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Conclusion: As French as Everyone Else
- Temple University Press
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CONCLUSION As French as Everyone Else T HIS FIRST STUDY to compare the New French with the French in general directly examined the commonly accepted and more or less implicit notion that “the New French are not as French as everyone else,” and yields four answers. First, our results invalidate this hypothesis. The New French do not seem to confine their nationality to a strictly legal question. Their identification with their compatriots does not depart from that of the French in general. And if the New French are unique in any way, with regard to religion, for example, they are far from being on the margins, or estranged from French society and its principles and values. From this point of view, the majority of these French do not express a communautaire sentiment combining minority identification, rejection of the nation, and special rights claims. From many points of view, their integration into French politics seems at the very least to be comparable to that of the French in general. In sum, these people are truly as French as everyone else, and are not French people in conflict with everyone else! Second, the social and religious particularities of the New French are indisputable; however, they are far from being systematic. These characteristics show the degree of dissimilarity between our two populations . The New French are politically more left-leaning than the rest of the population. The importance given to religion is substantially higher. The predominant religion is Islam, and its norms remain 114 ■ Conclusion very important to those who claim to be Muslim. Anti-Semitic attitudes are also found significantly more frequently among the New French. The outcomes of all these differences, however, are not uniform . Thus, while the New French register to vote less often, they also claim to be neither left nor right less frequently. Also, their attachment to the democratic system seems more pronounced, along with their “feeling that, at their level, they can effect change in their country.” Another example: sexual intolerance is higher in this sample, but authoritarianism is less pronounced, despite a stronger sense of insecurity . These dimensions bring to light disagreement over values, a tension that is also found across French society as a whole and profoundly questions France’s cultural homogeneity. Third, the particularities of the New French do not have a strong effect on their attitudes. Thus, for example, their religiosity does not determine their attitudes toward laïcité. Belonging to the most modest socio-professional classes, where the New French are overrepresented, has less of an effect on their political behavior than it does on the rest of the French population. Ironically, a New French blue-collar worker is, from this point of view, more “French,” while a blue-collar French worker is more of an “unskilled laborer.” Finally, the New French cannot be characterized as a homogeneous group any more than the rest of the French can, contrary to what the very notion of communautarisme presupposes. The disputes over values (racism, authoritarianism, anti-Semitism, sexual intolerance , etc.) that cross French society as a whole do not spare the New French among them. From this point of view, they still seem French like the other French, like everyone else. Their diversity trumps their unity. Our study also brings to light the discrepancy that exists between the spokespeople and the silent majority on a number of issues. True, the study does not capture the communautaire phenomenon in all its fullness, nor does it clarify the rationale behind communautarisme. Nevertheless, it reveals a mismatch between the active minorities and their leaders, seen so frequently in the media, on the one hand, and the New French, on the other hand, in the name of whom the former claim to act. As French as Everyone Else ■ 115 OUR RESEARCH has incidentally shown the predominant place of attitudes toward Islam among the whole of the French when they are confronted with political issues. It seems that the question of integration is, first and foremost, an interrogation about the place of Islam in France. The question of state funding for the Muslim religion not only is understood as the demise of the relationship between laïcité and state neutrality but depends above all on the respondent’s relationship to Islam. This focus on Islam, in the two samples studied, harbors effects that could be negative for French society. Focusing on Islam risks perpetuating the malaise surrounding issues of immigration , integration, and the representation of visible minorities, even though...