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41 2 Aristotle’s Understanding of Wisdom and Wisdom’s Pursuit On Distinguishing Sophia and Phronesis Aristotle begins his discussion of wisdom or sophia in the Nichomachean Ethics by distinguishing between what he sees as the two basic ways in which this word is used. On the one hand, the term sophia is employed to denote “those men who are the most perfect masters of their art,” such as master craftsmen; today, we would refer to such people as “experts” in their respective fields. On the other hand, Aristotle points out that we also think of some people as “wise in general” (sophous holos), and not in any one department of knowledge. Such people, we say, must be possessed of “the most perfect sort of knowledge.” The wise man (sophos) therefore must have knowledge not only of the conclusions that follow from “first principles” (tas archas); he must also know “the truth” (aletheuein) about these archai them‑ selves. Hence, wisdom is not simply what we might call scientific knowledge of the principles that form the basis for activities and inquiry in the various studies and arts in which human beings might engage. It is not good enough simply to have a knowledge of these archai and how to apply them; to be wise, one must know what relation these archai bear to “the truth” (aletheia); that is, one must know how the various archai are themselves related to the one divine beginning or arche, here referred to by Aristotle as Mind, Intellect, or nous. This is why he calls sophia a combination of nous and “knowledge of the most exalted objects”: inasmuch as one “takes up” (anairesis) the most exalted objects of knowing toward their truly first principle in the divine, one shares, to the extent possible for a mortal being, in the immortal nous through one’s own noetic activity, for the human nous—our share in what is immortal—is only a reflection of the divine nous. Having offered an overarching explanation of the nature of sophia, Aristotle next designs to distinguish it from “practical wisdom,” “prudence,” or phronesis—a quality here also identified with “political science” or ten politiken.1 Unlike sophia, phronesis does not concern the “most serious thing” (spoudaiotaten), since human affairs are certainly not the highest thing in the cosmos. In fact, Aristotle points 42 The Pursuit of Wisdom and Happiness in Education out that phronesis need not even be construed as a distinctly human excellence or virtue (arete); rather, it is a kind of knowing of what is good that human beings share with all complex sentient beings; just as a prudent human being knows and is able to act in a good way, so too do animals share in phronesis inasmuch as they display a capacity for “forethought” (pronoetiken) as regards their own lives. In this respect, phronesis is depicted as quite a low and common thing, and very different from sophia. On Accusations against Sophia After distinguishing the exalted nature of sophia from the lowliness of prudence, Aristotle next turns to deal with a common criticism directed at sophia and those who pursue it to the furthest extent: namely, philosophers. Because sophia is culti‑ vated when those seeking it “take up” (anairesis) each thing toward its beginning, which is beyond the multitude of things as well as the archai of the arts and sci‑ ences of these things, those seeking out wisdom necessarily engage in a practice that “disengages” them from, or rather, causes them to look “disinterestedly” past or through the many and finite things and affairs of the world, and instead to cast their gaze toward the source of these things and pursuits. Philosophers, or anyone who seeks after wisdom, therefore look as though they are oblivious to the world around them. The ridiculous appearance of philosophers is often the butt of jokes and lodged as a criticism against them: Thales falling into a well because he was too engrossed in contemplating the heavens, or the philosopher being lampooned as a “stargazer” on a ship of fools in Plato’s Republic are only two noteworthy examples. Because philosophers—due to the strength of the spiritedness (thymos) with which they pursue wisdom—show such disinterest in the worldly things of practical men, Aristotle remarks that they are accounted “wise but not prudent,” and that this is why they are accused of “ignorance” (agnoia) concerning their own “private” (idiotes) affairs. Moreover, this perceived ignorance of worldly affairs affects the way that...

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