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2 It Takes Three to Tango Argentina, the Bretton Woods Institutions, and the United States, 1946–1956 When I took charge of the government in 1946, the first visitor I received was the President of the International Monetary Fund, who came to invite us to join the Fund. . . . I responded cautiously that I needed to think it over and immediately assigned two trusted young experts from the government staff to investigate this dangerous monster , born as I recall in the suspect Breton Hood [sic] agreements. The conclusion of their report was clear and precise: In sum, we were dealing with a new putative deformed spawn of imperialism. I, who have the advantage of not being an economist, am able to explain it as it should be understood.1 Juan Domingo Perón, the IMF, and the World Bank: Judging by the historiography that portrays Perón as a staunch anti-imperialist, and by statements such as this one, such a relationship would seem impossible. But was it really so? As we will see, Peronist Argentina’s entry into the Bretton Woods institutions was in fact desired not only by the leaders of the IMF and the World Bank but also by Perón himself. From 1946 to 1955, the years of his administration, Perón made significant and repeated attempts to reach an agreement by which Argentina could join both institutions. (Nations cannot join just one of the Bretton Woods twins.) Those efforts were translated into an almost permanent state of negotiations between the parties involved. Some of the arguments in this chapter are also explored in my article “Chronicle of an Inconclusive Negotiation: Perón, the IMF, and the World Bank (1946–1955),” Hispanic American Historical Review 92, no. 4 (2012): 637–668. The article was originally written in Spanish and was translated into English by Thomas Holloway. I am grateful to Hispanic American Historical Review for enabling me to republish parts of the article within the framework of this book. It Takes Three to Tango 33 The thus far unknown “Peronist chapter” of the relations among Argentina, the IMF, and the World Bank provides an opportunity to reconsider a crucial historical period in which potentially contradictory processes were at work.2 One was the formation of a new multilateral order under U.S. hegemony. The other was the emergence of nationalist, populist, and reformist currents in Latin America.3 Specifically, the analysis of the Perón–Bretton Woods relationship offers an alternative vantage point for reconsidering different models of inclusion in and exclusion from the new world order. This case also lets us explore the impact of postwar multilateralism not only on those nations that joined the new order, but also those that, like Argentina, remained on the margins. With respect to Latin America, remaining formally on the margins appears not to have freed countries from the need to adopt the policies driven by the Bretton Woods institutions—policies that were at odds with the growing economic nationalism, protectionism, and interventionism in the region. Thus, while the literature argues that the IMF used conditional loans to exercise its influence on member countries, an analysis of the negotiations conducted during the Peronist decade shows that, from its formative years, the IMF promoted reforms even in the economic policies of countries that had not yet become members. Close examination of the wide range of interactions that took place between Argentina and the Bretton Woods institutions in 1946–1956 reveals important aspects of the challenges with which Latin American nations had to deal while entering the new multilateral system. At the same time, it offers privileged lenses through which to look at the inner workings of the IMF and World Bank as their managers turned their eyes for the first time toward non-European member states. Specifically, the meetings between IMF delegates and local officials in Latin America and at the IMF’s headquarters, the need to furnish the IMF with accurate financial data, the debates among several IMF departments, and the demands by Latin American nations to be given more voting power in both institutions all contribute to a better understanding of the design and establishment of the monitoring mechanisms that later became part and parcel of the borrowers’ dependency on the IMF. First, it should be clarified that in public rhetoric, the first Peronist government did not refer to the IMF and World Bank, perhaps to avoid putting the negotiations with the Bretton Woods institutions in jeopardy. The earliest...

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