Antifoundationalism

INTRODUCTION

Introduction TOM ROC}(MORE My task here is to introduce a collection of original essays, arranged in historical order, concerning various issues of foundationalism and antifoundationalism throughout the philosophical tradition. An introduction should seek to present the book to follow , to lead into it, to induce the reader to follow along in the book; it should not seek to take the place of the book, by anticipating the arguments to follow. For that reason, rather than providing another essay on foundationalism and antifoundationalism, I limit myself here to preliminary remarks intended to characterize these alternatives, to show why they are problematic, and to justify the historical approach taken in the essays. It will be useful to comment on four points: First, we must indicate why, at this late date, one should continue to think about antifoundationalism: why the issues surrounding this concept require still further attention; in a word, why this is not a case of driving still another nail into the foundationalist coffin. If everyone , or nearly everyone, has switched to antifoundationalism, if most of the recalcitrants have now been converted to this new religion , is there still something that needs to be said? Second, it needs to be shown why this volume takes a resolutely historical perspective ; why it does not simply restrict itself, as is so often the case in modern philosophy, to a discussion of the latest views, on the assumption that it is finally only in recent thought, in the latest views to emerge, that philosophy has achieved a sound footing. To put this point in even sharper form: If foundationalism is a view that some writers have defended because they were uncritical, now that we are critical, now that we have reached the present stage, is there any need to examine earlier mistakes? Why cannot we just 1 2 INTRODUCTION start over again in blissful ignorance of the history of philosophy, content in our conviction that philosophy in any significant sense is independent of its history? Third, we must ask whether all the critiques of foundationalism address the same issue or complex of issues. As becomes apparent from the various essays, behind the width of views concerning antifoundationalism there lurks an even wider understanding of the nature of the genus, a remarkable disparity of the sense and reference of the basic terms, in short, the familiar diversity of opinion that has been characteristic of philosophy throughout its long tradition. Accordingly, we can at best provide only a general indication of how these terms are to be understood, as each contributor redefines them in the course of his or her contribution to the volume. I Among the many reasons that could be cited in support of this anthology on antifoundationalism, two are particularly important. On the one hand, this term is in the air, it is part of the current philosophical discussion; but it is unclear what it means and there is a danger that the inquiry is moving faster than the comprehension of the topic. The chaotic state of the discussion is indicated by the burgeoning literature about it, which seems to be developing exceedingly rapidly in comparison with the philosophical tradition, where discussions often continue for centuries. In just the recent literature antifoundationalism at one time or another has been associated with an almost bewildering assortment of current trends, including, in no particular order, incommensurability, hermeneutics, objectivism, relativism, postmodernism, forms of literary theory, deconstruction, and so on, and with writers such as G. W. F. Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Marx, Martin Heidegger , Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault, W. V. O. Quine, Richard Rorty, and [ean-Francois Lyotard. The wide, but not always careful, reference to antifoundationalism suggests that possible confusions lurk behind facile allusions . A single example will suffice for present purposes. In a recent volume on the relation of antifoundationalism and practical reasoning from the perspectives of hermeneutics and analysis , antifoundationalism is described as a "slogan" popularized Introduction 3 by Rorty "for a complex of ideas previously lacking resonant expression ." 1 Although this description reflects the current state of the rapidly moving debate on antifoundationalism, on reflection it seems highly questionable on at least four grounds. First, it is not the case that Rorty initially coined the term "antifoundationalism ," as might be inferred. In fact, even his use of the term is uncharacteristic, as he is concerned almost exclusively in his work with the supposed failure of the analytic approach to epistemology , which he mistakenly equates with theory of...