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CHAPTER 7 The Emergence of Israel The Palestine Question Before the United Nations On 18 February 1947, Ernest Bevin officially informed the House ofCommons of the British cabinet's decision to refer the Palestine question to the United Nations. This decision ushered in the final phase of the struggle for Palestine, fifteen months of dramatic political, diplomatic, and military developments that culminated in the establishment ofthe State ofIsrael in May 1948. For the Council, it was a time of unusually frantic activities, a frenzy signifying the last leg of its desperate campaign to prevent the creation ofa Jewish state. 1 Immediately after learning about the shift in Britain'spolicy, the Council began to plot its own new strategy. As early as 21 February, Berger urged the ACJ to prepare its case against the Jewish Agency and submit it to the proper UN authorities. In its presentation to the United Nations, the ACJ would have to explain that the Jewish Agency could speak only for Zionists and should be known as a "Zionist Agency."Z At the same time, George Levison rushed to Washington, D.C., to learn more about State Department thinking on the Palestine question. He stayed there from 20 to 24 February and discussed the Palestine situation with Dean Acheson, Loy Henderson, Kermit Roosevelt, and William Eddy. They not only expressed respect for the Council's work but also gave him the impression that constructive suggestions from the ACJ would receive sympathetic consideration. From this visit, Levison also learned about the general feeling in the State Department that the British were "through" in the Middle East. The real question was whether the United States or Russia would take control over the region. He was told that the American government would attempt to persuade Britain to stay in Palestine as a UN instrument, but it did not seem likely the British would accept such a task. As far as the "Jewish National Home" was concerned, it was a "fait accompli, which must be preserved, and which the Arabs must Copyrighted Material 159 The Emergence of Israel accept." But the State Department felt pessimistic about the passage of emergency DP legislation, despite its intention to fight for that cause, because ofpopular opposition within the United States to the relaxation of immigration laws. 3 Rosenwald himself went to Washington on 26 February and met with Loy Henderson. Rosenwald told him that the Council intended to testify before the United Nations at the proper time and would approach the Palestine problem on the basis ofthe AACI's recommendations. Moreover, until that time, he offered to take the heat off the State Department: It would be our duties and functions to try to point out to our Jewish citizens the dangers involved of bringing pressures to bear on our State Department to espouse the creation of a National Jewish State before the United Nations. It would be our duty to try to indicate to Christian citizens that our State Department should be represented at the United Nations strictly in a judicial capacity without any fetters or commitments; that in no other way could we honestly discharge our obligations.4 Throughout March, the ACJ concentrated on organizational and public-relations matters. Rabbi Berger spent most of the month on a recruitment and publicity trip, visiting Council centers in St. Louis, Dallas, Houston, New Orleans, Baton Rouge, Shreveport, Cincinnati, Lexington, Galveston, Evansville, and Dayton. The tour was extensively publicized. Local newspapers usually carried advance as well as follow-up stories about his activities.5 In March the ACJ also spent considerable time and energy in its sustained effort to inform the American public that the words Jew and Zionist were not synonymous. Letters emphasizing this distinction, signed by Berger, were sent to seventeen hundred newspaper editors and a thousand radio-station directors. 6 On 17 March a letter from Rosenwald, which upset Zionists, appeared in the New Yark Times. Challenging the Zionist publicity campaign with its stress on humanitarianism, Rosenwald asserted that Zionists were, in fact, not primarily interested in the welfare of European Jews but in "contention for political domination" in Palestine. Emanuel Neumann, vice president of the ZOA, angrily dismissed Rosenwald's letter as "a further proof of his anti-Zionist campaign and a renewed attempt to spread a monstrous slander against the Jewish Agency."7 While fighting Zionists, the Council continued to work for the relaxation of American immigration laws. Thus, in March an entire issue of the Copyrighted Material 160 [18...

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