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Chapter 8: Diplomacy Reconsidered
- State University of New York Press
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69 8 Diplomacy Reconsidered At the end of nineteenth century, the decline of diplomacy appeared as a theme that was ultimately never to leave the political discourse. Its persistence attests to diplomacy’s ability, as an institution and an idea, to withstand the onslaught. Diplomacy has had many counselors of despair in modern times. They have presented its dysfunctions, the causes of its obsoleteness, and the case for its utter transformation. Disenchantment with diplomacy was one of the by-products of the Enlightenment . Revolutionaries of many kinds, whether genuine or false, demonstrated their contempt for diplomacy, among them French revolutionaries , Bolsheviks, liberal internationalists, and totalitarians of the extreme right. Another claim was that diplomacy had declined because mankind had abandoned God for materialism and secular humanism, opening the gates for a new barbarism. Diplomacy, it seems, was caught unarmed between the prophesies of a new dawn and the coming of the end of the world.1 The unsubstantiated accusations against the “old diplomacy,” the ramifications of the policy of appeasement, and the secondary role allotted to diplomats during the Cold War era were all harmful to diplomacy ’s reputation. No less degrading was diplomacy’s standing within international theory. Theorists are vociferous about its intellectual paucity , though they are unable to offer a meaningful analysis of its place in international politics. Theoretical models that had been refined into irrelevance, readily rejected diplomacy.2 An unfounded sense of intellectual inferiority is driving scholars to invent a new diplomatic theory. Diplomatic tradition and the majority 70 The Courtiers of Civilization of the literature in this regard, are considered to be a theory in a “narrow sense.” Diplomacy is rich in its historical perspectives, practices, and sociological associations; it is futile and mistaken to abandon diplomatic tradition, only to be immersed in conceptual obscurity. The attempt to integrate diplomatic study with various theoretical approaches will inevitably lead to a new cul-de-sac. On the state of diplomacy one may concur with Lloyd George’s perceptive remark: “It is a mistake to assume that the best are devoid of the worst and that the worst possess no trace of the best.”3 Diplomacy is not an autonomous phenomenon, and its decline or rise is due to neither its intrinsic nature nor its practice. It is, rather, dependent on the structure of the world order, the prevailing international norms, and the quality of governance by the great powers. The euphoric days of 1989 and the “new world order” have passed, and to date the beginning of the twenty-first century is proving to be extremely unexpected. The collapse of international order, uncontrolled economic cycles, and the shift in the balance of power are beyond the diplomat ’s reach. His continuous presence and counsel may add stability and insight, when the complexity of international affairs is on the rise. The increase in challenges confronting diplomats has accelerated since the First World War. The “new diplomacy” that was ushered in by the United States and Soviet Russia was shrouded in ambiguity and moral dualism from its very inception. A benevolent interpretation of Wilsonian internationalism is that it represented a return to the tradition of the Founding Fathers. In fact, the fourteen points contained nothing that contradicted the national interest of the United States. The Bolshevik Revolution exposed their expediency as a counterbalance to Soviet diplomacy before they were imposed on the European great powers.4 Open diplomacy was a path no one truly wanted to follow, other than the propagandist attempt by Leon Trotsky, the first foreign-policy commissar of the Soviet Union. According to the fourteen points, “diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.” This statement was too ambiguous to carry any real substance, but was enough to demoralize and scare veteran diplomats. The “new diplomacy” was “a blind alley for thought,” in the words of Edward Grey. Indeed, “the vagaries of public opinion” exerted less influence on the status of diplomats than the reforms introduced by the foreign services of the great powers, and the growing tendency to centralize the conduct of foreign policy in the highest executive organs. But diplomacy was never the exclusive preserve of diplomats, and summits as well as conferences were neither an innovation nor a change in the essence of diplomacy.5 [54.210.143.119] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 15:25 GMT) Diplomacy Reconsidered 71 The challenges confronting diplomats are historically recurrent but critical nonetheless. Diplomats do not have to be confined to mainly...