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151 8 The Problem of Introducing Schole into Schools Today One need not be a philosopher, of course, to recognize the hollowness of strict pragmatism and the self‑concerned demand that all things contribute to and be useful for our own successes. Thankfully, much of what we do and a good deal of what we enjoy about our lives—our true friendships, our love for our intimates, and our pleasure in music, to name just a few examples—has little or nothing to do with utility. Following Aristotle, James Schall points out that “we are ‘rational’ beings,” and that our rational nature transcends calculative reasoning; that is, by nature we seek to know the truth, and “we do not want to know this truth about ourselves for any particularly utilitarian purpose, for what we might ‘do’ with it,” though certainly there is nothing wrong with knowing how things work, or with “doing” things. Schall cites Pieper in this regard, writing, “We would be desolate if we had to live in a world containing only things which we could dispose of and use, but nothing which we could simply enjoy, without thought of any utilitarian end.”1 Indeed, beauty, as such, is not useful; yet, without it, Schall writes, “we would not be who we are.” “What is best in us,” writes Schall, “is ‘useless.’ ” Among those activities without utility, yet which nonetheless make us “who we are,” Schall lists play, prayer, philosophy, and contemplation (theoria). In his view, it is important that we experience the highest pleasures as they are associated with appreciation of the highest forms of beauty, since, if we do not experience them, “it is quite likely that we will lapse into what are called lower ones, that is, into activities that are disordered, separating their purpose from the pleasure connected with them.”2 The pleasures of theoria or contemplation are therefore integral to our correct assess‑ ment and enjoyment of all other pleasures, since “if we do not experience this pleasure, we really have no idea of that to which we are directed in our being as the ‘rational animal.’ ”3 Drawing Schall’s insights into the orbit of this book, how much more important is it, then, that children in a democratic public education system be exposed often and with great reverence to the pleasures associated with the seeing (theoria) of higher things in order that they not simply follow the lower 152 The Pursuit of Wisdom and Happiness in Education desires with which they have become all too familiarized in the “democratized” classroom where each child pursues whatever it is that is of interest to him and his peers? Whatever is of interest to children—not having been exposed to these higher things—might indeed be pleasures in very low things that are taken as though they were worthy of far greater esteem and significance. The seeing (theoria) of higher things as a way to educate children also about the lower things is therefore very important in education; moreover, theoria is not an activity beyond the scope of children inasmuch as it may be characterized as a form of play, for like the child’s play, it too is engaged in for the sheer delight of the activity itself. All children love to play, and as Schall points out, “to play is to contemplate [theorein].” During our review of ancient literature on the pursuit of wisdom, we argued in favor of likening philosophy to a kind of play (paidia) or game. Schall makes a similar case for understanding philosophy as a form of play that invites us to take pleasure in the highest things for themselves rather than for any extrinsic purpose. Just as games require a physical and temporal space to exist (e.g., a time limit, a game board, or a playing field), so too does philosophy require a kind of prescribed space for its transpiration; this space we described as a “wisdom atmosphere,” and we identified that atmosphere with a certain kind of friendship (philia) in the practice of leisure, schole, or otium. I suggest here that, in order to give philosophy or “the pursuit of wisdom” effect in a school setting, this space must not be conceived solely in metaphoric terms; that is, it is not just a spiritual space—although that is indeed its most important quality; rather, in order for it to run its course like other games, it must also be delineated both spatially and temporally. Why...

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