Antifoundationalism

Six. Nietzsche and the Problem of Ground

Six Nietzsche and the Problem of Cround WILHELN.l S. WURZER The history of metaphysics has largely been guided by what Leibniz calls "the grand principle" of ground whose concise formula states, "Nihil est sine ratione."Nothing is without reason or ground, without ultimate explanation, without the certitude of dialectic presence. Moreover, the principle of ground signifies a system of concepts, a totality of connected ideas in a unique dialectic terrain that consolidates reason and ground. This peculiar but certain OI\eneSSis first and foremost radically questioned by Friedrich Nietzsche. Indeed, one of the important aims of his philosophy is the undoing of the metaphysical identity of Vernunftand Grund. Thus, his inscription of dlifference in aesthetic configurations marks a significant attempt: at dismantling the principle of sufficient reason. Accordingly, in what follows I first outline Nietzsche's attempts at transforming the principle of sufficient reason set in motion in The Birth of Tragedyand Thus SpokeZarathustra.I then direct my attention to the very process of Nietzsche's subversion of ground as it culminates in the GenealogyofMoralsand in TheTwilightof theIdols, particularly in relation to his observations on the political. In retrospect , I ask whether Nietzsche's withdrawal from ground unveils an antifoundationalist mode of thought or whether it is merely a digression that serves the traditional principle of ground anew. 12 7 128 Reason's Dionysian Site WILHELM S. WURZER Early in his philosophy Nietzsche recognizes that the problem of ground is intimately connected with the question of reason. His aesthetic projection of the primal One (das Ureine)shows that ground and cause have been mistakenly aligned in the history of metaphysics. He claims that one can conceive das Ureineas ground of all things without granting pertinence to the idea of ground as causa, or even as causarationis. In effect, the very idea of cause, at least in its conventional cause-effect connection, becomes problematic in The Birth of Tragedy.Ground as primal One is too dynamic, complex, and conflictual to be the simple, absolute cause of appearances . Initially, therefore, Nietzsche sees the problem of ground not merely as one of separating cause from ground, but, more importantly, as one of reason's withdrawal from ground. Thus, Nietzsche's aesthetic genealogy radically transforms the principle of sufficient reason by dissolving the logo centric identity of reason and ground. The Birth of Tragedybegins this process by granting imagination the Apollonian freedom of standing outside reason's estranged dialectical self-presence. It sets up a new world for reason , a different ground sustained by a Dionysian perspective of suffering. This transformative view of ground seeks to express reason 's tragic spacings in relation to reality rather than to "pure" reason . Nietzsche, therefore, accounts for reason-in-reality, reasonin -nature, reason as Dionysian phenomenon. The idea of ground is reinscribed, but not as pure cause or reason. Ground is now other than reason as "reason." This radical other is the aesthetic phenomenon of reason turning to difference, to imagination, far from the metaphysical region where reason and ground are one and the same. A closer look at the matter of reason in TheBirthof Tragedyshows that reason is aesthetically grounded in the metaphysical abyss of the primal One, das Ureine, the absolute imaginal space of pain and contradiction. Torn between the Apollonian desire to be free from primordiality and the ironic Dionysian impulse expressive of the primal One, reason, in a new face that Nietzsche calls "a discursive image" (eine Bilderredey,'reveals the aesthetic tensions of the beautiful and the sublime. This "discursive image" marks a dissemination of ground whose perspective of imaginal identity Nietzscheand the Problemof Ground 12 9 signifies an aesthetic, albeit metaphysical, opening for difference. The difference of ground and reason becomes particularly operative in the Apollonian-Dionysian interplay of image and power. In turn, reason's 13ilderrede is more than a discourse on the image of the Apollonian-Dionysian constellation; it is a discourse on primal desire conceived as reason desiring to exceed the appearances of the primal One. On this view, a tragic showing begins to challenge the Socratic dialectic seductively aligned with morality. Reason is seen as das Ureineextending its pow'er over a terrain of thought that exceeds the moral and political bOllndaries of Socrates' search for truth. This tragic movement of reason about the center of an aesthetic ground points to a Dionysian revolution of reason, a disclosive art of thinking beyond the haunting terrain of consciousness. Still, consciousness plays a role in this drama of reason...