology of Martin Luther: A Critical Assessment

9. Dialectics: Freedom and Limitation

9 Dialectics: Freedom and Limitation Luther’s remarks on freedom are concentrated in two of his writings that seem to contradict one another: The Freedom of a Christian (), and The Bondage of the Will (). But what is said in these two writings is not only compatible; although they have fundamentally different occasions and addressees, in their substance they belong inalienably together. The sequence of their origins is also important for understanding them. Contemporary questions The word “freedom” today is far from having the seductive sound it did at the time of Luther or of the French Revolution. For Lessing, the Reformer was one who freed people from the “yoke of tradition,” for Goethe he brought liberation from the “fetters of spiritual bigotry.” As late as , on the occasion of the Year of Luther, Gottfried Maron found that Luther “can, indeed must be said to have played an important, even decisive role in the history of human freedom, and can, indeed must, continue to play such a role.” In the interim, talk about the Reformation’s emotions surrounding freedom has died down somewhat—which no doubt is connected also with the historic success of Luther’s understanding of freedom. Freedom, at least in the West and the countries oriented toward it, has become a matter of course. The first article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ( December ) declares that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” The constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany ( May ) seconded this: “Everyone has the right to the free development of his personality . . .” and “freedom of faith and of conscience, and freedom of creed, religious or ideological, are inviolable.” But despite these sweeping statements many people have the feeling that their freedom is long gone. There have been objections from the very beginning and from the most varied directions to Luther’s idea of freedom; these objections are still be199 200 The Theology of Martin Luther ing articulated today. Though religiously motivated, they can seem utterly contrary: while more norm-dependent contemporaries fear that Luther’s talk about freedom might lead to an indefensible liberalism or even libertinism, others find his image of the human altogether too pessimistic when he denies that humans have the ability to make a free decision before God; after all, we are undoubtedly free to do good! At present the freedom offered on all sides for self-development and personal decision is also associated with feelings of a total lack of orientation. Can these fears be defused? From a political point of view Thomas Müntzer and the peasants of the Reformation period were the first to formulate an accusation against Luther that has not yet been silenced and was used fairly recently as a paradigm by Herbert Marcuse: Luther’s idea of freedom, which applies only to the inner person, is said to be schizophrenic and serves ultimately to legitimate political and social bondage. What Luther had to say about freedom also stands today in the context of worldwide theologies of liberation that have scarcely any points of contact with Luther’s idea of freedom. A third objection is that in view of global capitalism and its economic pressures the question seems no longer to be about freedom but rather, and more urgently, about justice and a sustainable ecology. What is the significance of Luther’s notion of freedom in this context? Finally, some anthropologically-based objections suggest themselves. The plea for individual self-development has shown that overinflated ideas of entitlement on the part of individuals can lead to conflicts, and even to the endangerment of whole societies. Does a guiding authority not in fact serve to give the psyche some relief? On the other hand, many kinds of esoteric methods of relaxation are now practiced, such as certain forms of meditation, and these offer a certain relief from the pressures of everyday life: has Luther’s talk of freedom lost its function and become outdated as a result? But we can also ask: when brain research indicates that there is in fact no such thing as a genuine free decision on the part of a human being, does that confirm what Luther says about unfreedom? To approach an answer to these questions we must first consider that Luther makes a clear distinction between the freedom of a Christian on the...